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I. INTRODUCTION
As international commerce continues to increase in online volume, so to
will disputes arising out of that online commerce. Since arbitration, over
litigation in a national court, is the preferred method to resolve international
commercial disputes,' online arbitration could be an alternative dispute
resolution norm in the near future. National courts simply might not have the
ability, the capacity, or the authority to effectively resolve the potentially
numerous disputes that could arise.
Arbitration has become a legitimate dispute resolution method virtually
everywhere in the world with varying degrees of scope and application.2 For
* Tiffany Lanier graduated from the University of Miami Law School in 1999. She focused on
Internet studies taught by Professor Michael Froomkin. She has been in private practice since 1999.
1. Camille A. Latumo, InternationalArbitration ofthe Creative: A Look at the World Intellectual
Property Organization's New Arbitration Rules, 9 TRANSNAT'L L. 357, 370 (1996).
2. YAsUmi TANIGucm, Is There a Growing International Arbitration Culture?An Observation
fromAsia, in INTERNATIONAL DISPr RESOLUTION: TOwARDS AN ITrERNATIONAL AmrFRATION CULTURE
33 (International Council for Commercial Arbitration Congress Series No. 8, Albert Jan van den Berg, ed.
1996).
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example, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) has recently
recommended online arbitration to resolve domain name disputes.3 However,
before online arbitration can be readily accepted, it must be determined which
basic rules will govern matters of proper administration, choice of law,
jurisdiction, enforcement, and review.
International arbitration law and national law can provide guidance in
determining the necessary basic rules. The national law of the country where
the arbitration takes place generally provides the rules for conducting the
arbitration. However, because online arbitration has only a virtual presence, a
question arises as to where, or in what country, the online arbitration has taken
place. Typically, the parties will either determine the place via contract, or an
arbitral tribunal will determine the place of an online arbitration.
The topic of this paper is limited to problems arising out of judicial review
of online arbitral awards. Judicial review is an important aspect of all
arbitrations. The losing party of the arbitration invokes judicial review. In an
online arbitration, the country where the arbitration takes place could affect the
judicial review of an arbitral award, because national law determines the scope
of judicial review. Problems arise because different countries follow different
models of judicial review. Sometimes peculiarities can develop when local
rules are applied to international arbitration. The scope of this paper is to
determine whether the national courts of the arbitration situs have the authority
to review the arbitral award, and if that authority is established, the effect the
country's national law might have on the award's review.
11. ONLINE ARBITRATION SITUs: WHY IS IT SO IMPORTANT?
The situs of the arbitration is the locale where the arbitration has taken
place, or its legal seat.' The importance of the place of the arbitration can not
be overestimated. The role of the arbitral situs is vital in supporting
international commercial arbitration.' Parties will likely agree to an arbitral
situs in the arbitration clause of the relevant commerce contract. However, if
the parties fail to agree to the arbitration situs, then the arbitral tribunal may fix
the location." The arbitration situs determines the mandatory procedural rules
that will have to be adhered to while conducting the arbitration.' The place of
3. See WORLD INTuEcALPROPERTYORGANIZATION, FINALREPORTPUB. No. 92-805-0779-6
(forthcoming Apr. 1999), available at http:J/www.wipo.wipo2.int [hereinafter WIPO FINAL REPORT].
4. YvEs DERAiNS & ERIC A. ScHwARTL, A GUIDE TOTHE NEW ICC RULES OF ARBrTRATION 201
(1998).
5. W. MICHAEL RE1SMAN ET AL., NERNATiONAL COMMERCIAL ARBrITATION 156 (1997).
6. DERAiNS & SCHfWARTZ, supra note 4, at 200.
7. REISMAM, supra note 5, at 156.
the arbitration may literally determine the outcome of the case.' The laws of
the arbitration situs will also determine the likelihood and extent of the national
court's involvement in conducting the arbitration through judicial assistance
and/or judicial interference. If the country's national law deems the place of
the award to be the place where the award was signed, then the arbitration situs
may or may not be determined as the place of the award. Overlooking these
considerations when determining the arbitration situs could be critical.
III. GOVERNING ONLINE ARBITRATION: WHO WILL BE RESPONSIBLE?
Two general theories exist regarding regulating commerce on the Internet.
One theory suggests that since laws that govern international commerce already
exists, those laws should be applied to online commerce, thereby treating the
Internet merely as a new mediumn. A second theory suggests that basic
regulations should be developed to deal with the particularities and uniqueness
of the Internet.
The most optimal solution may evolve by combining existing international
law while drafting flexible new laws to supplement, adapt, or clarify the
existing laws. This combination may produce the least-restrictive regulation
necessary while providing parties with some certainty as to rules, procedures,
and possible outcomes. Perhaps a similar combination can be applied to create
some certainty as to which laws to apply to online arbitration. The adversarial
participation in the arbitration process is more meaningful when the decision-
maker is bound by a set of procedural rules.9
International law can be used to help resolve online commerce conflicts.
International law binds all nations and arises through tradition, practice, and
treaty.' Two subsets of international law are public and private international
law." Public international law addresses issues of state recognition, treatises,
and war.'2 Private international law is concerned exclusively with private
disputes among individuals and/or corporations. Private international law is
also referred to as conflicts of law.' 3 When the law of more than one
jurisdiction can apply, conflicts rules determine whether a court should apply
the laws of its own jurisdiction or the law of another jurisdiction."
8. London was selected as the arbitration situs in the arbitration clause in an ICC arbitration
between Finish and Australian corporations. Because of the situs, the arbitrator applied the United Kingdom
Statute of Limitations Act that effectively barred the claim.
9. TANIGUCm, supra note 2, at 33.
10. MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTIONTO INTERNAIONAL L.AW 48 (3d ed. 1999).
11. Id.
12. ANDREAS F. LOWENFEW, CONFuCT OF LAWS 853-54 (1986).
13. JAN1M, supra note 10, at 234-35.
14. Lionel S. Sobel, The Framework of International Copyright, 8 CARDOzo ARTS & ENT. L J. 1
(1989).
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Both substantive and procedural laws also regulate arbitration. Often, the
arbitral tribunal has the power to determine which substantive and procedural
laws to apply."5 Substantive law governs a contractual arbitration agreement
between parties. The substantive law determines the validity, scope, and effect
of the arbitration clause.16 It is widely believed that an arbitrator must apply the
rules of substantive law rather than decide a case by his sense ofjustice, unless
the parties otherwise agree.
7
Typically, parties agree on which procedural law will apply in the
arbitration agreement. Procedural law governs arbitral procedures such as the
appointment and challenge of arbitrators, pleadings, discovery, hearings, and
the form of the final award.'" If the parties contractually agree to an arbitration
location, then the parties' choice will be upheld. The choice of law is
imperative when the contract does not specify what to do in a particular
situation. The parties are also likely to agree, or they may only have one
choice, as to which arbitral tribunal they will be submitted. One arbitral
tribunal may be more suitable for a particular online transaction than another.
There are currently six arbitral tribunals to which an arbitration can submit:
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), American Arbitration Association
(AAA), LCIA Arbitration International (LCIA), International Center for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), Stockholm Chamber of Commerce
(SCC), and the United Nations Conference on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL). For example, Article 14(2) of the ICC Rules of Arbitration
provides that the Arbitral Tribunal may, after consultation with the parties,
conduct the hearings and meetings in any location it considers appropriate
unless otherwise agreed to by the parties. 9 Once the parties have either agreed
to the situs in their arbitration clause, or the arbitral tribunal has chosen the
situs with the parties' consent, the diverse physical locations of all the parties
involved should not matter.
IV. TRADmTONAL ARBITRATION VS. ONLINE ARBITRATION
The following examples show a significant difference between traditional
notions of arbitration and at least one emerging online arbitration approach.
Traditional arbitration procedure provides the model for WIPO's proposed
15. Tricia A. Hoefling, Note & Comment, The (Draft) WIPO Arbitration RulesforAdministrative
Challenge Panel Procedures Concerning Internet Domain Names, 8 AM REV. INT'LARB. 173, 178 (1997).
16. RONALD BERNSTEIN ET AL., HANDBOOK OF ARBrMRATION PRACTnCE (Derek Wood ed., 3d. ed.
1998).
17. TANIGUCHI, supra note 2, at 32.
18. Frank A. Cona, Focus on Cyberlaw: Application of Online Systems in Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 45 BUFF. L REV. 975 (1997).
19. DERAwiS & SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, at 205.
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online arbitration. However, certain unique features of WIPO's online
procedure may cause it to not be considered an arbitration for purposes of
review.
WIPO defines this online procedure as an administrative procedure. It is
questionable whether the administrative procedure will qualify as an arbitration
for review purposes, because WIPO recommends that the parties retain the right
to initiate litigation in a national court even after the arbitrator renders a
decision. WIPO further suggests that a party who disagrees with an arbitrator's
determination is free to seek review from a national court. Therefore, the
arbitrator's determination will not be binding precedent under national judicial
systems.2 Assuming competent jurisdiction, a national court's decision that is
contrary to an arbitrator's determination will override the arbitral
determination.2
However, most countries' statutory arbitration rules will uphold an
arbitrator's determination as binding, which is not subject to review except for
a finding of fraud or arbitrator misconduct. For instance, the United States
Federal Arbitration Act limits a court's review to four instances; 1) if an award
was procured by fraudulent means; 2) if there is evidence of corruption among
the arbitrators; 3) if there is any misconduct by the arbitrators; or 4) if the
arbitrators have exceeded their powers.22 A party's dissatisfaction with the
outcome does not trigger any of the four factors specified in the United States
statutory arbitration law.
Another reason the WIPO procedure may not be considered arbitration for
purposes of review is because, typically, submitting to arbitration is a voluntary
choice. WIPO's proposal requires a domain name applicant to automatically
submit to the online tribunal's jurisdiction when they accept the terms of their
registration agreement.23 However, the submission will not preclude a
complainant from filing a claim in a relevant national court.' The registration
agreement also requires the applicant to submit to the online procedure if a third
party feels his intellectual property rights have been infringed. The validity and
enforceability of such a mandatory procedure may be questioned in certain
jurisdictions because courts view adhesive contracts suspiciously.' The
mandatory nature of the submission also raises questions particularly for
purposes of consumer protection laws, due process considerations, and the fact
20. WIPO FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, 196(ii).
21. Id. I 196(v).
22. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000).
23. WIPO FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, 110.
24. Id. 196.
25. An adhesion contract is a standardized contract offered exclusively on a "take it or leave it"
basis without giving the consumer the opportunity to bargain. See e.g., Carnival Cruise lines Inc. v. Shute,
499 U.S. 585, 592-93 (1991).
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that submission purports to create rights for a third party who is not even privy
to the registration agreement.
V. CYBER-ARBITRATION LOCATION
Typical parties involved in an online arbitration may include the
complainant, the defendant, up to three arbitrators, and the arbitral institution.
Online arbitration could address the possibility that all the parties could be
located in six or more geographical locations. Up to six national courts could
have relevant jurisdiction for purposes of review.
The Lex Loci Server theory would suggest that the place of the arbitration
can be determined by the geographical location of the computer server through
which the arbitration is taking place.26 If the parties previously stipulated to the
place of the arbitration, then the situs will generally be fixed as the parties'
wish. However, if the parties did not agree to the arbitration location, then the
arbitral tribunal can fix the situs to wherever it deems appropriate.27
VI. ARBITRATION POLICY PERSPECTIVES
The role of the arbitral seat can be seen from two different policy
perspectives. Essentially both policy perspectives pose the question to the
extent that arbitral awards should be subject to the jurisdiction of judges of the
arbitration's situs. First, it is necessary to consider the country's policies where
the arbitral award is rendered. The arbitral situs' perspective is relevant
regarding grounds for review.' The national courts of the arbitral seat must
first be concerned with whether it has the power to review the award. A
determination then must be made as to whether the situs court has the power to
correct errors of law on the merits of the dispute, or if the court should limit
itself to a due process review. For instance, in Hiscox v. Outhwaite, the House
of Lords determined that the place of the award is where the award was
signed. 9 Although the entire proceedings in that case were conducted in
London, the place of the award was determined to be Paris, the location where
the award was signed.
Next, it is necessary to consider the policies of the country asked to
enforce the award. If an award is annulled where it was rendered, then the
enforcement forum will be concerned if, and under what circumstances, the
26. Chandru GaneshArbitration asa Dispute Resolution Mechanismfor the Domain Name System
(1999) (paper presented at World Intellectual Property Organization's Regional Consultation on the Internet
Domain Name Process held at Singapore on Jan. 22, 1999).
27. Id. (discussing the ICC Rules of Arbitration, art. 14(3) of 1984).
28. REISMAN, supra note 5. at 1098.
29. Hiscox v. Outhwaite, [19911 2W.LR. 1321 (C.A.).
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award will be enforceable in a different country where the losing party owns
assets." An enforcement forum may always impose its own standards for
review as long as those standards are consistent with treaty obligations. It is
less clear, however, whether the enforcement forum should always, or ever,
recognize an arbitral award annulment by the courts of the arbitration's situs.
VII. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ARBITRAL AWARDS
Typically, judicial review of awards falls into one of two categories.31 One
model is a full review on the merits, which seeks to maximize the legal
certainty concerning the merits of the dispute. The second model is a limited
review for conformity to basic procedural fairness, including arbitrator fraud
and abuse of authority. The limited review for procedural fairness is an attempt
to insure an arbitration's integrity, while minimizing judicial meddling with the
substantive results. 32 Keeping judicial review within acceptable limits is not an
easy practice. There is no bright line test distinguishing between the arbitrator
who exceeds his authority and one who merely makes a mistake and renders a
bad award. In some cases, the arbitrator may even be justified in disregarding
the parties' choice of law in favor of the mandatory norms of the arbitral situs.
33
However, from the winning party's perspective, review only adds delay and
expense. It also compromises the privacy that the parties expected from the
arbitration. However, some measure of court review on the award's merits is
necessary out of respect for the losing party's interests.
Belgium's new philosophy of non-review reflects a third model of judicial
review. Non-review is an extremely limited model and has been scrutinized by
some scholars as a legal fiction because it is hard to qualify as a review policy.
Under Belgian law, when both parties to the arbitration are non-Belgian,
annulment of an arbitral award by the Belgian courts is excluded all together.'
This amendment was first introduced into the Belgian Senate in 198 1.
3
Belgium is an important center for international arbitration because of its ideal
location and the multiple language skills of its nationals. By excluding
annulment of arbitral decisions "with which Belgium has nothing to do," the
attractiveness of Belgium as a place of arbitration is enhanced. Parties are not
even allowed to agree that Belgian courts have jurisdiction to annul arbitrations
in Belgium. The arbitral situs will not set aside an award for any reason,
30. RJSMAN, supra note 5, at 1101.
31. Id. at 1100.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1103.
34. Id. at I100.
35. H. Van Houtte, La Loi Belge du 27 mars 1985 sur l'Arbitrage International, 595 REVUE DE
L'ARBnIRAGE 29 (1986).
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including fraud by an arbitrator, or an abuse of his authority.36 In effect, the
amendment concentrates judicial control over the international arbitration
process on the enforcement court.37
VIII. DELOCALIZATION
Delocalizing international arbitration is a recent trend that decreases the
role of the national court at the place of the arbitration while increasing the role
of the losing party's national courts.38 Delocalization tends to promote the
parties' wishes without necessarily violating the vital interest of the arbitration
situs. However, following the trend of delocalized arbitration too far can also
pose problems. The judge at the arbitral seat should possess a clearly defined
power to correct fraud, arbitrator excess of authority, and infringement of due
process. If not, the losing party may have to defend an unfair award anywhere
in the world where he owns assets.39 A legal system that supports this model
supports arbitration within its borders without providing the minimum
safeguards of basic justice. An entity that never signed the arbitration
agreement will not have the chance to litigate the arbitrator's jurisdiction when
the award is rendered. In addition, there would not be an opportunity to review
choice of law or arbitral errors.
Imagine if the parties agreed on English law to govern the contract and
UNCITRAL rules to govern the arbitral procedure. The arbitrator could apply
French law and AAA rules without the losing party challenging these defects
until after the award is later presented for enforcement.'
When the losing claimant is victim to procedural irregularities, the results
of arbitral autonomy are dramatically unfair. If the courts where the award is
rendered denies the losing claimant the opportunity to set the award aside, then
the losing claimant has no enforcement forum in which to test the defective
award. This is simple because there is nothing to enforce."' The goals of
arbitration, such as speed and finality, are misguided if it is at the expense of
the losing party's expected procedural fairness.
Award annulment is the legal principle when a court in the originating
country deems that although a document purports to be an arbitral award under
the country's arbitration laws, the arbitral award has no legal force. The party
36. REISMAN, supra note 5, at 1100.
37. ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG, Annulment of Awards in International Arbitration, in
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION INTHE21STCENTURY: TOWARDS "JUDICIALIZATION" AND UNIFoRMITY? 142
(Richard B. Lillich & Charles N. Brower eds., 1994).
38. REISMAN, supra note 5, at l100.
39. Id. at 1101.
40. Id. at 1100.
41. Id. at 1102.
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who has lost the arbitration institutes annulment. In most countries, attempts
to have international arbitral awards set aside have not been successful. Almost
all national arbitration laws provide for annulment of awards in one way or
another.42 While some countries provide a single action for the annulment of
awards, other countries have more complex procedural frameworks.
Annulment in these countries is provided through arbitration law and case law.
There are some countries that will allow an arbitral award to be annulled
on different grounds. The grounds can be divided broadly into the following
categories. First, an award can be annulled for lack of a valid arbitration
agreement.' 3 Second, an award can be annulled for violating due process
principles." Third, an award can be annulled if an arbitrator is found to have
violated his scope of authority.45 Fourth, annulment may occur if the rules for
appointing arbitrators or governing the arbitral proceedings are not followed."
Fifth, a lack of signatures could create a formal invalidity of an award.47
Finally, an award can be annulled for a violation of public policy that does not
favor arbitration.4"
In a majority of countries, it is a basic principle that a court cannot review
the merits of an arbitral award. WIPO's proposed online arbitration procedure
provides that arbitrators' awards can be re-litigated in a court of competent
jurisdiction. 9 WIPO's Final Report has recommended that the registrant-
applicant submit to the court's jurisdiction in the country of the applicant's
domicile and the country of the registrar without prejudice to other potentially
applicable jurisdictions."
IX. JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is the power of a court to exercise control over subject matter
and parties.5' Generally, the court that has the jurisdiction to review an award
is the court in the country of the awards' origin. In other words, it is the court
in the country under whose arbitration law the arbitration was conducted and
award made.52 In a vast majority of cases, it is the country of the arbitration
situs. An action seeking annulment has a cross-border effect. However, this
42. JAN VAN DEN BERG, supra note 37, at 133-135.
43. Id. at 135.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id
47. JAN VAN DEN BERG, supra note 37, at 135.
48. Id.
49. W1PO FINAL REPORT, supra note 3,[ 1143.
50. Id. 147.
51. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 766 (5th ed. 1979).
52. JAN VAN DEN BERG, supra note 37, at 136.
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may need to be reassessed in view of recent developments in legislation and
case law in Belgium, France, Sweden and Switzerland, where annulment is no
longer sacrosanct.5" In the originating country, an action for an award rendered
via international arbitration is excluded by law in Belgium, and may be
excluded by agreement in Switzerland and Sweden.
X. Swiss ANALYSIS
In 1969, the Swiss Federal Government approved an intercantonal
agreement unifying the laws on arbitration known as the Concordat. The Swiss
government introduced a specific federal act for international arbitration. The
parties to an international arbitration in Switzerland may exclude the possibility
of annulment by agreement before the Swiss courts.
The agreement is subject to two conditions. First, none of the parties may
have their domicile, habitual residence, or business establishment in
Switzerland. Second, the exclusion must result from an express statement in
the arbitration agreement, or in a subsequent written agreement.' It is now
believed that excluding annulment will have a limited use because parties are
more concerned with certainty, versus speed and economy, at least where
significant interests are at stake.55 In the Swiss International Arbitration Act,
the highest Swiss court, the Tribunal Federal, is the sole competent authority
for entertaining actions of annulment of arbitral awards rendered in
international arbitrations taking place in Switzerland. If it is the losing party's
intention to try and delay his award obligation, the availability of only one
instance of recourse may make the losing party think twice about delay. It also
appears that Sweden will allow exclusion by agreement of annulment of an
arbitral award rendered in an international arbitration held in Sweden. The
Swedish Supreme Court decided that if the parties have no contact with
Sweden, and reside in different countries, then the parties must agree, prior to
any arising dispute, to limit their right to challenge the award in a Swedish
court on the account of formal deficiencies.56
Would an award annulled in the court of origin be given effect by a foreign
court before which enforcement of the award was sought? This consideration
53. ld. at 133.
54. This formal requirement means that an indirect exclusion, such as an exclusion set forth in
arbitration rules, lacks sufficiency. See Marc Blessing, The New International Arbitration Law in
Switzerland, 5 J. INT'L ARB. 9, 75 (1988); ANDREAS BUCHER & PIERRE-YvE TSCHANZ, INTERNATIONAL
ARBrTRATION IN SWrTzERLAND 145 (1989).
55. Jean-Francois Poudret, Les voles de recours en matiere d'arbitrage international en suisse
selon le concordat et la nouvelle loifederale, REv. ARB. 595,616 (1988).
56. XVI INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBrRATION, YEARBOOK: COMMERCIAL
ARBrRATION (Albert Jan van den Berg ed. 1991), discussing Solen Boneh Int'l Ltd. v. Republic of Uganda
(Sup. CL 1989).
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would only arise under awards not governed by the New York Convention. If
the New York Convention applies, annulment of the award of the court in the
country of origin constitutes a ground for refusal of enforcement pursuant to
Article V(1)(e) of the Convention. 7 However, the New York Convention
enables a party to rely on more favorable domestic law concerning the
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.58 Some countries, such as France, have
domestic law on enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, which appear more
favorable than under the New York Convention rules.
XI. THE FRENCH VIEw
France is one of the few countries to apply two separate statutes for
arbitrations. One statute was enacted in 1980, which applied to domestic
arbitration. The other statute was enacted in 1981, and applied to international
arbitration.59 Title VI of the 1981 Decree relates to the recognition and
enforcement of, and the recourse against arbitral awards that were rendered
abroad or through international arbitration. Contrary to Article V(1)(e), the
French statute does not include a ground for refusal of enforcing an annulment
of an award by a court in a country of origin. Therefore, under French law, an
award which was rendered in international arbitration and which was annulled
abroad under the basis of local law, is not contrary to French arbitration policy.
French courts do not give effect to an annulment by a court in the origin
country because, under the French view of international arbitration, an
arbitration award is not incorporated in the legal order of the country where it
is merely located geographically.' Only French law defines the incorporation
of the arbitral award into the French legal order. The French, who follow a
unilateral approach, are not concerned with the incorporation of an award in a
foreign legal order. This is the case even if the latter is the place where the
award has been made.61
Whether the arbitral award is incorporated into another legal system does
not matter. The rationale is that just because an arbitral award is acceptable to
a French judge, the award should not be refused force and effect just because
a foreign judge has different ideas of acceptability. In France, the notion of an
award's nationality does not exist. There are awards rendered abroad or awards
57. JAN VAN DEN BERG, supra note 37, at 147.
58. Id.
59. See generally Yves Derains & Rosabel E. Goodman-Everard, National Report: France, in 2
IN'ERNATONAL COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBTRAIoN 1 (Peter Sanders & Albert Jan van den Berg eds.,
1998).
60. Berthold Goldman, Une Bataille Judiciarire Autour De La Lex Mercatoria, REV. ARB. 379
n.12 (1983).
61. JAN VAN DEN BERG, supra note 37, at 151.
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rendered in France relating to international matters. There is no such thing as
an English, French, or Italian award.
XII. AWARD ENFORCEMENT
Enforcement is distinguished from annulment. Enforcement of an award
occurs when the prevailing party seeks judicial assistance in forcing the losing
party to honor the award. The situs of the arbitration may have an effect in
judicial proceedings after an arbitration. Judicial enforcement of arbitral
awards must necessarily accommodate two competing policy interests. For
international commercial transaction purposes, the most important interest is
limiting the courts' review of the merits of the dispute and the arbitrators'
decision, thereby giving effect to the parties' choice of arbitration.
The other competing interest is the courts correcting genuine abuses by
arbitrators, and enforcing any relevant mandatory jurisdictional rules. Party
confidence in the enforceability of the arbitral award withoutjudicial review of
the merits is what makes international arbitration such an attractive alternative
to domestic litigation on the first place. Countries that have assumed the last
of the New York Convention view arbitration as the abandonment of the right
to litigation. However, the online arbitration system proposed by WIPO
recommends that a party who submits to arbitration will not give up their access
to court litigation.62
Enforcement of an award can only take place after a court has given
permission to execute the award by public force. Awards are appointed by
private individuals that hire the parties, and not by judges of the State.
However, the procedure and the extent of control exercised by the courts over
awards in enforcement proceedings differ from one country to the next.63 In
most countries, an enforcement made in the country where it is sought consists
of relatively short summary proceedings. Here, control exercised by the courts
over the arbitral award is very limited. The principle international standard for
enforcing arbitral agreements and awards is primarily regulated by the New
York Convention.' The New York Convention provides more exclusive
control on the grounds of refusal for enforcement. If enforcement is refused in
the country of origin, the arbitral award, in theory, is still capable of
enforcement in a foreign country under the New York Convention. The New
York Convention does not list refusal of award enforcement in the origin
country as a ground for refusal. However, in practice, a refusal of enforcement
62. WIPO FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, 1 138-39.
63. Jan van den Berg, supra note 37, at 138.
64. H. Verbist, The Practice of the ICC International Court ofArbitration with Regard to Fixing
the Place of Arbitration, 12 ARE. INT'L 347, 350 (1996).
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in the country of origin may constitute pervasive authority in a foreign country
where enforcement is thought.65
Articles m and IV of the New York Convention set forth the rules
regarding enforceability under the Treaty. Each of the member states agree to
recognize arbitral awards as binding and to enforce them according to the rules
of procedure where the award is relied upon. Article VI imposes a further
limitation on permissible domestic procedures, by prescribing a straightforward
method of obtaining enforcement. The party seeking enforcement need only
supply the requested court with a duly authenticated original award, or certified
copy, along with the original, or a certified copy, of the arbitration agreement
pursuant to which the award was rendered. This rule of minimum formality and
abbreviated procedure is exactly the method that needs to be implemented in
online arbitration procedures. Thus, a similar need of balancing certainty and
flexibility in international arbitration can be applied to online arbitration.
In Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., the United States Supreme Court found
the underlying purpose in American adoption and implementation of the New
York Convention was threefold. The first purpose was encouraging the
recognition of, and enforcement of, commercial arbitration agreements in
international contracts. The second purpose was to unify the standards by
which arbitration agreements are observed. The third purpose was to ensure
that arbitral awards are enforced in the signatory countries.'
Pro-arbitration is a well-established federal policy in favor of enforcing
both arbitral clauses and awards in the international context. However, the
Scherk Court also pointed out that arbitration obviates certain dangers peculiar
to the choice of forum for resolution of international business disputes. These
dangers include a forum's hostility towards one parties' interest, and a forum's
lack of familiarity with the law to be applied or the subject matter of the
agreement.
A few European countries, such as France, the Netherlands, and
Switzerland have, as a matter of public policy, accorded greater enforceability
to foreign awards, as compared to domestic awards.' American case law and
the European statutory law take an increasingly internationalist approach,
restricting the extent to which arbitral authority is subject to the mandatory
rules otherwise applicable to domestic arbitrations.
65. JAN VAN DEN BERG, supra note 37, at 139.
66. Scherck v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 n. 15 (1973).
67. See, e.g., French Decree of May 12, 1981, 1981 JOuRNAL OFFiCIEL DE LA REPUBUQUE
FRAI4CAISE 1492, translated in 27 LL.M. 917 (1981); the Netherlands Arbitration Act of 1986,26 I.LM. 921
(1987); the Swiss Federal Law on International Arbitration, adopted Dec. 18 1987, translated in 27 LL.M.
37 (1988).
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Xm. CONCLUSION
In most cases, the parties will agree to the situs of a cyber-arbitration in a
contract. However, agreeing to a situs without knowing the particular national
law of the country agreed to can have serious effects. When the parties do not
select a forum and the arbitral tribunal selects one for them, the same problems
may arise. The situs of the arbitration will determine whether the local courts
will help or hinder the arbitration process. The arbitration situs will also
determine local mandatory procedures to be followed. While online arbitration
may be a helpful alternative dispute resolution in a relatively short number of
years, much work is left to be done to create new, or amend the old rules
regulating arbitration.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the nearly 300 years since the industrial revolution,' the advancement
of technology has always aided international business.2 However, unlike the
first industrial revolution that took more than 100 years to cause a massive
effect on society,3 the Internet revolution has occurred almost instantaneously.4
Today, more than 100 million people worldwide use the Internet to do
everything from research to purchasing products online.5
One of the many progenies derived from the use of the Internet6 in
everyday life is the development of electronic commerce, or e-commerce.
Unlike the evolution of the telephone for doing business, the Internet allows
businesses to have more access to more customers in a shorter amount of time.
1. The Emerging Digital Economy, United States Government Electronic Commerce Policy, at
http:lwww.ecommerce.govldancl.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2000) (comparing the digital revolution with
the industrial revolution which began in 1712).
2. See id. (stating that the invention of the steam engine coupled with the invention of electricity
meant that companies had the freedom to be located anywhere).
3. id. (noting that it took fifty years after the invention of electricity to create a power station to
store electrical power and another fifty years before electricity became commonplace in businesses and
households).
4. In terms of technological revolutions fifty-four years seems like a blink of an eye. In 1946, the
Electronic Numerical Integrator and Computer (ENIAC) was invented. See id. At that time, ENIAC took
up a 1,500 square feet of space and could perform only non-graphical calculus computations. See id. By
1971, Intel, the company famous for its Pentium Processors, was able to reproduce a chip which was four
times more powerful than ENIAC and able to conduct 400 million instructions per second.
5. Id.
6. A few of the Internet progenies include digitized telecommunications, online banking, and
online securities trading.
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Globally, the speed of these transactions allows income generated from e-
commerce transactions to be very lucrative for the e-commerce merchant.
Currently, no country has taxed the income generated from e-commerce but
many countries are considering that prospect.
E-commerce, although a relatively new unit of analysis, lends itself to
distinctive issues. This paper advocates three theories regarding international
e-commerce. First, an absolute bar on global taxation on the Internet will lead
to market efficiency. Second, the burden of regulating consumer privacy during
international e-commerce transactions should be placed on the consumer.
Finally, each nation should take a nationalistic approach to the issue of whether
a digital divide exists.
This comment first defines the concept of e-commerce, discussing its
development in the international market. The comment next examines the legal
questions raised in the use of the Internet to facilitate business. Legally
speaking, in order to promote efficiency in the world market this comment
recommends two things: 1) no taxation on international e-commerce income
and 2) that the international buyer should be more responsible in. their Internet
business transactions. Additionally, this comment analyzes the political issue
of the "digital divide" and how international nation states have addressed these
issues. This comment advocates that increase competition in the global market
will lead to increased market access and a narrowing of the digital divide.
Finally, this comment describes the business models that have formulated due
to the use of the Internet and then it focuses on one company, Yahoo!, to see
how it has handled the legal and political ramifications of the Internet in its
global business.
1I. E-COMMERCE IN THE INTERNATIONAL MARKET
The term "e-commerce" has only been in existence since about 1994.
Economist and capital market analysts use the term loosely to describe anything
from the amount of sales generated by an online bookstore to explanations
regarding the fluctuations in the global market. What they fail to do is clearly
define the term "e-commerce." E-commerce is simply the use of the Internet
to conduct business transactions locally, nationally, or internationally.7 The rise
of e-commerce is based on the revolution of the Internet and its technology.
The development of the Internet has evolved from a tool of communication to
one of economic utilization. The Internet facilitates electronic business
transactions both nationally and internationally by permitting businesses to
7. World Trade Organization, Studyfrom WTO Secretariat highlights potential trade gains from
electronic commerce, at http://www.wto.orglenglish/news -/pres98-e/ p96_e.htm (Mar. 13,1998) (defining
electronic commerce as the use of telecommunication networks to produce, advertise, sell, and distribute
products).
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have easy access to large consumer bases at lower costs. The use of the Internet
to conduct business is not without problems. Internationally, there exist some
concerns as to who should govern the flow of e-commerce income. Yet, the
current debate does not look like it will be resolved any time soon.
A. The Development of the Internet
The modern structure of the Internet8 developed from a United States
Army experiment more than thirty years ago.' Today, the Internet exists in no
physical or tangible realm.'0 Instead, it is a "giant network which interconnects
innumerable smaller groups of linked computer networks."" This network is
referred to as the World Wide Web (www). The current capabilities of the
Internet for business transactions are enormous. 2 The Internet has the ability
8. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1) (Supp. 1998). ("The term 'Internet' means the international
network of both Federal and non-Federal interoperable switched data networks."). The term "Internet"
derived from the terms "interconnection" and "network." See GLEE HARRAH CADY & PAT MCGREGOR,
MASTERING THE INMRNET 5 (2d ed. 1996). The term initially meant "the network formed by the cooperative
interconnection of computing networks." See id. In the development of the Internet other terms were
frequently used. William Gibson, in his science fiction novel Neuromacer, invented the term "cyberspace."
See WILLIAM GIBSON, NEUROMANCER 51 (1985). Cyberspace is derived from the term "cybernation," which
is equally derived from the term "cybernetics," or the study of automatic control systems of communications,
by means of a computer. See WEBST'SNINTH NEWCOu..EGiATEDICIONARY 319 (9th ed. 1987). See also
CADY & MCGREGOR, supra note 8 at 835. Gibson wrote that cyberspace was "[a] consensual hallucination
experienced daily by billions of legitimate operators, in every nation... A graphic representation of data
abstracted from the banks of every computer in the human system." See GIBSON, supra note 8 at 51. Bill
Gates attributes the term "Information Superhighway" to then-senator Al Gore, Jr. See BIL GATES, THE
ROAD AHEAD 5 (1995). At the time, Senator Gore was advocating the creation of a National Research and
Education Network. See id.
9. Nightline: Wired (ABC television broadcast, Oct. 19, 1999) (asserting that the birth of the
present day Internet occurred on October 24, 1969, with the first use of the ARAPNET system). See
generally Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2334 (1997) (recalling the historical and technological
development of the Internet); Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 951
(1997) ("The Internet is an international 'super-network' connecting millions of individual computer
networks and computers.").
10. See Corinne Bronfman et al., The SEC's Market 2000 Report, 19 J. CORP. L. 523,524 (1994)
(flouting the premise that with the advance of technology, markets have lost the necessity of belonging to
physical entities).
11. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (available at] No. CV 96-74381996
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7919, at 22 (1996), aff'd, Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. CL 2329 (1997) (providing a detailed
history of the emergence of the Internet from the ARPANET program to the current World Wide Web). See
also Ari Staiman, Shielding Internet Users from Undesirable Content: The Advantages of a PICS Based
Rating System. 20 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 866, 871-72 (1997).
12. See, e.g., Statement of the Commission Regarding the Use of the Internet Web Sites to Offer
Securities, Solicit Securities Transactions or Advertise Investment Services Offshore, Exchange Act Release
No. 33-7516, Exchange Act Release No. 34-39779, 63 Fed. Reg. 14, 806, 14,813 (Mar. 23, 1998) (implying
that the Internet has fostered investors' ability to obtain market stock quotations and disclosure information
from foreign markets in order to execute a purchase or sale of stock anywhere in the world).
to disseminate information to a large number of people quickly and with
minimum costs.' 3 Because of the inexpensive nature of the Internet, the start-up
cost to a company desiring to have a place on the Internet is minimal. 4
The Internet, unlike other forms of communication, has the ability to allow
persons to interactively communicate with one another. 5 Consumers access the
World Wide Web by either an Internet Service Provider (ISPs)'6 or Internet
Content Providers (ICPs).'7 ISPs and ICPs should not be confused with Internet
portals. Internet portals are website interfaces that attract people to utilize the
site.'" Similar to television stations, the portals do not in and of themselves sell
anything. Instead, the portals entice consumers to hyperlink to other sites that
may provide advice or sell consumers various products.' 9
In addition to direct communication, anonymous communication is also
available on the Internet, permitting consumers and purchasers to conduct
transactions in private.20 The flexibility, the low cost of maintaining a website,
the ability to quickly disseminate information, and the instantaneous communi-
cation to a large population of consumers, makes the Internet an ideal
environment for business transactions.
B. E-commerce: The Internet as a Tool for Conducting Business Transac-
tions
In its early inception, the Internet was used mainly as a tool for people to
communicate with one another through e-mail or in chat rooms. Early
utilization of the Internet for business focused mainly on direct business to
consumer transactions. This model allowed businesses to by-pass retail and
13. See David M. Cielusniak, Note, You Cannot Fight What you Cannot See: Securities
Regulation on the Internet, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L J. 612, 615-616 (1998) (advancing that currently there
exists three methods in which to disseminate information over the Internet: the use of websites, electronic
bulletin boards, and e-mail).
14. See Thomas D. Donlan, Editorial, Regulatory Milestone: SEC Chairman Levitt treads lightly
on the markets, BARRON'S, Oct. 18, 1999, at 58 ("American investors can trade practically anything with
practically anyone on earth, at practically any time of the day. They can do it more cheaply than ever before,
and they can deal with an amazingly diverse array of brokers, advisers and mutual-fund managers.").
15. See Securities Activity on the Internet: Report of the Internet Task Force to the Technical
Committee, 1128 PRAcrtSING LAw INsT. 533, 546 (Sept 19, 1998) [hereinafter Report of the Internet Task
Force] (implying that the graphic, audio, and instant written communication capabilities of the Internet acts
as a benefit to security investors).
16. For example, Mindspring.com is an Internet service provider that provides its subscribers with
e-mail addresses and paid access to the Internet.
17. See, e.g., http://www.eSinglemoms.com. Content providers do as their name suggests; provide
a vast amount of information on a particular topic or various topics.
18. Interview with Jon Brod, V.P. of Marketing, iwon.com, Irvington, NY (Nov. 9, 1999).
19. id. See also http://www.iwon.com.
20. See Report of the Internet Task Force, supra note 15, at 548 (voicing concern that anonymity
of securities trading can also trigger fraudulent practices).
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wholesale merchants by selling directly to their customers. Profitability
depended on key elements. Some problems included brand marketing," both
in the website name recognition and marketing the product, creating or carving
out a market share, and producing or providing a similar service or product
already in the market.' Some businesses, realizing the risk of surviving in the
Internet environments, have moved away from consumer based transactions to
the business to business (B2B) model.'
B2B e-commerce is the use of the Internet by one business to market his
product to another business.' Traditional brick and mortar companies have
enhanced their participation in B2B marketing by creating B2B kerestus,
purchase groups for Internet product suppliers. 5 Businesses participating in
B2B transactions make money in numerous ways from taking a percentage of
each sale to renting space on their website.26
The efficiency of B2B transactions work by automating the intermediaries,
such as taking human purchase order processors, out of the supply side of the
supply-demand equation.27 The theoretical result of B2B transactions on the
consumer side of the equation is lower prices, better services, and more
choices.2" Yet, some market specialists believe that B2B is just another passing
trend in the capital market.29
21. Shannon Henry, For Venture Capital, a Wide-Open Door, WASH. POST, Apr. 5,2000, at G13
(acknowledging the difficulty of raising money to support develop a brand around a consumer company).
'"Trying to have a technical advantage is better than building a brand." See supra note 15, at 548 (quoting
Karl Khoury, principal with the venture capital firm Columbia Capital).
22. See id. at G 13 (describing how the market for Internet business targeted toward consumers, i.e.
B2C, is in low demand because certain brands such as Amazon, eBay, or Etoys have already established
themselves in the American consumer lexicon of web businesses).
23. See Barrett Schaefer, International Taxation of Electronic Commerce Income: A proposal to
utilize software agentsfor source-based taxation, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TCH. L.J. 111, 120
(stating that the majority of e-commerce occurs between businesses).
24. Greg Schneider, Net Firms Get Down to Business, WASH. POST, Apr. 5, 2000, at GI.
25. See id. at G21 (illustrating how the automotive companies have combined forces to create an
online marketplace for buying auto parts). In Japan, a keiretsu is the business model of various businesses
combining their individual efforts to support each business economically. See id.
26. See id. at G16 (mentioning that companies conducting B2B transactions may command a
market worth between $1 to $8 trillion by 2004).
27. See id. (quoting Shikhar Ghosh, co-founder and chairman of Open Market, Inc., and CEO of
iBelong Inc.). Jim Fox, co-founder of EqualFooting.com, Inc., an online market for small construction
companies, states that the age of traveling salesmen may soon evaporate. See id. at G21.
28. Id. at GI. (explaining that in theory that is how it is supposed to work, in reality current
speculations of the possibility of B2B transactions seem a bit premature). See generally LARRY DOWNES &
CHUNKAMUI, UNLEAS ION THE KILLER APP: DIGrrAL STRATEGIES FOR MARKPLACE DOMINANCE (1998)
(supporting the premise that the evolution of the B2B marketplace will increase the expectations of consumers
of lower prices and more purchasing choices).
29. Henry, supra note 21, at G 3 (quoting Jack Biddie of Novak Biddle Venture Partners as saying
that "a year from not they won't be talking about... B2B on Wall Street.").
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Beyond simple B2B transactions are business to business to consumer
(B2B2C) deals.3" B2B2C is a new market for venture capital investments.3
B2B2C centers on businesses that provide services or products, either software
or hardware, to their business clients, who then sell the products or services to
their customers.32
C. Development of International E-commerce
E-commerce or electronic commerce is the practice of conducting
commercial transactions, based on the processing and transmission of
digitalized data over electronic networks.33 The Organization of Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) created a working definition' of, and
guidelines 35 for, e-commerce.
The various uses of the Internet by business entities include the ability to
advertise, generate, or otherwise perform regular business functions. According
to OECD, e-commerce transactions can be used for both business to business
and direct consumer marketing. 36 Through the use of the Internet, either
business transaction is considered e-commerce.
OECD has developed specific guidelines for international e-commerce.
They expound eight central principles of e-commerce. First, the guidelines call
for fair business dealings, advertising, and marketing practices in e-commerce
transactions. Second, the guidelines propose that companies conducting e-
commerce transactions give consumers sufficient information necessary" to
make an informed decision in their online purchases. Third, the guidelines ask
that companies establish a clear procedure for the confirmation of purchase and
sale orders online. Fourth, the guidelines recommend that websites are secured
for consumer protection. Fifth, the OECD guidelines suggest that the
companies have in place a way to conduct timely and affordable dispute
resolutions. Sixth, the guidelines propose that customers are given protection
30. B2B2C stands for business to business to consumer.
31. See Henry, supra note 21, at G13 (recognizing that business to consumer transactions are
decreasing and business to business transactions, both interstructure and intrastructure deals, tend to be more
profitable).
32. Id. (defining the concept of B2B2C).
33. William F. Fox, Jr., international Electronic Commerce, SE06 A.L.L-A.B.A. 159, 161 (1999)
(stating that e-commerce is merely the transaction of any kind of business over the Internet).
34. See id. (noting the breadth of the definition of e-commerce).
35. See OECDAdopts Guidelinesforlnternational Protection In E-Commerce, 17 COMPUTER LJ.
30 (2000) (stating the purpose of the guidelines) [hereinafter OECD Guidelines].
36. Fox, supranote 33, at 161 (acknowledging that bothorganizations and individuals are the target
markets of electronic retailers).
37. Sufficient information includes, but is not limited to, general disclosures about conducting
business transactions online, the warranties regarding the quality of the goods being sold by the company,
and the terms and conditions of the sale.
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of their privacy of information provided to the company. Seventh, the
guidelines call for companies to conduct both consumer and business education.
Finally, the guidelines suggest that governments internationally should
cooperate to implement these guidelines.38
Since OECD is not a global governing body, the guidelines developed by
OECD are not binding regulations on any country.39 The guidelines act merely
as suggestions as to what would be considered fair business practices in
international e-commerce transactions. Yet, the guidelines serve two central
purposes. The guidelines act as a regulatory scheme, which governments may
model in their creation and implementation of consumer protection laws
regarding e-commerce and for private companies to emulate in their develop-
ment of self-regulatory practices. Furthermore, the guidelines assist private
companies in their goal of educating consumers about business practices on the
Internet.' However, since OECD lacks the jurisdictional predicate to enforce
these guidelines they are merely ideals of the organization.
Jurisdictional questions arise when discussing international use of e-
commerce.4 Response to such questions, as the amount of sales generated over
the Internet, has gotten the attention of the World Trade Organization (WTO)
regarding possible regulation of e-commerce.42 The WTO asserts that
electronic commerce transactions fall within the scope of authority of the
WTO/GATT.43 The WTO divides e-commerce transactions into three
distinctive stages." The first stage of e-commerce is what the WTO defines as
the searching stage, where the market producers and market consumers first
interact with each other with the purpose of gathering information from one
another. Once a transaction has been agreed upon, the second stage, ordering
and payment of the desired product, takes place. Finally, the last stage is the
delivery of the goods or contracted services.4"
38. See International Guidelines for Consumer Protection in E-Commerce Issued by OECD, at
http://www~ft.gov/opa/1999/9912/oecd2.htm (last visited Sept. 30,2000).
39. The OECD is an intergovernmental organization of 29 nation states established to promote
global economic growth, trade and development. See OECD Guidelines, supra note 35.
40. See id (stating that the guidelines should be used as blueprints for both international
governments and private companies).
41. John Burgess, As Internet Commerce Goes Global, Countries Weigh New Barriers, WASH.
POST, Nov. 7, 1999, at H01 (asking the question which country has the power to regulate when a company's
headquarters are in country A. with a website hosted in country B, shipping products from country C, to a
buyer in country D).
42. See id.
43. Fox, supra note 33, at 161 (noting that the WTO asserts jurisdiction over electronic commerce
transactions).
44. Id. (discussing the three WTO categories of e-commerce).
45. Studyfrom WTO Secretariat highlights potential trade gains from electronic commerce, World
Trade Organization, at http://www, wto.org/english/newse/pres98_e/pr96_e.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2000)
(discussing the WTO's three stages of c-commerce).
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Other organizations have tried to provide similar guidelines to the political
and legal issues of e-commerce. The International Chamber of Commerce
(ICC) issued a set of principles for ensuring and certifying digital messages."
In December 1996, the United National Commission on International Trade
Law (UNCITRAL) formulated the model law on international e-conmerce,
which established a global legal principle addressing the issue. 7 Specifically,
in the United States, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws (NCCUSSL) have worked for several years to propose amendments
to the United States' Uniform Commercial Code to incorporate language
regarding e-commerce transactions.'
Il. LEGAL QUESTIONS AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS REGARDING INTERNA-
TIONAL E-COMMERCE
A. Legal Issues Concerning International E-commerce
There exist a plethora of legal issues concerning e-commerce 9 The two
that this paper will focus on are taxation of e-commerce and consumer privacy.
1. International Taxation of E-commerce Income
The emergence of the Internet and e-commerce has generated millions in
revenue for the online merchant.'o National and local governments have
debated on how to harness e-commerce's success into the government's coffers
of taxable revenue.5 Yet, taxation of the Internet can be difficult when
international corporate taxation is based on geographical location."
46. See GUIDEC, General Usage for International Digitally Ensured Commerce, at
http://www.iccwbo.orgthome/guidec/guidec.asp (last visited Mar. 30,2000) (detailing the ICC's GUIDEC,
or General Usage of International Digital Ensured Commerce).
47. See generally Electronic Commerce Guide to Enactment of the Uncitral Model Law on
Electronic Commerce, 7 TUL J. INT'L&COMP. L 251 (1999) (presenting in its entirety UNCrFRALs model
law for international e-commerce).
48. Uniform Commercial Code Article 2B." Computer Information Transactions, at http://www.
law. upenn.edu/bl/ulc/ucc2b/2b299.htm (last visited Sept 20, 2000) (providing the text of the proposed
Article 2B of the UCC regarding the regulation of computer software licenses) [hereinafter UCCArticle 2B].
49. See Fox, supra note 33, at 161 (listing eight issues ranging from contract formation and
execution to content regulation).
50. See id. (predicting optimistically that by the year 2003 e-commerce transactions may reach 5%
of all global sales or $3.2 trillion U.S. dollars).
51. ROBERT E. LTAN & WILIAM A. NISKANEN, GOING DIGITALI: A GUIDE TO POuCY IN THE
DIGITAL AGE 26 (1998) (stating that governments may view e-commerce transactions as a potential source
of revenue which deserves taxation).
52. Schaefer, supra note 23, at 134 (evaluating the difficulty of taxing the Internet economy and
declaring that predicated tax rules are necessary to examine taxation of global e-commerce income). See also
infra Section II.A.1. (advocating that global taxation acts as a hindrance to economic progress on the
Internet).
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Two methods of taxing the international e-commerce income are source-
based taxation and residence-based taxation. Source-based taxation, or taxation
by source country, dictates that "a country may impose a tax on a non-resident
company if that company derived [its] income within the country's borders."53
Source-based taxation can only be applied to companies with a permanent
establishment in the source country. The establishment requirements are
derived from OECD Model Income Tax Treaty, which states that a company
should have economic ties with the source country to cause a legal establish-
ment.
On the other hand, residence taxation states that the resident country of the
corporation has the authority to impose taxes.5 4 The difficulty of applying these
two methods to e-commerce transactions is that companies solely operating on
the Internet have no physical residence. Additionally, developing countries,
under the residence-based taxation method, would be excluded from taxing
some corporations "squatting" in its territory. 5
2. Global Privacy of Consumer Information
Another legal dilemma facing e-commerce is the protection of consumers'
privacy when conducting an online transaction. Consumer International
conducted a global e-commerce shopping survey, which concluded that despite
the rise in the use of the Interet to buy products, consumers' confidence in the
entire process is low.56 Some believe that consumer confidence in e-comerce
is crucial for the success of global e-commerce.5 7 However, the responsibility
for consumer protection tends to fall on the e-commerce corporations and not
on the individual consumer."t
53. Schaefer, supra note 23, at 125.
54. See id. at 124 (providing background information regarding taxation under the OECD Model
Income Tax Treaty).
55. See id. at 135 (arguing that developing countries benefit best under a source-based taxation
model).
56. See International Chamber of Commerce, How e-business can secure vital consumer
confidence, at http://www.iccwbo.org/home/newsarchives..Jhow_e-businescansecurevital_ consumer.
asp (Sept. 20, 1999) (acknowledging that 11% of the time, when an item was purchased online it was never
delivered).
57. See id. (citing Louise Sylvan, chief executive of the Australian Consumers' Association).
58. See id. (articulating UK's Advertising Standards Authority personnel, Caroline Crawford's
views that self regulation by the e-commerce companies would establish consumer protection guidelines
without national government intervention).
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B. A Legal Foot to Stand on Regarding International E-commerce
1. There is No [Cyber] Space for Taxation of
International E-commerce Income
The question of taxation of e-commerce transaction is nation state specific.
Currently, members of the United States Congress have expressed their desire
to place a moratorium on new state and local Internet sales and services tax.59
The United State's position is that unregulated e-commerce will benefit both
rich and poor nations alike.' However, within the United States, the
NCCUSSL has proposed uniform laws that the individual states may agree to
adopt regarding the regulation of Internet software licenses.
61
The legal and tax consequences of doing business across borders are
intensified when the domicile of the business is unknown.62 Yet, some have
advocated that taxation of global e-commerce transactions would provide
beneficial revenues for individual national governments. Some members of
OECD advocate taxing e-comerce.63
In Argentina, a law has been passed to place tariffs on all intellectual
property entering the country on discs or by electronic transmission."
Argentina has yet to test the law. U.S. companies, along with the European
Union, are in the midst of negotiating a self-regulatory scheme where the
companies agree to certain e-commerce etiquette.65 The U.S. government
advocates a non-taxing e-commerce policy.' Instead, the administration favors
a permanent moratorium on international e-commerce tariffs.67 Some scholars
predict that collection of any taxes for the purchase and download of strictly
online intellectual property will be difficult. 61 Currently, no country imposes
tariffs on e-commerce.
59. See IaTAN & NISKANEN, supra note 51, at 26 (explaining that Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR) and
Representative Chris Cox (D-CA) sponsored legislature which would place a freeze on state and local laws
which are designed to place a tax on e-commerce transactions).
60. Burgess, supra note 41; See also Patrick Thibodeau, Trade group readies international E-
commerce guidelines, NETWORK WORLD FUSION (Oct. 18, 1999).
61. See UCC Article 2B, supra note 48.
62. This problem is more acute in the case of purely web-based companies which have no real
physical presence, except on the Internet.
63. Thibodeau, supra note 60.
64. Burgess, supra note 41. This law includes computer software and hardware and MP3 music
files. Id.
65. See id. (stating that the U.S. would like to extend the temporary moratorium on tariffs on cross-
border electronic transmissions agreed to by WTO members last year).
66. See id. (quoting Deputy U.S. Trade Representative Susan G. Esserman requesting that no
barriers to Internet-based trade be established).
67. Dow JONES REPORT, COMM. DAiLY, Oct. 29, 1999, available at 1999 WL 7580703.
68. Alan Reynolds, The Coming ofE-Commerce Boom, AM. OUTLOOK, Spring 1999, at p. 34.
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2. Globus Caveat Emptor
The theory of "let the buyer beware" arises in terms of global e-commerce
marketing and the privacy rights of consumers. The Organization of Economic
and Cooperation and Development (OECD) plans to release a set of consumer
protection guidelines to aid American companies doing business abroad.69 The
guidelines establish business standards for selling products over the Internet.'
In September, Consumers International conducted a diagnostic of more
than 700 international e-commerce website, with thirty-five percent in
Australia.7" The results indicated that most international e-commerce websites
lacked legal language stating the controlling law on the Internet contract or any
privacy policy.
The solution to the problem of consumer protection in global e-commerce
transactions begins with the consumer. Forcing e-commerce businesses to act
with more self-regulation presumes that companies have been in compliance
with generally accepted business standards. However, self-regulating
companies are few. Consumers should have a grain of skepticism when
conducting certain transactions online. There is a correlation between
consumer confidence and the success of global e-commerce. However, this link
is not damaged if the consumer exercises his or her best judgment.
C. The Legal Laissez Faire Approach to International E-commerce
1. Absolute Bar on Global E-Tax Promotes Market Efficiency
An absolute bar to international taxation of the e-commerce income
promotes market efficiency by preventing legislative waste. Information rich
nations tend to regulate e-commerce more than information poor countries.
The legislation, thus far, tends to address fair dealings in international e-
commerce transactions and consumer privacy on the web. However, some
countries have resisted the urge to draft laws regarding the taxation of
international e-commerce." Taxation of international e-commerce would slow
down the amount of commerce on the Internet. Taxation would increase the
start-up costs for international e-conumerce businesses. Thus, the amount of
revenue generated would actually decrease because a tax would be levied on the
income.
69. Thibodeau, supra note 60.
70. See id.
71. International E-Commerce Sites Fail Consumer Test, ASIA INTEllG.NCEWIRE, Oct. 15, 1999.
72. See infra Part IV (discussing the difference between information rich versus information poor).
73. See infra Part ILB.I (discussing the United States government desire to place a moratorium on
international taxation of the e-commerce).
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Non-taxation of international e-cornmerce has a downside. The disadvan-
tage to developing countries is that they will be unable to benefit from the
increasing revenue that the international e-commerce generates. Yet, such a
disadvantage is outweighed by the advantage of promoting international e-
conmerce.
2. Consumer Skepticism is Needed for an Efficient
International E-commerce Marketplace
The theory of globus caveat emptor, or international buyer beware, works
in two ways. First, it creates a duty on the international e-commerce seller to
act fairly and truthfully in its dealings. Second, it shifts the responsibility of
consumer protection in international purchases from the seller to the consumer
since the enforcement of breaches of international consumer privacy is difficult
since no specific global governing body exists.
IV. INTERNATIONAL E-COMMERCE POLITICAL CONCERNS & PROPOSALS
A. Political Issue Concerning International E-commerce
1. International Impact of the Digital Divide
a. What is the Digital Divide?
The digital divide is the term used to describe the division between those
persons, within a given nation, who have access to and/or knowledge of the
intellectual property characteristics of the Internet. Globally, the digital divide
is not based on race 4 or ethnic division, which exists in the United States.75
Nor is the digital divide a solely economic issue to be resolved among nation
states. There are, however, two common characteristics that dictate the degree
to which a digital divide exists within a country.
The first characteristic that indicates the degree of a digital divide existing
in a country is the amount of intellectual property the country controls. The
term "info rich" is the degree of intellectual property that currently exists in the
nation state or is under the state's control, either by regulation or other means.
If the means to create intellectual property exist in a country, the country can
be deemed information rich even if it presently do not have a large amount of
74. See Richard G. Barnes, Government concerned by growing digital divide, 1M PHLADELPHIA
TRIB., Aug. 7,1998, at 5A (noting FCC Chairman, William Kennard, classifying the digital divide as a racial
divide where Black and Hispanic Americans are more likely not to have a computer in their homes).
75. See, e.g., William E. Kennard, Information POWER: William E. Kennar4 FCC Chairman,
Shares With Us The Importance Of The 'Information Age, SACRAMENTO OBSERVER, Sept. 9, 1998, at S30
(noting that Chairman Kennard was giving this speech before the NAACP regarding the lack of African
American representation in the technology field).
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intellectual property under its direct control. "The means for existence" can be
illustrated through legislative or governmental intent to become info rich. In
addition, info rich countries try to legislate e-commerce.76
In contrast, info poor nations lack the necessary technological infrastruc-
ture and necessary resources to become a technology property owner.
Furthermore, info poor countries systematically lack the means to establish an
intellectual property foothold. Although the current market trend and
technological advances create a division between info rich and info poor states,
as the Internet and its progeny, e-commerce, become more global in nature the
chasm which exists will narrow.
The second common characteristic of the existence of a digital divide
within a nation is the number of people in the country who have the requisite
technological knowledge (T knowledge) to know how to utilize the intellectual
property (T knowledge rich v. T knowledge poor). T knowledge rich countries
tend to have more people that are obtaining or have an advanced knowledge of
intellectual technology. In comparison, T knowledge poor countries lack the
requisite number of people who are technologically inclined to fill the
increasing number of intellectual property jobs available in the given nations.
These highly skilled workers are missing in T knowledge poor nations because
there either exists a limited number of people with that knowledge or the
populace as a whole lack people with such sophisticated knowledge. Similar
to the factor of intellectual property, there is a direct correlation between the
number of persons with intellectual knowledge and the degree of the existence
of a digital divide.
b. Four International Models of the Digital Divide
Four international models of the existence of a digital divide develops
from the characteristics of ownership and control of intellectual property and
technological knowledge. The first model is countries that are info rich, T
knowledge rich. India best illustrates this model type. Economics and inherent
classism are the strongest basis for the digital divide in India.
India has a large population of persons who are familiar with intellectual
technology and e-commerce. 7 Currently, India has the largest population of
intellectual manpower, outside of Silicon Valley.78 Yet, despite India's high T
76. The Millennium Digital Commerce Act, S. Res. 761, 106th Cong. (1999) (enacted); see also
Singapore, India Join Forces in Information Technology, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESsE, Mar. 30, 2000
(mentioning that India is interested in proposing legislation on e-commerce due in part to Singapore's e-
commerce legislation).
77. Singapore, India Join Forces in Information Technology, AGENcE FRANCE-PRESSE, Mar. 30,
2000 (emphasizing India's prowess in intellectual technology).
78. Id. (citing India's Minister of Communications, Pramod Mahajan).
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knowledge quotient, the country still has difficulty demystifying the Internet
and intellectual technology for the general India populace. 9 In a country of
more than one billion, the role of the Indian government is not only to harness
its T knowledge, but also to convince the Indian population that the Internet and
e-commerce is something to embrace."0 A second issue facing the Indian
government is the need to regulate international e-commerce. Although India
can be described as info rich, T knowledge rich, the country does not have any
current legislation regarding e-commerce.81 The Indian legislature expects to
have a proposed e-commerce bill by the summer of 2000.
Singapore's approach to international e-commerce can be described as info
rich, T knowledge poor. 2 Singapore's digital divide does not stem from a lack
of technological development but from the lack of knowledgeable persons to
implement their plans. Singapore currently has legislation on e-commerce8 3
However, the country lacks the necessary manpower to execute its intellectual
technology initiatives.
On March 30, 2000, Singapore and India announced a plan to enter into
ajoint partnership to harness both countries' intellectual technology know how
and man power.84 According to Yeo Cheow Tong, Singapore's Minister for
Communications, Singapore recognizes that India dominates the East-Asian
technological community with large populations of intellectual talent.8 5 Thus,
part of the purpose of the joint task force is to "tap into the vast pool of talents
that India has."86 In addition, Singapore Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong has
stated that due to the lack of local talent within its country, Singapore needs
foreign talent to implement its intellectual property plans. The Singaporean
79. See id. (acknowledging that if India does not convince its more than one billion population that
the Internet is something to embrace, then the Internet will not become an asset but a liability widening the
digital divide).
80. See id. (declaring that there is a view persistent in India that the Internet and its progeny are
limited to elite groups of English speakers in the upper class of society).
81. Id. (citing India's Minister for Communications and Parliamentary Affairs, Pramod Mahajan,
as stating that India is in the process of formulating legislation regarding e-commerce). Information rich
nations tend to have some form of e-commerce in process or it is already a part of their laws. See Robert
MacMillian, Senate Democrats Unite on Electronic Signatures, NEWSBY'ESNEWS NETWORK, Mar. 30,2000
(articulating the United States Senate's bill entitled The Millennium Digital Commerce Act, which is
proposed to establish federal guidelines regarding the creation of binding electronic contracts and electronic
signing of documents).
82. Singapore, India Join Forces in Information Technology, supra note 77 (quoting Singapore's
Minister for Communications, Yeo Cheow Tong, desire to turn Singapore into the Eastern Silicon Valley).
83. Id. (discussing India's desires to implement e-commerce legislature similar to Singapore's
legislation).
84. Id. (describing India and Singapore's plans to create ajoint information technology task force).
85. See id.
86. Id. (quoting Yeo).
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government believes that their national digital divide can be resolved through
international infusion of more people with intellectual technical knowledge.
The third model of an international digital divide, info poor, T knowledge
poor, is demonstrated by the governmental practices within New Zealand.1
7
New Zealand's approach to increasing technological ownership is by cost
benefit analysis.8 New Zealand's Minister of Information Technology, Paul
Swain, stated, in his briefing papers to the government, that "New Zealand is
not doing enough, fast enough, to reap the full benefits of electronic commerce
... " This is due in part to New Zealand's technology focus. Unlike informa-
tion rich countries, like India, who focus on instantaneously acquiring
intellectual property and people, New Zealand's mentality relates the country's
lack of technological progress with the lack of understanding of the issue. 9
The New Zealand government policy ignores major e-commerce issues, such
as consumer privacy and taxation, and instead focuses on increasingly practical
and market research on the feasibility of e-commerce. By focusing solely on
whether e-commerce is feasible, the New Zealand government gets further and
further from becoming either info rich or T knowledge rich.
Finally, the model of info poor, T knowledge rich is difficult to find an
example of in the global context. The model in and of itself begs the question,
how can a country that does not own intellectual property have a populace
which has extensive technological knowledge. Although this model type may
not currently exist, it does not preclude the possibility of such an example in the
future.
B. The International Politics of E-commerce
E-commerce for one, E-commerce for all: closing the gap on the
international digital divide. A nationalistic approach to the international digital
divide is the best approach to alleviating the problem. A nationalistic approach
looks to the government or world organizations to intervene in international
electronic economy. By intervening, the government and/or the agency assert
their authority over the e-commerce market to ensure that technologically
disenfranchised groups have access to the electronic market. In addition, a
87. See, e.g., Eric R. Biel, The Impact of Technological Change on Developing Countries, 25
CAN.-U.S. L.J. 257, 264 (1999) (analyzing the negative impact new technologies will have in developing
countries, i.e., widening the digital divide).
88. See Rob O'Neill, Government Gets Proactive with E-commerce, INDEP. BUS. WEEKLY, Mar.
29, 2000, at 20 (maintaining that New Zealand's Minister of Information Technology, Paul Swain has
recently laid out in a report the legal impediments to c-commerce development in New Zealand).
89. See id. "Progress is hampered by the lack of adequate research and statistics on local e-
commerce." Id.
90. See id. (confusing the current legal issues of e-commerce, taxation, and consumer privacy with
lesser important issues such as statistics on local e-commerce).
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nationalist approach calls for an increased intellectual ownership by national
government. Such an approach promotes strategies toward narrowing the
international digital divide.
C. Political Analysis
1. How Does Increased Competition Resolve the Problem of Lack of
Intellectual Ownership Due to the Digital Divide?
Increased competition in the global e-commerce market resolves the
dilemma of the lack of intellectual ownership by certain Internet disenfran-
chised groups by allowing market forces to dictate a solution. Although the
Internet has provided a forum to create new market forces on the economy,
economic law still prevails.9" Microeconomic theory may be used to explain
e-commerce. 9 The three basic assumptions of microeconomics are: (1) no
barriers exist for a company to enter and exit the market; (2) no business
dominates and thus has the ability to manipulate market prices; and (3)
companies will operate at a loss in the short run. 3 Any company desiring to
conduct business online needs a business plan and little to no money to begin.94
Companies conducting business on the Internet are so fluid that e-commerce
ideas are easily duplicated and thus creating competition.95 Amazon.com is a
prime Internet example of the sacrifice of short-term loses for long-term
profits.96
Political economy is defined as the parallel existence and mutual
interactions between the state and the market.' A pure capitalistic market
exists when the state is absent from the equation and the market is left on its
own to establish the prices of commodities due to market forces.98 On the other
hand, a pure socialistic market exists when the market is non-existent and it is
the job of the state to provide the commodities to society.99
One assumption is that in order to increase national wealth, there must be
free and unrestricted exchange among individuals in both the domestic and
91. Jacob M. Schlesinger, IfE-Commerce Helps Kill Inflation, Why Did Prices Just Spike?, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 18, 1999 at Al, (quoting University of California at Berkeley economist Hal Varian as saying
"technology changes but economic laws do not.").
92. Opportunity Knocks: On-line retailing shakes up the market again, BARRONS, Sept. 13, 1999.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. C. ROE GODDARD, JOHN T. PASSm-SMIH, AND JOHN G. CONKLIN, INTERNATIONAL POLIrCAL
ECONOMY: STATE-MARKET RELATIONS IN THE CHANGING GLOBAL ORDER 9 (1996).
98. Id. (capitalism).
99. Id. (socialism).
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international economies." °  Some scholars have argued that pure market
theories may be put to the test with the emergence of e-commerce and its effects
on the market.' However, that argument may be hindered by the fact that the
Internet does not provide perfect competition at all times. The Internet also
allows industry leaders to obfuscate certain websites so that only industry
experts can have access to discounted prices, while simultaneously hosting a
high-end priced website that is easier to comprehend.0 2
2. A Nationalistic Approach to the International Digital Divide
On the other hand, applying a nationalistic model can lessen the issue of
the international digital divide.' Unlike free market competition, a nationalis-
tic approach to international e-commerce urges foreign governments to
intervene in the electronic economy. The theory being that without government
intervention, info poor/T knowledge poor countries, like New Zealand, will be
unable to industrialize their technology and thus widen the international digital
divide.
A nationalistic approach toward combating the international digital divide
can also occur at the international agency level. The WTO's assertion that
international e-commerce is inherently within its authority" gives rise to theory
that the WTO can use its power to narrow the digital divide. Info rich/T
knowledge rich countries should urge the World Trade Organization to
intervene in the global economy generated by e-commerce in order to
encourage the use of the Internet in business but also to level the playing field.
Without the WTOs intervention, some countries will be unable to benefit from
the advent of e-commerce in the global market and thus fail to become players
in the new global market.
V. THE INVENTION OF INVENTION
The United States is the world leader in e-commerce."'0 Although e-
commerce only accounts for 1% of the retail economy in America," it has been
100. Id. at 26.
101. Schlesinger, supra note 91 (acknowledging the theories of MIT economists Erik Brynjolfsson
and Michael Smith).
102. See id. (giving the example of travel agencies and their ability not to create a price war through
lower airfares accessible on the Internet).
103. See infra Part V.A.I (describing China's nationalistic e-commerce model).
104. See infra Part n.C (expressing that the wro believes it has authority over international e-
commerce under the WrO/GATr).
105. Burgess, supra note 41.
106. Schlesinger, supra note 91.
a force in lowering prices online as well as off-line. °7 E-commerce creates the
same efficiency of service on an international scale as it does on a domestic
one.0 8 Before the ease of access to the Internet, commerce was dominated by
vertical economic links that interconnected manufacturers, wholesalers and
retailers causing consumer prices to be linked with "middle-man" syndrome.
The emergence of the Internet has converted vertical economics to horizontal
economics where all upstream suppliers are on the same level, thus giving
consumers easier access to the best price for a product."° This translates into
lower prices for the average consumer due to decrease in inventory stockpiling
by the seller."0
A. The Internet Creates New Models of Doing Business
Many U.S. merchants have specifically targeted foreign buyers."' The
Internet has been the greatest benefit to the individual consumer as well as
merchants."' The consumer can buy over the Internet, without the purchase of
a plane ticket, using only a mouse and a credit card."' Single interactions by
consumers become great ripples in the e-commerce supply chain.'' Thus,
companies are advised to be more flexible to the consumer-centric market of the
Internet."5
1. Nationalistic E-commerce Model - China's Plan
On April 6-8, 2000, China held its 4th China International E-Commerce
Summit. The purpose of the summit was to bring together the top information
technology specialist from China and around the world to discuss how to
107. Id (finding that although car buyers may not buy a car over the web, a majority will use the web
to determine what is an ideal price for a car in their local area).
108. Burgess, supra note 41 (expounding the premise that the use of the Internet can shorten
response time between purchasers and merchants, decrease the need to store piles of inventory, and increase
the diversity of goods offered).
109. Michael Casey, Power of the Internet Ensures Supply and Demand Will Never Be the Same,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 1999, at A43M (stating that horizontal economic structures allow purchasers to give
a greater access to sellers).
110. See id. (stating that the Internet has brought about an age of efficient consumer response and
continuous replenishment of inventory).
Ill. Burgess, supra note 4l (contending that U.S. merchants have established web pages specifically
for foreign buyers).
112. See id. (noting that many international consumers comparison shop over the Internet for
quotations on prices of a particular item in the next state or country).
113. See id. (describing the use of downloadable MP3 music files as a means of selling records world
wide).
114. Casey, supra note 109.
115. See id.
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develop the Internet and e-conmerce in China." 6 As of the end of 1999, from
a total population of 1.3 billion people, 4.5 million are Internet users. 1 17 The
number is estimated to increase to 9.4 million users by 2002. 18 China's
Minister of Information Industry currently has five goals for China's e-
commerce development."'
First, China would like guidance in the overall planning of e-commerce
development.'I China's governmental intervention could be looked at in two
ways. The Chinese government's assistance could stem from the government's
desire to aid in the furtherance of e-commerce in China. Yet, on the other hand,
such interference from an intolerant government, such as China, could result in
the Chinese government censoring the content of certain websites.
Second, the Chinese government would like to emphasize the function of
enterprises in e-commerce development. On November 15, 1999, the Chinese
agreed to permit foreign investors to own up to 49 percent of telecommunica-
tions industries, including Internet services."' China's major concerns
regarding development of an e-commerce market are its inadequate electronic
infrastructure, diminutive credit card base, lack of communications among
government departments and difficult to communicate with inland provinces. '22
Yet, the agreement has been a catalyst for China's membership into the
WTO. 23 Furthermore, China's move to deregulate the telecommunications
industry has opened the way for local Chinese companies to emerge as e-
commerce providers."
Third, the Chinese government seeks to have standardized guidelines for
any e-commerce development project. The Chinese government's major
concern is exposure of inappropriate content to children." 5 But the govern-
ment, aside from the telecommunication ban from foreign investment, has not
indicated the degree of its control of the Internet.
116. China to Hold its Largest E-Commerce Conference, CHINA BUSINESS INFORMATION NETIWORK,
Oct. 19, 1999, available at 1999 WL 17731516.
117. Yahoo! Introduces Yahoo! China: New Internet Guide Features Localized Web Programming
for China, BUSINESS WIRE, Sept. 24, 1999.
118. See id.
119. E-Commerce Development Principles Set, ASiAPORT DAILY NEWS, Oct. 27, 1999, at 1,
available at 1999 WL 22635630.
120. See id
121. Michael White, Chinese Official Urges U.S. Investors to Stop Worrying About Restrictive
Policies, ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSWPE, Nov. 20, 1999.
122. China to Hold its Largest E-Commerce Conference, supra note 116.
123. White, supra note 121.
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. China to Hold its Largest E-Commerce Conference, supra note 116.
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Fourth, E-commerce websites within China must obey Chinese regulations
on security and national law. Similar to other countries in the world, in China
it is a criminal offense to misuse the Internet for criminal benefit.
Finally, cooperation between the Chinese government and international e-
commerce business will be intensified.
2. Intrabusiness Model - IKEA
Ikea, the Swedish based home furnishing store, launched an international
e-commerce website which will advertise and sell twenty to thirty percent of its
current merchandise. 127 Ikea, through its advertising agency, developed a series
of microsites, which are targeted to certain life situations.' Similar to old-
fashioned mail order catalogs, the new website systems would be an electronic
mail order service for its stores around the world. 29
3. Interbusiness Model
The advantage of the Internet to the consumer is the ability to gain
information on multiple sellers of any given product. In addition, the Internet
allows consumers to have access to the same items online if the local seller
charges too much. 3° However, the majority of e-commerce sales are from
business to business transactions.' 3 ' Businesses that specialize in computers or
Internet components use the Internet to make products designed specifically for
the customer.33 Likewise, other industries that are supply and demand driven
have been through the global use of the Internet. Purchasers for companies
dependent upon chemical products, industrial parts and commodities, or steel
and biological raw material are no longer stagnated by the geographical location
of their supplier. 33
127. Ikea to Offera Fresh Start, NEwMEDIA AGE, Nov. 25, 1999, at 7; see also The Oil Daily, Oct.
26, 1999, available at 1999 WL 10014886.
128. Ikea to Offer a Fresh Start, supra note 127.
129. Ikea Eyes the World, NEW MEDIA AGE, Oct. 8, 1999, at 2.
130. Schlesinger, supra note 91; citing economist Ethan Harris' statement that "the Internet
eliminates local monopoly power." Id.
131. Reynolds, supra note 68, at 33.
132. Dell Computers began as a company which sold computers over the Internet, specifically to
those specifications requested by the customers. The advantage of such an approach ensures that they are
"built to order" for the customers specific needs.
133. Casey, supra note 109 (featuring two companies, FreeMarket Inc. and VerticalNet Inc., which
provide an auction based system to allow industry buyers better access to suppliers worldwide).
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B. The Global Reach - Yahoo! A Case Study'34
In September 1999, Yahoo!, a leading Internet portal, launched Yahoo!
China (http://www.yahoo.com.cn).135 The twentieth system in Yahoo!'s global
network, Yahoo! China provides a localized web guide to financial, news and
regional information, as well as e-mail and instant messaging. 136 The Yahoo!
service utilizes both simplified Chinese characters and traditional Chinese
script.137 Similar to the original Yahoo! portal, Yahoo! China, as a search
engine and ICP, organizes information under various easy to access categories
with banner advertisements. 38
Yahoo! China did not enter the Chinese electronic business community on
its own. Instead it created ajoint venture with Beijing Founder Electronics Co.,
Ltd., a subsidiary of Founder (Hong Kong) Limited and a leading information
technology company in China. 39 Founder Limited is the world's largest
research based for China's electronic publishing systems. 4' The initial purpose
of the joint venture was to establish a venture company that will provide online
advertising in mainland China and develop Internet technology and applica-
tions. "' The implicit goal of the joint venture was to circumvent the Chinese
government's ban on foreign investment in China's Internet industry.'42
Prior to and after Yahoo! China launched its website, Wu Jichuan, China's
Minister of Information Industry (MII), had forbidden partnerships similar to
Yahoo! China.4 3 The Chinese government's focused on the ban on foreign
investment in its telecommunication industry.'" China's ban is based on the
notion that foreign investment would corrupt China's telecommunication
industry. Thus in China, the Internet, as a branch of telecommunication, must
also have a ban against foreign investment.'45 Yet, Yahoo! China received a
tacit consent from the Chinese government for their endeavor. 4 6 The tacit
134. See also Commerce Department's Electronic Policy, The Emerging Digital Economy, at
http:llwww.e-commerce.govlemerging.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2000) (presenting case studies of seven other
companies who conduct B2B transactions using the Internet).
135. White, supranote 121.
136. Yahoo! Introduces Yahoo! China: New Internet Guide Features Localized Web Programming
for China, supra note 117.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Yahoo! Evades Ban on Net Deals, SOtlIn CHINA MORNING PosT LTD., Sept. 25, 1999, at 1.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.; see Chinese Internet Off Limits to Foreigners, ASIA INTELLIGENCE WIRE, Sept. 28, 1999
(saying Yahoo! China was launched four days later).
144, Chinese Internet Off Limits to Foreigners, supra note 143.
145. Id.
146. Yahoo! Evades ban on Net Deals, supra note 140.
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consent could be due to the fact that in China there exists no one department
that governs the Internet. 47 The overall confusion regarding the telecommuni-
cation policy of the Chinese government has allowed other companies to defy
the ban.'
Recently, on March 30,2000, the FTC announced that it was investigating
Yahoo!'s consumer information gathering to determine whether it complied
with consumer protection laws. 149 Yahoo acknowledged the FTC's concerns.
Yet, Yahoo believes the FTC's inquiry is due in part to a non-profit health care
foundation's allegations that some of Yahoo's medical related websites were
sharing information about their users. 5 ' According to California Healthcare
Foundation, Yahoo's host sites failed to meet consumer privacy guidelines by
not requiring across the board standards for all online business relationships as
to the disclosure of consumer information.'
This scenario raises the issue as to how far must an e-commerce website
provider go to ensure the protection of a customer's privacy. Furthermore,
when is the consumer no longer a consumer of the original e-commerce
company, at online business relationship level 1 or level 100?
VI. CONCLUSION
The lack of global taxation on international e-commerce income promotes
efficiency in the market. Although some countries may benefit from source-
based taxation of e-commerce income, overall taxation acts as an impediment
to international e-commerce. Companies conducting international business
over the Internet should be aware of their responsibility of fair dealings to their
customers. However, the burden of consumer protection regarding international
e-commerce should lie with the consumer. The customer is the one who has the
ultimate control over whether their personal information is disseminated over
the Internet. Therefore, the customer should take measures to protect
themselves. Finally, the international digital divide created by the emergence
of the Internet and e-commerce is a national specific phenomenon. One broad
sweeping solution can not resolve the problem world wide. Each nation state
needs to access their degree of intellectual ownership coupled with their amount
of intellectual knowledge in order to create solution to e-commerce.
147. Id.
148. China to Hold its Largest E-Commerce Conference, supra note 116.
149. Steven Bonisteel, Yahoo Confirms FTC Probe of Privacy Policy, Newsbytes, at
http://www.newsbytes.com/pubNews/O0/146655.htrnl (Mar. 30, 2000) (detailing the allegations of
impropriety made against Yahoo! by the California Healthcare Foundation).
150. Id. (discussing that the FrC quickly responded to California Healthcare Foundation's
allegations against Yahoo by asking related healthcare sites if CHF's statements were true).
151. Id.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is the cornerstone
of the United Nations efforts in the field of international development
cooperation and operates as the central funding and catalytic mechanism of the
United Nations development system. From its origins in the Expanded
Programme of Technical Assistance and Special Fund to the present, UNDP has
continually adapted itself to the changing needs of programme countries and the
evolving nature of international development.
Developing cooperation in the 60s and early 70s was largely perceived as
technical assistance: the transfer of skills, technology and knowledge from the
advanced and rich countries to the poor countries of the third world. In keeping
with the times, UNDP used Specialized Agencies,' such as FAO and UNESCO,
* Mr. Ssekandi is currently the General Counsel of the African Development Bank in Abidjan,
Cote d'voire and former Deputy Director of the General Legal Division of the Office of Legal Affairs. Ms.
Johnson is an Associate Legal Officer in the General Legal Division, Office of Legal Affairs, at the United
Nations in New York. The views expressed herein are solely the views of the authors and do not necessarily
represent the views of the United Nations or UNDP. Copyright 1999.
1. Organizations brought into relationship with the United Nations under Article 63 of the Charter.
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largely staffed by people from developed countries to provide technical
assistance.
It is widely accepted today that a more cooperative approach to the
provision of development assistance is necessary,2 one where there is
partnership among people and active participation by those in the programme
country in the design and implementation of development programmes and
projects.3 In UNDP, the main instrument to convey this approach to the
provision of development assistance is known as national execution.
This paper documents UNDP's transition from the traditional model of
providing development assistance referred to above, which used Specialized
Agencies as UNDP's technical and managerial agents, known as the tripartite
relationship among UNDP, the Specialized Agencies and programme country
governments, or agency execution, to national execution, where governments
assume overall responsibility for such management.
In order to understand UNDP and the significance of this transition,
Section One describes UNDP's origins in the Expanded Programme of
Technical Assistance and the Special Fund as well as the subsequent merger of
these two programmes to form UNDP. Section Two traces the
institutionalization of national execution in UNDP as the norm for the provision
of development assistance. Finally, Section Three gives an overview of the
promises and challenges of national execution.
H1. SECTION ONE
A. The Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance
The Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance was approved by the
General Assembly in its resolution 304 (IV) of 16 November 1949, on
recommendation of the Economic and Social Council, with the primary
objective of helping under-developed countries to "strengthen their national
economies through the development of their industries and agriculture, with a
view to promoting their economic and political independence in the spirit of the
Charter of the United Nations, and to ensure the attainment of higher levels of
economic and social welfare for their entire populations."4 It was the first
attempt by the United Nations to provide technical assistance on a large scale.'
An analysis of the principles on which the Expanded Programme was based and
2. THE COMMISSION ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, OUR GLOBAL NEIGHBORHOOD 189 (1995).
3. Id. at 191-92.
4. See Economic DevelopmentofUnderdeveloped Countries, G.A. Res. No. 222 (IX), ECOSOC,
at 14, 15 and Annex 1 I 1 (Avg. 1949).
5. MAHNAR NASHAT, NATIONAL INrEREsTs AND BUREAUCRACY VERSUS DEVELOPMENT AiD 1
(1978).
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the manner in which it functioned can help to understand UNDP today - and
the significance of the shift to national execution.
The origins of the Expanded Programme can be traced to an earlier
General Assembly resolution, resolution 200 (I), of 4 December 1948, in
which the General Assembly considered that "the promotion of conditions of
economic and social progress and development [was] one of the principal
objectives of the Charter of the United Nations" and that the lack of "expert
personnel" and "technical organization" were among the factors impeding the
economic development of underdeveloped countries.6 The General Assembly
considered further that the United Nations could extend "efficacious and timely
help" and requested the Secretary-General to arrange the following:
a. international teams of experts to advise Governments on their
economic development programmes;
b. facilities for the training of experts from under-developed
countries through fellowships for study;
c. facilities for the training of local technicians within the under-
developed countries themselves; and
d. facilities to assist Governments obtain technical personnel,
equipment and supplies.7
The General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to report at each
session on measures taken to implement the resolution and to formulate
recommendations.8
In resolution 180 (VIII) of 4 March 1949, ECOSOC requested the
Secretary-General, taking into account, inter alia, General Assembly resolution
200 (1) and the Secretary-General' s first report in response thereto,9 to prepare
a report in consultation with the executive heads of the interested specialized
agencies setting forth:
1. A comprehensive plan for an expanded cooperative programme
of technical assistance for economic development through the United
Nations and its specialized agencies, paying due attention to questions
of a social nature which directly condition economic development;
2. Methods of financing such a programme including special
budgets; and
6. TechnicalAssistanceforEconomic Development, G.A. Res. 200 (l), U.N. GAOR, l12(a)-2(b)
(1948).
7. Id. 71 2, 3 (a)-(d).
8. Id. 6.
9. Creation of a Central Publication for the Promotion of and Advising Development Projects,
U.N. GAOR, 8th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/1083/Add. (1949).
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3. Ways of coordinating the planning and execution of the
programme.1
0
In response to ECOSOC's request, the Secretary-General consulted with the
executive heads of the International Labour Organization (ILO), the Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the World Health Organization (WHO), the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and the International Refugee Organization (IRO); input was also
received from a number of Member Governments and the Organization of
American States." The Secretary-General's Report in response to ECOSOC
resolution 180 provided an overview of the objectives and nature of the
programme, the fields of work, forms of technical assistance, organization,
finance, and included detailed proposals by the above-referenced organizations,
except the IMF and IRO which prepared statements instead along with the
International Trade Organization (ITO).
In June 1949, the Secretary-General proposed that "ECOSOC give
consideration to the expansion of the scope of the technical assistance
programme."'" Notably, the Secretary-General proposed comprehensive
missions, advisory services by experts, training, seminars and publications, for
a total increase in the 1950 budget for such activities to United States $676,000
from United States $307,750 appropriated for such purposes in 1949."
The Secretary-General's March and June 1949 Reports provided the basis
for ECOSOC Resolution 222 (IX), which set out the Observations and Guiding
Principles of the Expanded Programme.
The Observations and Guiding Principles of the Expanded Programme
contained in Annex I of ECOSOC resolution 222 (IX) were recommended by
ECOSOC to serve as guides to the United Nations and the specialized agencies
participating in the Expanded Programme (hereinafter collectively
"Participating Organizations") and addressed the following areas: General
Principles,' 4 Standards of Work and Personnel, Participation of Requesting
10. TechnicalAssistanceforEconomic Development, G.A. Res. No. 180 (VIII), ECOSOC, at pmbl.
and f 1-3 (Mar. 1949).
11. U.N. SGR to ECOSOC, El1327/Add. 1, at vii, viii (1949).
12. Addendum to Second Report by the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, U.N. DOC.
E/I 335/Add.I, at 2 (1949).
13. it at 5 1 (f).
14. The general principles for the provision of technical assistance, taken from General Assembly
resolution 200 (Ell), are as follows:
(a) Technical assistance for economic development of under-developed countries
shall be rendered by the participating organizations only in agreement with the
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Governments, 5 Coordination of Effort, Concentration and Economy, and
Selection of Projects.
ECOSOC resolution 222 (IX) also set out the administrative and governing
structure for the Expanded Programme. The Programme was governed by both
a Technical Assistance Board (TAB) and a Technical Assistance Committee
(TAC), both of which were to be guided by the Observations and Guiding
Principles of the Expanded Programme. 6
The TAB consisted of the executive heads of the Participating
Organizations chaired by the Secretary-General or his representative, and
included the United Nations, ILO, FAO, UNESCO, ICAO, and WHO.' 7 The
TAB provided a forum through which the Participating Organizations could
come together and share information on new requests for assistance and
ongoing activities. Each Participating Organization was required to present
annual reports to the TAB on its proposed programme for the next year and the
TAB was to make recommendations concerning the proposals and the overall
programme to ECOSOC through the TAC. The Secretary-General was
authorized to designate the Executive Secretary of the TAB, in consultation
with the Participating Organizations, whose responsibility was to service the
TAB.18
Governments concerned and on the basis of requests received from them;
(b) The kinds of services to be rendered to each country shall be decided by the
Government concerned;
(c) The countries desiring assistance should perform, in advance, as much of the work
as possible in order to define the nature and scope of the problem involved;
(d) The technical assistance furnished shall:
(e) Not be a means of foreign economic and political interference in the internal
affairs of the country concerned and not be accompanied by any considerations of a
political nature;
(i) Be given only to or through Governments;
(ii) Be designed to meet the needs of the country concerned; and
(iii) Be provided as far as possible in the form which that country desires
Technical Assistance for Economic Development, G.A. Res. No. 222 (IX), ECOSOC, 9th Sess., Agenda Item
9, at Annex L (fl 1-3, U.N. Doc. E/1335/Add.l (1949).
15. Governments were to facilitate the activities requested from the Participating Organizations;
and undertake sustained efforts required for economic development, including "progressive assumption of
financial responsibility for the administration of projects initiated at their request under international
auspices." Id. at Annex 1 1, 5.
16. Id. at 7 7.
17. Although not Participating Organizations, the IRBD, IMF, and IRO regularly attended and
participated in the meetings of the TAB and pledged the fullest cooperation for the promotion of the
objectives of the Programme. Report of the TAB, E/1742, at J 7 (July 4, 1950). In addition, the International
Telecommunications Union (ITU) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) became Participating
Organizations on August 30,1951 by ECOSOC resolution 400 (XIII), and the International Atomic Energy
Association (IAEA) on October 23, 1958, by ECOSOC resolution 704 (XXVI) of the same date.
18. Id. at 5 9 3-4.
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The TAC was proposed as a standing committee of ECOSOC, consisting
of the members of ECOSOC. The terms of reference for the TAC were as
follows: to critically examine activities undertaken by the Programme and the
results achieved; to examine each year's programme; to interpret ECOSOC re-
solution 222 (IX) in the event of conflicts; to receive reports from the TAB; and
to review the working relationships between the Participating Organizations.' 9
At the first meeting of the TAB, a draft basic Agreement was prepared to
be used in negotiating with the recipient countries regarding the provision of the
technical assistance. The Agreement was based on the Observations and
Guiding Principles contained in ECOSOC resolution 222 (IX), Annex I, and the
experience of a number of international organizations.' The agreement set out
the basic terms and conditions under which the Participating Agencies would
provide technical assistance to the recipient countries and addressed issues
relating to the type of assistance to be provided, administrative and financial
arrangements and the privileges and immunities to be accorded to the
Participating Agencies and their personnel.2 The clauses in this early
agreement are similar to those still being used today in UNDP's standard basic
assistance agreement (SBAA).22
As has been shown, the Expanded Programme was truly a joint initiative
of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies. The Specialized Agencies
were deeply involved in establishing the principles upon which technical
assistance would be provided to Governments under the Expanded Programme.
From the earliest efforts of the United Nations in the field of development
cooperation, the Specialized Agencies assumed the role of providing and
managing such assistance.
B. The Special Fund
The Special Fund was established following a number of years of study by
special committees of the General Assembly and ECOSOC on ways of
enhancing urgent assistance to developing countries, as complementary to the
work already done by the United Nations, the specialized agencies and the
Expanded Programme. The purpose was to "advance the process of technical,
19. Id. at 6 6.
20. Id. 116.
21. Articles in the agreement addressed: Furnishing of Technical Assistance; Cooperation of the
Government with Respect to the Provision of Technical Assistance; Administrative and Financial Obligations
of the Parties; Facilities, Privileges and Immunities; Publication of Findings; Modification of Agreement,
Supplemental Agreements and Termination. Id at Annex 1.
22. See discussion of SBAA below.
23. See Resolutions Adopted on the Reports of the Second Committee, G.A. Res. 923 (X) (1955);
G.A. Res. 1030 (XI), U.N. GAOR, 537th mtg. (1957).
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economic and social development of the less developed countries, and, in
particular, [...to] facilitate new capital investments of all types - private and
public, national and international - by creating conditions which would make
such investments either feasible or more effective."
24
By its resolution 1219 (XI), and on the basis of the reports prepared by the
Ad hoc Committee on the Question of the Establishment of a Special United
Nations Fund for Economic Development, the General Assembly established
the basic conditions for the establishment of the Special Fund and the terms of
reference of a Preparatory Committee, composed of representatives of sixteen
Governments and appointed by the General Assembly.25
The Special Fund was intended to establish a new administrative and
operational machinery to spearhead the enlargement of the scope of technical
assistance available from the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies, to
include such activities as "intensive surveys of water, mineral and potential
power resources, the establishment-including staffing and equipping-of training
institutes in public administration, statistics and technology, and agricultural
and industrial research and productivity centres."'26
The establishment of the Special Fund was accomplished in October 1958,
by General Assembly resolution 1240 (XIII), entitled "Establishment of the
Special Fund." The resolution was adopted on the recommendation of
ECOSOC, which by its resolution 692 (XXVI) if 31 July 1958 had set out the
basic principles and structure of the Fund, following review of the
recommendations of the Preparatory Committee.27
The realization of the Special Fund was a unique accomplishment of the
United Nations in the field of development. Many of the institutions until that
time, such as UNICEF, had been by and large inherited from the League of
Nations and so this was one of the new structures under the Charter of the
United Nations. The Fund was provided a separate inter-governmental
governing body, known as the Governing Council.' The Council was to
exercise inter-governmental control of the policies and operations of the Fund,
with final authority for the approval of the projects and programmes
recommended by the Managing Director. It was to provide "general policy
guidance on the administration and operations of the Special Fund." The
management of the Fund was to be entrusted to a Management Director
appointed by the Secretary-General after consultation with the Governing
24. See Financing of Economic Development, G.A. Res. 1219 (XIl), U.N. GAOR, 730th mtg.
(1957).
25. G.A. Res. 1219 (XII) was adopted on December 14, 1957.
26. Id. M 1-2.
27. See Id. 12.
28. The Governing Council was transformed into the Executive Board in 1994 as a result of General
Assembly resolution 48/162 dated December 20, 1993.
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Council and subject to confirmation by the General Assembly. The
Management Director was to be advised by a Consultative Board consisting of
the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Executive Chairman of the
Technical Assistance Board and the President of the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development or their designated representatives.29
Immediately following the Governing Council's second session in May of
1959, action was taken towards establishing the legal framework of Special
Fund projects.3 ° The Governing Council prepared standard agreements
designed to govern the relations between the Special Fund on the one hand, and
the recipient governments and executing agencies on the other.3" These
agreements were similar to those used by the Expanded Programme and
embodied the conditions under which the Fund would provide each government
with assistance. The Agreement specified the nature of participation of the
government in the execution of projects, its counterpart contribution (provision
of materials, equipment, supplies, etc.) as well as the provision of local
facilities. The Agreement also dealt with the provision of privileges and
immunities to be accorded to the Special Fund and the executing agencies, their
property, funds and assets, and their personnel.3 2
The Standard Agreement with the Specialized Agencies, the UN or the
IAEA when acting as Executing Agency, known as the Executing Agency
Agreement, specified the respective responsibilities for the execution of
projects and outlined the financial and reporting arrangements.33 Pursuant to
this agreement, the role of the Specialized Agencies under the Special Fund
remained much the same as in the Expanded Programme. The Managing
Director of the Fund was to rely on the assistance of the Specialized Agencies
29. The Consultative Board would seem to be the precursor of the modern day Management
Committee established by the UNDP Executive Board for UNOPS.
30. Implementation of the Programme Approved By the Governing Council at its Second Session,
U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., U.N. Doc. SF/L 22, at 1, 12 (1959).
31. Annual Report ofthe Managing Director ofthe Special Fundfor 1999, U.N. GAOR, 4th Sess.,
Agenda Item 5, U.N. Doc. SF/L.28, at 14 28 (1960). Drafted StandardAgreement with Executing Agency,
U.N. GAOR, 2d Sess., Agenda Item 7, U.N. Doc. SF/L12/Add. 15/Rev. 1 (1959).
32. Id 129. The articles of agreement addressed the following. Assistance to be provided by the
Special Fund, Execution of Projects, Information Concerning Project, Co-operation of Government in
Execution of Project, Local Facilities to be Provided by the Government to the Special Fund and the
Executing Agency. Relation to Assistance from other Sources, Use of Assistance, Facilities- Privileges and
Immunities, Settlements of Disputes, and General Provisions. See, e.g., Draft Standard Agreement with
Governments, U.N. GAOR, 2d Sess., U.N. Doc. SFIL12/Add.14/ Rev.1 (1959).
33. U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. SF/L28 130 (1959). The agreement included articles on the following:
Performance of Work by Executing Agency, Conclusion of Agreement with Governments, Executing Agency
Status in Carrying out Projects, Information Regarding projects, Cost of Projects, Manner of Payment,
Records-Accounts-Vouchers, Expenses of Preparation, Currency and Rates of Exchange, Revision of
Financial Arrangements, Immunities of Subcontractor, and General Provisions. See, e.g., SFIL. 12/Add.15/
Rev. 1, "Draft Standard Agreement with Executing Agency."
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when evaluating project requests and to use the services available within the
Expanded Programme, moreover such Agencies along with the UN and LAEA
were responsible for the execution of the projects.
In addition to the two aforementioned sets of agreements which constituted
the basic legal framework for co-operation, a Plan of Operation was signed by
the three parties concerned, for each individual project. A typical Plan of
Operation, as a tripartite agreement between the Government, the Special Fund
and the Executing Agency concerned, contained a description of the project, a
detailed work plan for its execution including particulars concerning experts,
fellowships and equipment to be provided, a timetable showing sequence of
operation, and a detailed budget of the costs to be borne by the government and
the Special Fund.' Today, the Plan of Operation is known as the programme
support or project document.
The other salient features of the Fund were that projects were to be
undertaken only at the request of a Government or group of Governments (as
with the Expanded Programme); the execution of projects was to be carried out
by the United Nations, by the Specialized Agencies and the IAEA; and the
Managing Director was authorized to contract services of "other agencies,
private firms or individual experts" where the services of the executing
agencies were "wholly or partly unavailable or inadequate."
C. The Consolidation of the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance
and the Special Fund into the United Nations Development Programme
UNDP was established by General Assembly resolution 2029(XX) of 22
November 1965 by merging the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance
and the Special Fund, on the understanding that the special characteristics and
operations of the two programmes, as well as two separate funds, were to be
maintained and that contributions would be pledged to the two programmes
separately.35 The justifications for the merger were to, inter alia, streamline the
activities of the two programmes and provide a "more solid basis for the future
growth and evolution" of UN assistance programmes.36
A single inter-governmental committee of thirty-seven members known as
the Governing Council of UNDP was established to perform the functions
previously exercised by the Governing Council of the Special Fund and the
TAC, including the consideration and approval of projects and programmes and
allocation of funds. In addition, the Governing Council was to provide general
policy guidance and direction for the United Nations Development Programme
34. U.N. GAOR, 4th Sess., Supp. No. 28-29, at 15 131, U.N. Doc. SF/L.28 (1960).
35. G.A. Res.2029, U.N. GAOR, 220th Sess., Supp. Nos. 1,4,6, at 20, U.N. Doc. A/5748 (1965).
36. Id. at pmbl.
20001
48 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 7:39
as a whole, as well as for the United Nations regular programmes of technical
assistance.37
In place of the TAB of the Expanded Programme and the Consultative
Board of the Special Fund, an advisory committee known as the Inter-Agency
Consultative Board of UNDP was established. The Board was to meet under
the chairmanship of the Administrator or Co-Administrator and was to include
the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the executive heads of the
specialized agencies and of the International Atomic Energy Agency or their
representatives. The Board was to be consulted on all significant aspects of the
United Nations Development Programme, in particular, on the programmes and
projects submitted by governments prior to their submission to the Governing
Council, the selection of agencies for the execution of specific projects, and the
appointment of the Resident Representative.38
In 1969, a few years following the consolidation of the Expanded
Programme and the Special Fund, the United Nations commissioned a Study on
the Capacity of the United Nations Development System.39 The purpose of the
Study was to assess the capacity of the United Nations system to effectively use
UNDP's resources and its capacity to handle a programme double the
operations at that tine.' The Study critiqued the problems experienced in the
UN development system, in quantitative and qualitative terms, and made
recommendations for the future.
With respect to the qualitative aspects of UN development programmes
relevant to the present paper, the Study pointed out that a donor bias existed
whereby initiative came from specialized agencies and not from the country
itself, that there was a failure to recognize the need for a comprehensive
approach to development problems and insufficient emphasis on training.4' The
Study further noted that development projects resulted from the "salesmanship"
of specialized agencies rather than the priority needs of recipient governments,
that specialized agencies had heavy operational burdens which resulted in
delays in programme delivery as well as a decline in quality.42 Included in the
Study's recommendations to address the problems was the need to broaden the
concept of development to take into account the changing political, economic
and social conditions, noting that international development is made up of
individual national goals and reaffirming the country approach to
37. Id. 4.
38. Id 6.
39. A Study of the Capacity of the United Nations Development System, G.A. Res. 2029, U.N.
GAOR., 20th Sess., Supp. Nos. 1, 4, 6, at 20, U.N. Doc. DP/5 (1969).
40. Id 1.
41. Id. 21.
42. Id 23 (a)-(b).
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development. 43  With respect to the specialized agencies, the Study
recommended that, in cases where specialized agencies were over-burdened,
projects should be contracted outside the system, noting that the legislative
authority already existed, whereby the Administrator could specify that an
Agency subcontract on his behalf when assigning a project to it for execution.'
Following the recommendations contained in the Study, the General
Assembly adopted resolution 2688(XXV) of 11 December 1970, which sets out
UNDP's methods of operation, excluding the subsequent changes relating, inter
alia, to national execution discussed below.45 In accordance with this
resolution, distinctions between the Technical Assistance and Special Fund
components have been eliminated.' UNDP was to operate under the "United
Nations Development Co-Operation Cycle, which included the following
phases: country programme formulation, project formulation, appraisal and
approval, implementation, evaluation and follow-up." '47 The Cycle also
included periodic reviews.4
Pursuant to resolution 2688, country programming, the first phase of the
Cycle, is based on individual national development plans, or where they do not
exist, on national development priorities or objectives. The Government of the
country concerned retains the exclusive responsibility for formulating its
national development plan.49 The total resources available for programming is
divided between country programming on the one hand and inter-country
programming (consisting of sub-regional, regional, interregional, and global
projects) on the other."
The implementation of UNDP assistance is overseen by the Governing
Council and the Administrator. The Governing Council is empowered to
approve projects submitted by programmes for consideration. However, the
Governing Council while retaining this authority, delegates to the Administrator
43. Id. 134.
44. G.A. Res. 2029, supra note 39, at 20.
45. Other significant changes since the Consensus relate to the introduction of the programming
approach which seeks to integrate projects into a coordinated programme or programmes within the country
The Program Approach, U.N. Doc.E/199373, Annex I; U.N. Doc. E/ 995/98, 169 and the shift from the
use of the Indicative Planning Figure (IPF) for the allocation of programme resources which was essentially
guaranteed funding for the country programme to TRAC resources which is based on the premise that
governments get only a percentage ofdesignated funding and that the remainder is contingent upon minimum
performance indicators (cite).
46. See G.A. Res. 2029, supra note 39.
47. G.A. Res. 2688, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., annex, 1 1, 2, 4, 7, 11, at 50-59, U.N. Doc.
E/4884/Rev.1 (1970).
48. Id. 1l.
49. d 9 4-5.
50. Id. 24. Recent developments in the area of the country program, country cooperation
framework, program cycle, and program resources can be found.
2000]
50 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 7:39
for three years the authority to approve projects within country programmes. 5'
The Governing Council has over-all responsibility for ensuring that the
resources of the Programme are employed with maximum efficiency and
effectiveness in assisting the development of the developing countries.52 In
particular, the Council's responsibilities includes: considering and approving
country programmes, approving certain projects included in the programmes,
exercising operational control (including periodic reviews of the country
programmes), and making broad allocations of resources and control their use.53
In addition to the responsibilities delegated to him by the Governing
Council, the Administrator is fully responsible. and accountable to the
Governing Council for all phases and aspects of the implementation of the
Programme. 4 The application of the twin principle of the Administrator's full
accountability for the Programme and the decentralization to the country level
envisaged in General Assembly resolution 2688 required modifications in the
existing structures and procedures of the Programme. At the headquarters level,
regional bureaus were established to provide a direct link between the
Administrator and the resident representative in all matters concerning field
activities.55 In addition, in order to analyze the main trends in the evolution of
the Programme, a small long-term planning staff was established at the
headquarters level under the direction of a senior official.5 6 In addition, at the
country level, the resident representative was re-designated resident director.57
There was the maximum possible delegation of authority to the resident
director; he was to have full over-all responsibility for the programme in the
country concerned.58
Thus, under General Assembly resolution 2688, the role of the specialized
agencies in the provision of development assistance is preserved. The
resolution stipulates that the role of such Agencies is to be that of partners and
their advice available to the Administrator in the implementation of all projects,
whether executed by them or not.59 The resolution further stipulates that such
Agencies shall have first consideration as executing agents for the
implementation of the programme assistance.'
51. Id. 120.
52. G.A. Res. 2688, supra note 50, at 35.
53. Id. 36.
54. Id. 137.
55. Id. 57.
56. Id. 158.
57. G.A. Res. 2688, supra note 50, at 62.
58. Id. 163.
59. Id. 38.
60. Id. 7 39-40.
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Following the consolidation of UNDP, the Administrator commenced
preparation of a new standard agreement with a view to reflecting the "unitary
concept" of UNDP and to incorporating certain provisions from the project
documents in order to simplify negotiations with the recipient countries on such
project documents. 1 Today, over 130 governments have signed the new basic
agreement, referred to as the SBAA. It continues to be the basic agreement
between UNDP and programme country governments that sets out the terms
and conditions of UNDP's support to such countries.
II1. SECTION Two
A. The Transition to Government Execution
Throughout the period up to 1974, development theory, policy and practice
remained largely unchanged. The persistence of under-development was
explained by the lack of technical skills, shortage of managerial capacity and
dearth of capital.6 2 The injection of technical assistance and capital from more
advanced countries was the logical solution.
However, by the Second United Nations Development Decade developing
countries expressed the desire for a new international economic order, in part
a manifestation of the declining validity of the traditional approach to
development. The General Assembly adopted the International Strategy for the
Decade on October 24, 1970, wherein the General Assembly confirmed that the
ultimate objective of development must be to bring about sustained
improvement in the well-being of the individual and bestow benefits on all.63
By 1974, the General Assembly had proclaimed a "New International Economic
Order," declaring that the greatest achievement during the last decades had been
the independence from colonial domination and that the present international
economic order was in direct conflict with developments in international
political and economic relations. 4 The General Assembly further declared that
changes in the international economy necessitated full and equal participation
of developing countries in all decisions concerning the international
community.'
These dramatic changes in the international economic order forced UNDP
to consider new dimensions in technical cooperation. UNDP recognized that
the increased emphasis placed on self-reliance by developing countries required
61. Report of the Administrator on the Standard Agreement With Governments: Note by the
Administrator, G.A. (Res. 2688., U.N. GAOR, 16th Sess., Item no. 6, U.N. Doc. DP/86, 6 (1974).
62. Harrod/Dumas Growth Model.
63. G.A. Res. 2626, U.N. GAOR, Item no. 42, U.N. Doc. A/81241DS (1970).
64. G.A. Res. 3201, U.N. GAOR, 6th Sess., Item no. 7, U.N. Doc. A/9548 (1974).
65. Id. IN 1-3.
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a re-thinking of the automatic dependence on external inputs in technical
assistance." It is against this backdrop that UNDP declared for the first time
that governments and institutions in recipient countries should be increasingly
entrusted with the responsibility for executing UNDP projects.67 This view was
supported by a group of experts selected by the Secretary-General, at the
request of the General Assembly in resolution 3343 (XXIX) of December 17,
1974, to recommend proposals on structural changes within the United Nations
system to ensure that it is fully capable of dealing with problems of
international economic cooperation in a comprehensive manner. In this respect,
the experts recommended that responsibility for execution of projects need not
be automatically assigned to specialized agencies but that it could be entrusted
to, inter alia, "the recipient Government itself; institutions in the recipient
country; appropriate consultants, universities, contracting agencies or firms,
etc., institutions of other developed or developing countries."'
Consistent with UNDP's consideration of new dimensions in technical
cooperation, and the recommendations of the group of experts convened by the
General Assembly, in June and November 1975, the Governing Council and the
General Assembly decided that "Governments and institutions" in programme
countries should be increasingly entrusted with the "responsibility for executing
projects" assisted by UNDP.69 The decision by the Governing Council and the
General Assembly constituted the first major legal step towards government
execution and represents a significant progression from General Assembly
resolution 2688 which gave first consideration for the execution of projects to
organizations of the United Nations system.7'
Shortly after the adoption of resolution 3405 by the General Assembly, the
UNDP Administrator issued guidelines on the execution of UNDP-assisted
projects by governments and institutions of developing countries.7 In the
66. Report oftheAdministrator on the Future Role of UNDP in World Development in the Context
of the Preparations for the Seventh Special Session of the General Assembly, U.N. 3AOR., 20th Sess.,
Agenda Item 3 (c), U.N. Doc. UNDP DP/1 14 (1975).
67. ld. 153.
68. Report of the Group of Experts on the Structure of the United Nations System, U.N. GAOR,
1 150, U.N. Doc. EIAC.62/9 (1975).
69. Decision of the Governing Council, G.A. Res. 3405 (XXX), U.N.GAOR, 487th Mtg., Annex
(e)(i,ii,vii) (1975).
70. G.A. Res. 2688, U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess., annex IX, at 1 40, 50, U.N. Doc. E/5703 (1975).
Under resolution 2688, however, the Administrator was authorized to make use of "suitable services" from
governmental and non-governmental institutions and firms, through competitive bidding. The provision of
such services would be on the basis of a contract and are, thus, distinguished from execution which implied
a larger role in the management of the project.
71. Guidelines on the Execution of UNDP Assisted Projects by Governments and Institution of
Developing Countries, UNDP, U.N. Doc. UNDP/Prog/51 (1976); U.N. Doc. UNDP/Prog/field/72;
UNDP/Prog/Hqtrs/91 (1976) [hereinafter Guidelines].
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introduction to the guidelines, the Administrator explained that government
execution would constitute "an important aspect of the move towards
decentralization, and a means of economizing on overheads, enhancing the
capabilities of local expertise and institutions, and thereby promoting self-
reliance." 2 The Administrator further explained that government execution
would strengthen the "indispensable role" of governments in their development,
diversify the supply base for UNDP and facilitate the delivery of an expanding
programme.73 In accordance with the guidelines, governments were to
nominate themselves or other national agencies, organizations or institutions as
the "Government Executing Agency" with full responsibility for the
preparation, implementation and follow-up of a project assisted by UNDP.74
Thus, the new partnership with governments under this modality was to be that
of a bipartite relationship between UNDP and the government.75
Upon request of a government to execute a project, U.NDP would carry out
an assessment of the government's capacity to determine whether the proposed
government executing agency had sufficient managerial and technical capability
to fulfill its obligations as executing agency. In order to assess capacity,
Governments were requested to provide information on:
(a) the experience of the institution in executing similar projects,
whether financed from domestic or external sources;
(b) the depth of technical experience and know-how of the
institution and its access to, and links with, national and international
sources of expertise and know-how;
(c) the ability of the institution to exercise adequate managerial and
administrative supervision over the project; and
(d) the internal budgetary, accounting and audit arrangements of the
institution... [as well as] a copy of the financial rules and regulations
of the institution.76
When UNDP determined that the government executing agency had
sufficient capacity to execute the project, under the government execution
guidelines, that entity would be responsible for carrying out the project as it
would if it were a government project. Thus, the government executing agency
would be responsible for the engagement of international and national project
staff, who were responsible to the Government; the procurement, transport and
installation of equipment under the rules and procedures of the government;
72. Id. at 1.
73. Id.
74. I at 3.
75. Id. at2.
76. Guidelines, supra note 71.
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awarding of sub-contracts, which would be entered into directly between the
government and sub-contractor; and placement of fellows in training
institutions and carrying out other training activities."
Although government execution was largely a bilateral arrangement
between INDP and the government, provision was made for the involvement
of specialized agencies and other agencies of the UN system in all stages of the
project cycle. However, the involvement of such agencies was subject to the
specific request of the government and their role under government-executed
projects was limited to providing technical and substantive backstopping and
not the direct delivery of inputs, such as procurement.78
Following the issuance of the guidelines for execution of projects by
governments and institutions, on July 2, 1976, the Governing Council began to
restrict the Administrator's use of government execution by only authorizing
him to initiate government execution projects on a "carefully selected basis
pending submission of a detailed report to the Council ... on the criteria,
evaluation and administrative procedures and changes in the financial rules
necessary for the implementation of that new dimension on a regular basis."'7 9
Thus, although the guidelines on government execution were issued in May of
1976 to field offices and participating/executing agencies, just two months
following their issuance, the Governing Council in its decision 76/57 appeared
to slow down the move towards government execution.
In 1978, the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) prepared a report on the Role of
Experts in Development Cooperation."° The 1978 Report included an
assessment of the government execution modality. In particular, the Report
noted that implementation problems arise in projects when there is a "failure to
recognize government responsibility at the project identification and
formulation stages."'" The inspectors found that Governments which were not
involved at the early stages of project formulation felt that the project activities
did not relate to what they actually wanted and, consequently, expressed little
sense of commitment towards the project.82 The JIU recommended a "fresh
77. ILd. 23.
78. Id. It 49-51.
79. Governing Council decision 76/57, 1 (e) (1976).
80. Report on the Role of Experts in Development Co-Operation, UNDP, at 47.1, U.N. Doc.
JIU/REPf78/3 (1978). [hereinafter Experts]. In accordance with the Statute of the Joint Inspection Unit
(JIU), approved by the General Assembly in resolution 31/192 of 22 December 1976, the JIU consists of not
more than 11 inspectors chosen among members of national supervision or inspection bodies who serve in
their personal capacity. The JIU is charged with the responsibility of investigating all matters bearing on the
efficiency of the services and proper use of funds, including evaluation of programmes and activities. The
inspectors may propose reforms or make recommendations which are contained in reports drawn up under
their signature.
81. IL 144.
82. Id.
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approach" to government execution where each new project supported by
UNDP would be under "full government management."83  Under the JIU
proposal, although the government management authority would be exercised
over all aspects of project implementation, the government could seek the
cooperation of one or more of the agencies of the United Nations system in any
aspect of project preparation or implementation, such as recruitment and
procurement of international project components.8
In preparing the Report, the IU sent questionnaires to governments,
UNDP resident representatives and agencies to elicit views on the applicability
and feasibility of government execution. An analysis of the responses showed
that 4/5 of the 72 responding governments felt that government execution was
appropriate for use in their countries, with half giving it a high priority
ranking. 5 Resident Representatives and Agencies took a more conservative
position than governments in assessing the suitability of government
execution," The JIU further found that many governments had gained
experience in recruitment and procurement through implementation of their
own development programmes and established systematized procedures and
machinery for these purposes.8 The JIU concluded, as follows:
Government project management is an essential step in the direction
of self-reliant development, and it is equally imperative in order to
clear up the existing uncertainty as to where the management
authority for UNDP-assisted projects really lies. The present system
not only divides responsibility and authority - thus contradicting one
of the fundamental principles of good management by setting up dual
chains of command - but it does so in a way which places actual
decision-making powers in large measure beyond the reach of
national authorities, who are nevertheless most vitally concerned. By
the same token, the present system partly diverts the Agencies of the
United Nations system from their proper preoccupation with the
transmission of technical knowledge and skills, by involving them in
numerous management and administrative tasks which should not be
their primary concern. For all these reasons, the present system
contributes to difficulties in project identification, planning and
implementation in which there is insufficient government
participation, and hence leads to large, if as yet unquantified, wastage
in the use of both national and international resources. By accepting
government management as standard procedures for the UNDP
83. Id. 145.
84. Id.
85. Experts, supra note 80.
86. Id. at48.
87. d at 52.
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programme, an energetic start can be made towards rectifying this
situation and reducing the inefficiencies and diseconomies which
characterize it.88
The response of UNDP and the UN Agencies to the JIU Report was one
of caution. In joint comments prepared by UNDP and the UN Agencies, they
indicated that the proposals made by the JIU required the "most careful
assessment" by the Council. 89
Following the JIU report, new guidelines on government execution were
issued on January 18, 1979.9 The major difference in the 1979 procedures as
compared to the 1976 procedures is the prominence of the role of the UN
agencies. The 1976 procedures indicated that under government execution
UNDP and the government would essentially have a bilateral relationship, with
UN agencies providing technical support at the specific request of the
government. In the 1979 procedures, however, the close association of the UN
agencies with UNDP using the government execution modality is affirmed, as
follows:
[Government execution] calls for constant awareness on the part of
UNDP and Agencies of Governments' primary responsibility for all
management aspects of projects, and careful judgement in each case
of how to derive the greatest benefit from the technical experience
and knowledge available with the organizations of the United Nations
system. The interdependence of UNDP and the Agencies in their
support of countries' development efforts and UNDP's reliance on
Agencies' technical judgement in the planning and implementation of
projects and in the assessment of their results call for constant and
close cooperation in all aspects of government execution.9'
Consistent with the maintenance of the role of the UN agencies under
government execution, the 1979 procedures introduced the term "Cooperating
Agency" whereby a UN agency could participate in project execution along
with the Government agency concerned, to assist the government in the
utilization of UNDP-fmanced inputs.' In addition, in Annex 1 to the
procedures, government execution is defined as an "arrangement whereby
88. Id. 154.
89. Joint Comments of UNDP and the Organizations of the United Nations System on JJU's Report
on the Role of Experts in Development Assistance, UNDP, 25th Sess., Supp. nos. 16, 18, 20, U.N. Doc.
DP/334/Add.2 (1978).
90. U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. UNDP/Prog/64; UNDP/Prog/HQTRS/116; UNDP/Prog/ Field/101
(1974).
91. Id. 12.
92. Id. 143.
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UNDP entrusts to a government the responsibility for the mobilization of
UNDP-financed inputs and their effective application, in combination with the
government's own and other available resources, towards the project's
objectives. '"" In hccordance with the 1979 procedures, governments were
invited to designate one central authority to represent the government in dealing
with UNDP, however, the central authority did not have to be the same entity
actually carrying out project activities.'
In his report to the Governing Council in DP/558 of March 12, 1981, the
Administrator proposed a reversal of the cautious and selective approach to
implementing government execution previously adopted by the Governing
Council. While the debate on the Report reflected a range of views, with some
member states fully endorsing the approach and others arguing for a
continuation of the cautious approach, the Governing Council requested, in its
decision 81/21, that the Administrator give "full consideration" to
implementation of UNDP assistance by the host governments and that the
Administrator, along with representatives of the UN agencies, should review
and analyze in greater detail the reasons for the lack of progress in
implementing government execution.95
In response to decision 81/21, the Administrator submitted a report to the
Governing Council wherein he stated that the experience with government
execution had generally been positive, with a "slow but steady" progress in its
use." Findings contained in the report indicated that most governments felt
that, through government execution, they were closer to realizing self-reliance
in their development efforts. Others felt that through assuming full
responsibility in project design and implementation, the projects would be more
likely to "respond to specific requirements determined by local norms, values
and conditions. 97 However, the Report also noted that some governments
preferred the traditional modality of providing assistance through the use of the
UN agencies.98 The Report concluded that while many governments saw the
concept of government execution in a favourable light, they did not see
immediate large-scale implementation of government execution."
93. Id. Annex 1 7.
94. Id. Annex 19.
95. Governing Council Decision, U.N. GAOR, 734th mtg., U.N. Doc. 81/21. (1981).
96. Report ofthe Administrator Government Execution, UNDP, 29th Sess. U.N. Doc. DP/1982/11
8 (1982). For example, in 1976, two projects were under government execution for a total UNDP
contribution of US $1,630,230; by 1981, forty projects were under government execution for a total
contribution of US $12,298,538 See, e.g. DP/1982/11 /Add.11 1982, 1 13.
97. Id. 113; (See e.g. U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. DP/19821 I/Add. II, T 13. (1982).
98. Id. 17.
99. Id. ( 20-21.
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In April of 1987, the Administrator again reviewed the impact of
government execution."°  In his report to the Governing Council, the
Administrator noted that since its inception, government execution had grown
in importance and complexity. By the end of 1986, some 600 projects had been
executed by governments for a total of US $150 million."0 ' The Asia and
Pacific region utilized the government execution modality more than any other
region, with China executing the highest number (40) of projects. 2 At the end
of 1986, the four sectors with the largest number of government executed
projects were general development issues, policy and planning; agriculture,
forestry and fisheries; natural resources; and industry. 'I
With respect to the impact of government execution, the Administrator
indicated that an evaluation exercise was underway to make detailed
assessments of the successes and failures of government execution. The
Administrator further explained that preliminary replies from Resident
Representatives indicated that a high proportion of the government executed
projects appeared successful. 4 However, the Administrator pointed out that
some problems had been experienced with government execution, including
low rates of delivery.0 5 The reasons for the low delivery were being
investigated but it appeared that it was related to delays in recruiting experts
and slow reporting." 6 In addition, the Administrator indicated that cost-
effectiveness was to be measured by the evaluation exercise underway. It was
noted in this respect that the UNDP field offices and headquarters had
expended considerable resources in supporting government execution, largely
in the area of administrative and financial/accounting support. The reason for
this was not the inability of governments to carry out administrative, financial
and accounting procedures but was due to the difficulty in getting governments
to comply with extraneous administrative and accounting procedures for
projects which were considered relatively small in relation to governmental
budgets. 7 The Administrator concluded that the general assessment of
government execution was that much progress had been made.0 8 The detailed
100. Report of the Administrator: Government execution, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. DP/1987/16
(1987). [hereinafter Administrator].
101. Id. 45.
102. Id. 46-47.
103. Id. 48.
104. Id 52.
105. For example, in 1981, the total programme delivery rate was 77.6%, but only 61.6% for
government executed projects; in 1985, the total programme delivery rate was 69.1%, but only 50.1% for
government executed projects. Administrator, supra note 100, at 157.
106. 1 58.
107. Id. 63, 68.
108. ld 9[79.
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evaluation was submitted to the Governing Council on 4 March 1988."° The
response of the Governing Council was positive, with the Council, in its
decision 88/18, encouraging Governments to "continue the expansion of
government execution."'110
By 1989, it was felt by UNDP that a new agreement was needed with
governments entrusted with the execution of UNDP projects. The SBAA was
prepared on the basis of the tripartite approach, whereby UNDP executing
agencies would carry out the project activities. As such, the SBAA did not
envision execution by governments. Thus, in order to set out the legal
framework of government execution, the roles and responsibilities of the
parties, and to address certain problems that had arisen in the past with respect
to government execution relating, inter alia, to the lack of a central
coordinating authority representing the government and to the increased
involvement of field offices in carrying out project activities on behalf of
governments, a new Government Execution Agreement was prepared."I
Pursuant to that agreement, a central governmental authority would be charged
to coordinate the projects executed by the Government and to select the entity
to carry out the actual execution of the project. In cases where the Government
could not perform the full range of activities, provision was made for a UNDP
Executing Agency to act as a cooperating agency to assist the Government in
carrying out project activities. Finally, the agreement charged the Government
to be accountable to the Administrator for the proper utilization of the project
funds and implementation of project activities. Thus, the Governments were
to submit audited financial reports and accurate technical progress reports.
Unfortunately, for reasons that are not entirely clear, this agreement was never
used by UNDP. The government execution arrangements continued to be
carried out under the SBAA, with modest adjustments to the project document
to address some of the new financial and administrative details required under
government execution."'
109. Governing Council, UNDP, 36th Sess., at 57, U.N. Doc. DP/1988/19/A.2 (1988).
110. Governing Council Decision, UNDP, 35th Sess. '11, at 56, Doc. DP/1988/12/A..2 (1988).
111. Memorandum from Mr. Francis Ssekandi, Deputy Director, General Legal Division, to Mr.
Douglas Stafford, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Finance and Administration, UNDP, dated
October 26, 1989.
112. There may have been concern that governments would not sign the new agreement and that it
would be easier to continue using the SBAA, with the modifications on the project document. In this respect,
three annexes were developed to attach to the project documents to address the new financial and
administrative arrangements under government execution. See, e.g., UNDP PPM, Section 3490 et al on
Government Execution.
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B. National Execution
By 1990, the term "government execution" was replaced with "national
execution" to better reflect the variety of ways in which projects are
implemented. 3 At the same time, UNDP began referring to national execution
as the "ultimate modality" for activities supported by UNDP." 4 UNDP defined
national execution, as follows:
National execution is a cooperative operational arrangement whereby
the Government assumes responsibility for the effective management
of all aspects of its UNDP-financed technical assistance projects and
programmes as requested by it and agreed to by the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP). National execution recognizes
the wide range of technical support possibilities, and encourages
implementation arrangements that draw upon outside technical
expertise and in particular, the specialized agencies of the United
Nations. Under national execution, Governments are responsible for
the conduct of all project and programme activities including those
implemented by the specialized agencies of the United Nations, the
Office of Personnel Services (OPS) of UNDP, or other organizations
or institutions on their behalf. Governments are accountable to the
Administrator of UNDP for ensuring the most appropriate
implementation arrangements, the quality of technical cooperation
funded by UNDP and its judicious financial management." 5
With respect to the role of the specialized agencies in national execution,
UNDP saw the effective use and association of the specialized agencies as a
major challenge." 6 In this respect, the Administrator pointed out in its report
to the Governing Council that the specialized agencies had been used only to
a very limited extent in national execution. One reason for this trend suggested
by the Administrator is the appearance of new implementation agents on the
international development scene - non governmental organizations, private
sector firms and national institutions." 7  Notwithstanding the limited
involvement of specialized agencies and the appearance of new actors in the
113. Report of the Administrator, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. DP/1990/33 7 (1990).
114. Id. 3.
115. Id 8. The Governing Council of UNDP took note of the Administrator's report containing
the proposed definition of national execution (Governing Council decision 90/21 1 (1990).
116. Report of the Administrator to the Governing Council, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. DP/1991/23
136. (1991).
117. Id. 37.
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development area, the Administrator concluded that there is still a "significant
continuing role for United Nations specialized agencies.".. 8
At the request of the Governing Council, UNDP issued guidelines for field
offices on national execution in 1992, which defined key terminology such as
execution and implementation and the roles of the Government, specialized
agencies and UNDP in national execution. However, in 1993, the General
Assembly, in resolution 47/199, while affirming that national execution should
be the "norm for programmes and projects supported by the UN system, taking
into account the needs and capacities of recipient countries," again requested
that the United Nations development system agree on a common interpretation
of national execution. Thus, the Consultative Committee on Programme and
Operational Questions (CCPOQ), under the authority of the Secretary-General,
agreed that national execution is a "cooperative operational arrangement
entailing, inter alia, overall responsibility for the formulation and management
of programmes and projects by the recipient country, as well as the recipient
country's assumption of accountability for them."" 9 The CCPOQ also agreed
on the objectives and guiding principles for national execution, including, inter
alia, the recognition of the central role, ownership, direction and control of the
Government, and the enhancement of capacity building, self-reliance and
sustainability."2
Thus, by 1993, after almost 20 years since the first legislation on
government execution, the General Assembly had endorsed national execution
as the norm for the provision of development assistance by the United Nations
development system, with UNDP at the center of that system. Through this
progression to national execution, UNDP attempted to adapt itself to respond
to the needs of programme country governments and their desire to be in charge
of their national development programmes. UNDP's willingness to make
national execution the norm was a recognition of the fact that empowerment of
and control by national governments was the only way to lead to real impact
and results.
IV. SECTION THREE
A. Initial Assessment of National Execution
In 1995, a team of experts carried out an independent evaluation of
national execution, publishing an abridged and edited by UNDP under the title
118. Id.
119. National Execution and Implementation Arrangements, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. E/1993f73,
Annex 4, at 44 (1993).
120. Id.
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"National Execution: Promise and Challenges." '' The evaluation is based on
a field study of 11 countries, Chile, China, Burkina Faso, Egypt, Ethiopia,
Malawi, Nicaragua, Peru, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Zimbabwe.
The study noted that 75% of all UNDP projects were carried out through
national execution. 2 The evaluators found that national execution had both
positive and negative attributes. On the positive side, national execution 1)
improved and expanded the sense of ownership of programmes; 2) increased
self-reliance; 3) contributed to capacity building; and 4) increased cost-
effectiveness. On the negative side, national execution has led to 1) delays in
implementation due to the participatory nature of the modality; and 2) weak
public sector institutions have necessitated short-term compromises such as
national execution support units and parallel salary scales which jeopardize the
long-term objective of institutional capacity building. In this respect, the study
noted that in Latin America, national execution was used to bypass normal
government institutions to ensure that programme activities are completed on
time and to ensure that the funds are properly utilized.
The study was inconclusive on the cost-effectiveness of national
execution. An analysis of project budgets showed a modest decline in the
number of work months assigned to international personnel, with a large
increase in work months delivered by national personnel.124 However, evidence
did not show that greater use of national personnel affected performance, either
positively or negatively. Moreover, a full analysis of cost-effectiveness would
have to take into account costs related to the increased workload of UNDP
country offices.
The study was inconclusive on whether national execution led to increased
sustainability of programmes and projects. The evaluators noted that national
execution should lead to increased sustainability because the programmes are
more fully integrated into national structures, the greater use of national
personnel reduces technical discontinuity at the completion of projects, and the
sense of ownership enhances the possibility that governments will continue
supporting project activities in the future."n
The evaluators noted that the tripartite relationship among UNDP,
governments and specialized agencies no longer applies in its traditional form
as governments increasingly assume functions relating to ownership, oversight,
execution and implementation while the role of the specialized agencies is to
provide technical support. Thus, the evaluators recommended the adoption of
121. The team consisted of the following experts: Mr. Fuat Andic, Richard Huntington, and Ralf
Maurer with support from Mr. Abdenour Benbouali.
122. NATIONAL EXECUTION: PROMISES AND CHALLENGES, 7 (Z. Jamal ed., 1995).
123. l at 24.
124. Id at 25.
125. Id. at 27-28.
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a new conceptual framework for national execution with more clearly defined
roles for UNDP, Government, and Specialized Agencies. The new model
suggested by the evaluators envisages UNDP and Government as partners who
would select a management team which would normally be a national entity but
could be a specialized agency if agreed by the partners that using such an
agency was the optimal way to proceed.
126
In addition to the 1995 evaluation, national execution has been regularly
reviewed internally by the Board of Auditors. Recommendations of the Board
of Auditors on the 1994-95 biennium included that UNDP should re-emphasize
the need to assess the Government's capacity to undertake national execution;
the objectives of national execution should be clearly defined to provide closer
link to UNDP's aims; and that UNDP should issue new guidance on national
execution to reflect all relevant legislation.
2 7
In order to address some of the issues raised in the 1995 evaluation of
national execution and periodic comments of the Board of Auditors, UNDP
revised the procedures for national execution which were finalized following
guidance from the UNDP Executive Board in 1998. The procedures define
national execution, consistent with the definition used by the CCPOQ in 1993,
as a "cooperative operational arrangement entailing, among other things, overall
responsibility and assumption of accountability of the formulation and
management by the programme country of UNDP supported programmes and
projects." The key principles of national execution are the use of government
rules and procedures where they are consistent with internationally recognized
practices, government accountability for effective use of UNDP resources and
adherence to UNDP rules and regulations when the UNDP country office
provides services.
The procedures stipulate that national execution is based on an expression
of government's interest and willingness to assume management responsibilities
for the programme or project as well as national capacities. The procedures set
out key considerations for execution to guide country offices in determining
where national capacities need to be strengthened. Such considerations fall
within the areas of technical, managerial, administrative and financial capacity
of the national entity.
The procedures describe the roles of the various actors in nationally-
executed programmes and projects. The Government Coordinating Authority,
the focal point for all communications with UNDP, assumes ultimate
responsibility for the overall management of the programme or project on
behalf of the Government. The Government Coordinating Authority in
126. Id. at 9.
127. Report of the Board of Auditors, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 5A, U.N. Doc.
A/51/5/Add.1 (1995).
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consultation with UNDP designates the national entity which will serve as the
executing agent primarily responsible for the planning and overall management
of programme and project activities, reporting, accounting, monitoring and
evaluation, and audit. The executing agent can be a Ministry, a department
within a ministry; any other national entity, such as a central bank, a university,
regional and local authorities and municipalities. The implementing agent,
which provides services or carries out activities under the supervision of the
executing agent, including procurement activities, can be the executing agent
itself, another government entity, a United Nations executing agency (i.e. a
specialized agency or other UN entities authorized to execute projects) or an
outside entity such as an NGO, a private company, a consulting firm or a
university. In addition to acting in the capacity of an implementing agent, the
procedures specify that UN agencies can provide support to policy and
programme development (policy for the formulation of strategies and
programmes, advisory services and sectoral advice, technical assistance needs
assessment, sectoral or multi-disciplinary studies) as well as technical support
at all stages of the programme or project cycle (formulation and appraisal,
technical support and monitoring of activities during implementation,
evaluation).
The procedures provide that in addition to the assistance that UNDP
normally provides to UNDP-supported programmes and projects, the UNDP
country office may provide further support to the executing and implementing
agents including assistance with UNDP reporting requirements and making
direct payments.
One of the most important sections of the new procedures deals with the
provision of support services, including recruitment of personnel, facilitation
of training activities, procurement of goods and services, by the country office.
UNDP sought confirmation of its mandate from the Executive Board to provide
such services, which some delegations argued were tantamount to direct
execution, outside UNDP's mandate. In a hotly debated session of the
Executive Board in January 1998, the Executive Board reaffirmed UNDP's
mandate to provide support services under the following conditions, which are
reflected in the national execution procedures: the services can only be
provided at the request of the Government and for activities within the country
cooperation framework; the services must be in support of the implementation
of activities described in the annex to the programme support or project
document; the support must be provided based on a capacity assessment and be
accompanied by capacity building measures including an exit strategy to ensure
that long-term capacity building objectives are notjeopardized; and the nature
of the support will take into account services which can be provided by other
Ssekandi & Johnson
UN agencies.128 In order to placate those delegations which were concerned
that country office support services were in fact direct execution, namely
Germany, France, Belgium, Switzerland (only an observer), the Executive
Board also specified that direct execution activities of UNDP should be limited
to countries in special circumstances and apply only when it is "essential to
safeguard the full responsibility and accountability of the Administrator for the
effective programme and project delivery."' 29
The procedures also stipulate that the costs of providing such services by
the country office must be detailed in the annex to the programme support or
project document and recovered by UNDP.
In addition to direct country office support, the procedures describe
support services provided by management support units, which carry out
administrative work such as procurement, payment, contracting as well as
reporting, programme management training and capacity building activities.
The procedures stipulate that such units can only be supported or funded by
UNDP when UNDP has assessed sustainability, cost-effectiveness, and capacity
building. Clear responsibilities must be assigned to the unit and described in
the programme support or project document. The support provided by such
units is supposed to be temporary, clearly defined and accompanied by capacity
building measures. The unit is supposed to function within a government
structure and under government supervision. Finally, UNDP cannot employ or
remunerate civil servants working within such a unit and such units cannot be
established with the UNDP country office.
The procedures also give detailed guidance on monitoring and evaluation,
financial management and reporting and audit requirements.
With respect to the legal framework for national execution, UNDP has not
pursued the conclusion of the government execution agreement prepared in
1989. Instead, the national execution procedures provide for the conclusion of
a letter agreement with governments to address the support services provided
by UNDP field offices. The agreement extends the privileges and immunities
accorded to UNDP under the SBAA to the support services provided by UNDP
field offices under national execution. Thus, the SBAA continues to set out the
basic conditions of UNDP's support to programme country governments.
Under that overall agreement, the details concerning national execution are
reflected in annexes to the project documents and in the letter agreements on
support services provided by the UNDP field offices.
128. U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. U.N. Doc. DP/1998/2, dec. 98/2 (1998).
129. Id. I 8(g).
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B. The Future Direction of UNDP and National Execution
After 23 years, national execution is now legally and actually the preferred
modality for the execution of UNDP programmes and projects. During the 23
years leading up to the 1998 national execution procedures, the tension between
giving responsibility to the Governments and taking such responsibility away
from specialized agencies is evident. Clearly, the donors and member states of
such agencies have been aware of the impact that national execution would
have on the involvement of such agencies in UNDP programmes and
projects-that the role of specialized agencies would be marginalized and their
use in such programmes and projects reduced.
What has also become clear in the transition to national execution is that
as the role of the specialized agencies has become less significant, the role of
the UNDP country office has become more prominent. With the 1998 decision
of the UNDP Executive Board, the country office role in providing support
services has been reaffirmed. These activities, which include procurement and
recruitment, are activities formally provided by specialized agencies. Under
national execution, these activities should in principle be carried out by the
national entities responsible for the programmes and projects. Thus, the role
of the country office in national execution will have to be monitored carefully
to ensure that governments are empowered to manage and carry out all aspects
of the programmes and projects, including the procurement and recruitment
activities. The true challenge to UNDP, if it is sincerely committed to the
capacity building of national institutions and the development of programme
countries is not to allow national execution to become in effect direct execution
by the UNDP country office. There is already evidence of UNDP country
offices assuming far too large a role in national execution, notably in Latin
America. Thus, the international community, donor and programme countries
will have to watch and see if UNDP stays true to its mandate, in the hope that
UNDP will meet one of its biggest challenges of the twenty-first century.
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The framework of the international trading system is essentially a struggle
between: 1) international cooperation substantiated by the dominant economic
premises of comparative advantage, which the adherence to which begets more
acceptance of freer international trade, and 2) collective group responses to
economic impacts of trade within the restraints of respective political
institutions of a country. The extent to which interest aggregation or collective
groups permeate government trade policy depends on the type of government
and the political ideology of representatives and elites in power. At the nexus
of international and domestic trade levels, these interests have varying levels
of influence on trade policy.
I. INTRODUCTION
This article considers the dynamics of domestic politics, private sector
interests, and government institutions as they relate to international trade policy
within the context of the GATT/WTO. The context of GATT/WTO applies
when tariff bindings are established on import classifications in reduction
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schedules,' in negotiations at round discussions and yearly meetings,2 when
domestic government institutions sanction tariff levels or other issues agreed
upon at the international level,3 and when trading partners negotiate to resolve
disputes. While all of these situations are important and their dynamics will be
conspicuous when reading this article, it is the latter scenario into which this
work seeks to ultimately culminate. The argument established assumes that the
dominant theory of comparative advantage and international trade cooperation
restrains government policy-making because of the existence of long-term
commitments to freer trade and on-going mutual economic interests. However,
the ways domestic interests are represented to governments, and the ways
domestic interests influence government positions on trade issues, depend on
the functioning of domestic politics and institutions. Thus, strategic inter-
actions between governments on trade issues can be perceived as a two-level
game: domestic politics influence states' actions at the international level,4 and
vice versa.
The argument presented is also based on comparative government.
Institutional variations of private sector-government relations will engender
different levels of representation from domestic protectionist interests.
Institutional variants among statist, corporatist, and pluralist governments will
be employed to depict dissimilar levels of private sector influence on
government.5 While the theoretical underpinnings of these three types of states
might lead one to rationally presume that one form of government would be
more amenable to free trade than others, the dynamics of collective action and
relative dependence on international trade threaten the accuracy of any obvious
conclusion.
1. Once agreed upon this initial setting of tariffs is, for countries holding WTO membership or
those given MFN status, a multilateral international obligation that has some degree of future binding effect
on economic, private sector, and government changes on that country unless an exception is later raised.
2. Trade round negotiations ordinarily tackle diverse issues in a deep fashion and each country
inevitably brings domestic political and economic concerns to the negotiating rounds. Similarly, yearly
meetings also discuss issues of cooperation but the meetings are limited in duration. One needs to only
consider the 1999 Seattle meeting to illustrate collective domestic dissent to the WTO since issues on the
discussion agenda were suspended.
3. For example, in the United States, Congress approves international trade agreements and tariff
levels on goods.
4. See also Robert D. Pumam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic ofTwo Level Games,
42 INT'L ORG. 427-60 (Summer 1988) (discussing general international relations as a two level game); ARYE
L HfIM. & PETER MOSER, Trade Liberalization as Politically Optimal Exchange of Market Access, in
THE NEW TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMY (1995) (discussing trade theory as a two level game).
5. Several authors have articulated a connection between particular government institutions and
trade policy. STEHEN D. KRASNER, United States Commercial Policy: Unraveling The Paradox Of
External Strength And Internal Weakness, in BETWEEN POWER AND PLENTY: FOREIGN ECONOMIC POUCIES
OFADVANCED INDUSTRiALSTATES (Peter J. Katzenstein ed., 1978). STEPHEN D. KRASNER, DEFENDINGTHE
NATIONAL INTEREST: RAW MATEIALS INVESTMENTS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 10-20 (1978).
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The paper is structured as follows. Section U presents the legal framework
and ideology driving the international trade system. It presents the policies and
rules supporting higher aggregate economic growth through comparative
advantage, as structured in the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade
(GATT)6/World Trade Organization (WTO) framework. Within this dominant
structure for trade, Section II claims that the system of government could make
a state more susceptible to domestic positions that undermine higher levels of
trade cooperation. Section IV explains that collective action dynamics in the
private sector are the primary consideration driving more extreme government
positions on tariff binding levels or when a trade dispute erupts that requires
negotiation. Section V utilizes the framework established in the
aforementioned sections and applies it to theoretical trade negotiations in a two-
level game model.
II. IDEOLOGICAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESTRAINTS
Comparative advantage is the dominant economic axiom that underlies and
lends credence to increased cooperation in trade. It says that efficiencies in the
specialization of production, based on current efficiencies in a country's
resource endowments, will provide the highest global aggregate economic
prosperity.7 If higher aggregate prosperity is a global goal and there is a
reasonable presumption of spill-over benefit, a benefit that would not exist but
for reliance on the benefits of mutual trade relations to domestic economies,
cooperation in the international system should logically occasion governments
to pro-actively reduce tariff and non-tariff barriers that skew economic
efficiencies.' While support for comparative advantage and propensity to
reduce trade barriers have dominated international economic relations for
decades, they have not always been universally accepted. Domestic institutions
and influences on policy-makers, as well as policy-makers' interpretations of
the future viability and competitiveness of local economic actors, frequently
impugn upon the suppositions on which the doctrine depends. Most countries
have traversed through protectionist shifts based on economic circumstances
and political shifts. Others have embarked on revolutionary change and
6. General Agreement on Tarriffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-I l, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55
U.N.T.S. 194, available at 1948 WL6858 [hereinafter GATT 1947].
7. Helen V. Milner & David B. Yoffie, Between Free Trade and Protectionism: Strategic Trade
Policy and a Theory of Corporate Trade Demands, 43(2) INT'L ORG. 239 (1989), available at
http://www.jstor.orrg/fcgi-bin/jstor/iewitem/fes/002081 83/dm980266198p02157/0?current res.
8. Joseph M. Grieco, Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest
Liberal Institutionalism 42(3) INT'L ORG. 485, 495 (1988). This assumes there is a desire for mutual
cooperation so that states can achieve the highest aggregate gains, rather than adhering to a realist or relative
gains premise which assumes that states will only cooperate in international relations when perceived gains
derived from consummating an agreement will outweigh gains provided to the other party.
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implemented new ideals about the best means of achieving economic
prosperity.
For instance, changing global and domestic economic conditions induce
governments to restrict trade. An apropos example is the circumstance prior to
the Great Depression when many countries inordinately restricted imports to
protect domestic markets.9 Conditions were placed on trade to stimulate
domestic industry and attain revenue to fund new socioeconomic obligations
that were being undertaken by governments. This resulted in trade dwindling
to a fraction of previous levels."0 Governments began to regulate economies
more, closed doors on open-market principles, and in some cases roused elites
to unveil a "statist form!"' whereby government supervision and management
of the economy, markets, and the private sector became customary. 2 Despite
this and other historical periods of protectionism, there has been a
reconfirmation of the economic superiority of comparative advantage since
World War . Barriers to trade have dwindled in the aggregate as a result of
international cooperation.' 3 With this shift in economic ideology and the
existence of international agreements supporting freer trade, increasing
cooperation has survived even dramatic international economic shocks and
domestic political turnovers. 4
Even since the Bretton Woods Agreements shortly after World War II
(marking the emergence of modern-day trade liberalization) influential
examples of closed door policies were important in the countries in which they
arose, and also served as examples for many other countries. This was the case
in many Latin American countries that shifted economic policies from one
extreme to the other during given periods of economic torment.
The Soviet Union and China, of course, provided the precedential
illustrations. Both countries until the 1980s operated on principles of planned
economic development. Under planned economic development, opening trade
doors to the international system would undermine the agenda of the central
government because the government had contrived all production necessary for
9. Thomas Ferguson, From Normalcy to New Deal: Industrial Structure, Party Competition, and
American Public Policy in the Great Depression, 38(1) INT'L ORG. 41, 42 (1984).
10. Id.
11. Statism is discussed comparatively infra in section: IL Government Structure & Ideology of
Administration.
12. These characteristics are all factors which undermine comparative advantage.
13. Gottfried Haberler, Integration and Growth of the World Economy in Historical Perspective,
LIV(3) AMER. ECON. REV. 1(1964), ava/ab/e at httpJ/www.jstor.org/fcgi-bin/jstor/viewitem.fcg/00028282/
di950379/95p0160q/0?curfentrest.
14. International covenants can restrain government actions and establish parameters for trade
policies because the legality of international agreements survives replaced administrations and binds a state
to previously ratified agreements.
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society in multiple year plans. Under such a system, permitting imports to
freely flow into the country could spawn instability in domestic production by
engendering reliance upon, or a demand for, foreign products. The government
had already projected what society needed and wanted. In the alternative,
authorizing goods to depart from the country as exports because they might
fetch higher prices on international markets could eventuate domestic deficits
in these goods and halt production for internally projected requirements.
Outside of these circumstances, where large scale agendas to close doors
to rectify poor economic conditions caused long-lasting revolutionary shifts in
countries, the international trade system since World War 1I has gradually
become more liberalized and freer. However, short-term intermittent political
shifts within countries based on political turnover have also been an important
consideration in international trade.
In the context of trade, domestic political turnover occurs when differing
ideologies and economic programs have been enacted by political shifts in a
country's government. Such shifts result in the enactment of new policies that
are either more or less open to trade than were the previous policies. However,
the decision of a current administration to ratify a trade agreement to reduce
trade barriers should bind a successor government, even if that subsequent
administration is ideologically more protectionist. This means that without a
complete withdrawal from the international trade system, the degree of policy
change by a more protectionist regime will be restrained because of the
regime's desire to attain the benefits of future international trade. International
bindings are never completely resolute, but a protectionist government's full
purview of policy-making is somewhat harnessed by obligations made to the
international community. Even though protectionist governments may
maneuver within treaty obligations, for exceptional circumstances, or stretch
international obligations, 5 the global result has been an increasingly
institutionalized international framework supporting trade liberalization.
The GATT/WTO is the global international regime/rule structure. Its rules
and principles incorporate the dominant economic ideology of comparative
advantage by supporting less restricted trade. Although this ideology and
framework is accepted, it is not conclusively followed because countries do
introduce barriers to trade in order to protect domestic industries. 6 This is
15. To not permit some leniency could impede more countries from joining international regimes
or cause more pervasive denouncements of international agreements and regimes, which can undermine the
credibility of international law and attenuate the likelihood of future cooperation. The Reservations to the
Genocide Convention Case, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 31, available at 1951 WL 3.
16. This is often the case when domestic firms are less efficient than foreign counterparts. Herein,
"efficiency" can be described as a per unit cost and will generally vary based on the evolution of an economy
because higher costs are expected when producing goods in countries with a higher standard of living, since
wages are higher.
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often how disputes arise. Therefore, countries that have previously made
binding obligations among themselves to attain reciprocal rights with trading
partners, or that have assented to the general framework of the GATT/WTO,
have to some degree undermined the functioning of or violated that
international framework. In other cases, such countries have strayed too far
from the rules and policies to which they said they would adhere. The GATT's
general mission has always been to reduce trade barriers and eliminate
discrimination against contracting parties' 7 that have Most Favored Nation
status.' However, specific GATT rules tend to undermine an unwavering
adherence to its general policies. These rules are needed to provide an
international outlet for domestic economic needs and to protect the agreement's
overall integrity by tempering its flexibility. These outlets might include setting
a tariff binding higher than was originally agreed upon to protect domestic
industries, 9 utilizing safeguards and adjustments assistance authorized in
Article XIX of the GATT 1947,2" and providing industries with various forms
of subsidies and tax credits to maintain competitive advantages. 2'
For purposes of this article, GATT/WTO provisions will only be
considered from their policy position of supporting freer trade or undermining
freer trade. The paramount concern herein is to generally highlight domestic
actions that stray outside the international trade framework. In other words, the
analysis examines state actions that depart from its previously undertaken
obligations because of domestic influences. The domestic influence that
undermines this general policy can emerge from two primary variables: 1) an
institutional governing structure that might be, by its nature, more amenable to
protectionism, and 2) collective groups that place varying levels of pressure on
policy-makers to modify a trade policy position.
Both of these influences can shift a trade posture from what may be most
economically optimal globally, within general policies and rules of the
17. The GATT Preamble states that its purpose is for contracting parties "to enter into reciprocal
and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to
trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international commerce." GATT 1947, supra note
6, at pmbl.
18. Article I of GATT requires that like products of a contracting party be accorded treatment no
less favorable than those of other contracting parties.
19. The Harmonized Tariff Schedule provides categorizations for imports that have assessed duties
by domestic government institutions. The tariff level on products are generally expected to decrease over
time, but a country's choice to set some tariffs high may be perceived as protectionist for certain domestic
industries.
20. This includes establishing higher tariffs and/or quotas on imports when there are "increased
imports causing or threatening to cause serious injury to an identified United States industry." TRADE AcT
OF 1974 § 201 (1974).
21. While subsidies are for the most part restricted by the GAT/WTO, they will only become
issues when there is a significant change in market share of a product that can be tied to the subsidies.
GATT/WTO, to a short-term policy that might be perceived as serving the
interests of representatives in power or domestic interest group structures. This
varying level of influence, based on institutional dissimilarities across countries
in private-public sector relations, and collective private sector actions, are
discussed in the succeeding two sections.
II. GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE AND IDEOLOGY OF ADMINISTRATION
A. Government Structure
Even though dominant economic ideology and international
institutionalization support free trade and cooperation, the private sector can
influence trade policy at the domestic level based on statist, corporatist, and
pluralist government classifications. The private sector's influence on
government trade policy affects the vacillation of policy preferences. It also
affects the extent to which the rule framework of liberalizing trade is adhered
to by individual countries (including during abrupt shifts via change of political
ideology in government), and the dynamics of international trade negotiations.
In a statist government,22 public and private sector interests are unified.23
Government interference in the economy is perceived as normal and
beneficial.24 However, the more a government is involved in the economy, the
more the country is perceived as straying from free market principles. The
country is perceived to be distorting the economically optimal results ordinarily
consistent with premises supported by comparative advantage and prescribed
and accepted by the international trading system. This may be the case even
though statist governments often exist in countries that are resource dependent
and not economically dominant. These governments must act within the
framework of international trade cooperation, because they cannot control the
system.2' On the other hand, because government and private sector interests
are unified, the government's desires, the calculation of potential economic
22. A good example is Japan. PETER J. KATZENSrEIN, Introduction: Domestic and International
Forces and Strategies of Foreign Economic Policy, and Conclusion, in BETWEEN POWER AND PLENTY 16,
19, 297, 306, 308, 333 (Peter J. Katzenstein ed.), available at http://www.stor.org/fcgi-bin/jstor/viewitem.
fcg/00208183/dm980220/98p0031g/0?cunfentres.
23. MIutAN R. DASKA, THE FACES OF JUSICE AND STATE AUTmORrrY 80-88 (1986).
24. This is a common characteristic for small developing countries where the government tries to
manage the economy to achieve national goals. JOAN M. NELSON, The Political Economy of Stabilization:
Commitment, Capacity, and Public Response, 12(10) WORLD. DEV. 983, 988 (1984). A very high degree
of cooperation between business and government is found in Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, and
Malaysia. By contrast, in the United States, a pluralist system (discussed infra), the only sector in which
there are close government-business relations is the defense industry because of national security concerns.
James Kitfield, The New Partnership, NAT'LJ. 1840-44 (1994).
25. PETER J. KATNSTEIN, CORPORATISM AND CHANGE: AUSTRIA, SWflZERLAND, AND THE
POLMCS OF INDUSTRY (1984).
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benefits, and policy preferences should be somewhat restrained by the legal
framework of international trade and the cognizance of the need for long-term
international cooperation. Thus, sporadic domestic collective interests that
might otherwise influence government policy-making are unlikely to arise in
statist governments. Those interests are already represented by the intimate
nexus between the private sector and government,' even though the
government's institutional framework rejects market mechanisms and private
sector freedoms.
In a corporatist government structure, public policymakers and private
interests inhabit the same social and economic agenda. There is still a formal
and independent private sector apart from the government. Corporatism is
known for its national social partnership between government, business, and
labor. A concentrated system of licensed interest coalitions regularly bargains
with government, seeking policy positions that appease societal and collective
groups in a way that is in the best interest of society.27 There is less
government involvement in the economy than in a statist system. However,
government influence on the private sector is still a natural extension of
authority. Formal institutions may join the central government with the private
sector. Mediating institutions may also provide for periodic negotiations and
compromise.28 A line of demarcation can be drawn between the public (or
government's) role and the role of private sectors (unlike in statist
governments), even though the government will favor particular industries or
firms based on perceived societal need.
In pluralist government systems, government activities and private sector
activities have clearly defined roles. Government has regulatory authority in
the economy, but should not unreasonably interfere with the functioning and
rights of the private sector.29 Individual private sector actors operate within the
framework of market forces. Individually or collectively, they sporadically
advocate trade policy interests to government and representatives through
political forces. These unstructured and non-aggregated private sector forces
26. The level of influence of this argument has been questioned. H. Richard Friman, Rocks, Hard
Places, and the New Protectionismv Textile Trade Policy Choices in the United States and Japan, 42(4)
INT'L ORG. 695 (1988), available at http://www.jstor.org/fcgi-binljstor/ view.fcg/00208183/dm980264/
98pO20050?currentRes.
27. PETER J. KAESTEN, SMALL STATES IN WORLD MARKETS: INDUSTRIAL POUCY IN EUROPE
22-30 (1985).
28. Michael Moran, Finance Capital andPressure-Group Politics in Britain, 11(4) BRMISHJ. POL
SCENCE 381, 383 (1991).
29. This is analogous to a "reactive state" apparatus whereby the public sector's obligation is to
solely provide a supporting framework within which citizens pursue their own chosen goals. DAMASKA,
supra note 23, at 73. Thus, actors in the private sector compete amongst themselves for a larger share of the
societal pie and government plays little role in favoring one party over another. The belief is that this
competition will lead to efficient markets through competition.
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have the potential to dramatically influence government trade policy. Such
influence will arise when the composition of resource endowments and
collective advocacy mechanisms is favorable.3° Thus, despite the pluralist
system's institutional propensity to keep government out of efficient markets,
the government may taken together be even more prone to be protectionist in
pluralist than statist systems. Statist systems lack strong private sectors and
often do not treat market mechanisms as sacrosanct. The pluralist government
may also be more protectionist than a corporatist system government. In a
corporatist government, national collective entities represent private sector
interests. Both corporatist and statist governments, however, tend to pro-
actively plan for the economy.
If one conceives of the individual roles of government and the private
sector, with the government's defined obligation being to provide for the public
good and the private sector's role to stimulate the economy, the following
visual depicts the intimate private sector-government nexus that exists in a
statist government. Pacification of extreme private sector-government positions
through interest negotiations occurs at the national level in a corporatist
government. Collective action groups from the private sector directly influence
government policy-makers in a pluralist government.
Statist Corporatist
Pluralist
]M~uie Sack:
Figure 1
Based on the three forms of government, one would rationally presume
that a statist government, because its institutional form normally permits the
government to significantly influence markets and the economy, would have
attributes most apt to disrupt cooperative trade arrangements or distort global
economic production efficiencies. However, even if this was the expectation
given the institutional characterization, the political ideology of the current
government in power may not be entirely consistent with such institutional
30. See discussion infra in Section: IV. Collective Action Groups & Political Influence on Trade
Policy.
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expectations. This is ordinarily the case with trade dependent countries or
when levels of economic development are especially amenable to export
dependent interests.
B. Ideology of the Current Government on Trade Issues
While each of these three government constructs of government-private
sector relations may comprise an institutional and historical propensity for freer
trade or protectionism, the ideology of the government or representatives in
power can cause a drift in either direction. For instance, while there is a more
natural institutional framework for the operation of market forces in pluralist
systems than in corporatist or statist systems, administration changes and
economic development adduce policy vacillation over time in all types of
governance structures. This was the case with Republican-Democrat policy
shifts in the United States.
Trade policy is established by elected representatives in democracies
because it can impact the public interest and is a form of taxation. This means
that the ideology of those in power should to some extent represent the will or
position of the populace and result in temporal shifts in trade policy based on
the composition of the economy. For instance, in the United States, up until
World War I, firms were labor-intensive, but shifted after World War I because
domestic capital-intensive organizations began to dominate world markets.3
Concomitantly, during this time and up until 1950, the percentage of
Republicans in Congress voting for trade liberalization was very low, while
Democrats nearly unanimously favored trade liberalization.32 Since 1950, the
percentage of Republicans and Democrats favoring trade liberalization
equalized,33 likely because higher levels of exports from capital-intensive and
highly competitive United States firms formed a unified national interest.'
Certainly, there is always some degree of amalgamation between popular-based
or electoral public choice and private sector influences (that provide funding to
support a campaign) on politicians' trade policy positions.35 The balance of
these will be dependent on the government's particular electoral institutional
framework.3 ' Recently, however, it is even more difficult to argue that United
31. Ferguson, supra note 9, at 55-56.
32. Ile percentage of Republicans favoring trade liberalization was between 0% and 20% from
1913 to 1940 and began to climb thereafter. Democrats favoring trade liberalization hovered around 90%
from 1913 to 1962. Michael A. Bailey eL al., The Institutional Roots of American Trade Policy: Politics,
Coalitions, and International Trade, 49 WoRLD POLmrcis 309, 312 (1997).
33. Id at 312.
34. Id at 334.
35. J. MARK RAMSEYER, Public Choice, nCHICAGOLECTuRESINLAWANDECONONCS 101 (Eric
A. Posner ed., 2000).
36. Id. at 105.
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States trade policy is being driven by the will or desires of the populace37 or
clearly defined partisan influences, but instead by factors such as: the level of
national income,3" segmentation and position of major industries in the world
economy, and migration of old firms into new production methods and the
emergence of new and more modem industries. 9
Placing generalizations regarding political predisposition aside for a
moment, even diametrically opposed partisan positions may agree on trade
policy as blindly following strict assumptions about comparative advantage and
free market principles without utilizing government intervention to promote
exports and restrict imports in the short-run. This may not always be in the best
interest of the country, because it may be necessary to protect an infant industry
from foreign competition that has a first-mover advantage,' or to raise national
37. On the other hand, at some level, one can claim that the aggregate of voter preferences will have
some relation to a country's aggregate position on trade issues and tariff levels. However, the alternative is
to claim that it is the sum total and degree of protectionist interests (in the private sector) that influence
politicians to hold a particular position on trade. This paper segregates the latter as the independent variable
for analysis. While this is an issue that can be tested empirically, measuring cause and effect relations
between constituent positions and political positions will be problematic. Logic would posit that there are
numerous problems today with claiming that political constituency influences directly drive representative
positions or can be utilized as a predictive indicator for expected trade policy positions in democracies. First,
it is difficult to segregate voters into their rational choice positions because they may not be concerned with
only one factor of production, or simply "free trade." ROBERT E. BALDWIN, The Political Economy of
Protectionism, in IMPORTCOMPETrnON AND RESPONSE 268 (J.N. BHAGWATi&T.N. SRINIVAsAN eds., 1982).
Voters may be concerned with two or more factors of production, or free trade on some items and protection
on others. This results in cross-cutting tariff preferences. WOLFGANG MAYER, Endogenous Tariff
Formation, 74(5) AMER. ECON. REV. 970,983 (1984). Second, even if voters are acting in their rational self-
interest and are more apt to vote for a candidate that will best support the economic interests of the voter.
Id. at 974. Voter interests are often too diverse (outside of favoring protectionist policies if the candidate is
directly affiliated with labor or freer trade policies if he/she is more affiliated with capital) to register any
changes in tariff policy. Id. at 983. Third, to assume voters primarily impact trade preferences suggests that
contributions received or a pecuniary interest endowed from interest groups to politicians are not directly
translatable into political support, but are made to increase constituent support When a trade position
becomes an election issue in national elections, a politician's position is framed not as industry specific, but
as a general position somewhere between the dichotomous classification of free trade and protectionism. This
leads to the obvious problem of aggregating individual interests into general policy positions. On the other
hand, while constituents are also consumers, they have little ability to influence the political process through
campaign contributions. ARYEL HILMAN &HEINRICH W. URSPRUNG, Domestic Politics, Foreign Interests,
and International Trade Policy, 78(4) AMER. ECON. REv. 729, 732 (1988), available at
httpJ/www.jstor.org/fcgi-bin/jstor/viewitem.fcg/00028282/ di95002/95p0008d/0?currentRes. This is due
to diffuse interests, the difficulty for consumers to identify economic interests from imperceptible benefits
and costs involved in international trade, and the dynamics of the political process.
38. Ferguson, supra note 9, at 56.
39. U at 57.
40. Pankaj Ghemawat, Sustainable Advantage, 64 HARV. BUS. REV. 53 (1986). "First mover
advantage" is a business term suggesting that a firm that enters a market first has the ability to attain a larger
share of the market because of quick action even though other viable competitors may exist and could garner
more market share if action were taken more promptly by these competitors. Id.
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income by promoting the profitability of firms in imperfect markets.4 ' A
government may strategically use trade policy to obtain a larger share of
domestic and/or international markets and profits for its multinational
companies. This is because doing so could be expected to stimulate the
domestic economy and increase the tax base. Such a decision must be made
while considering international interdependencies, because enacting trade
policies that favor nationally-based interests can reverberate with trading
partners when a noticeably higher tariff level in one industry or non-tariff
protectionist measure is employed to safeguard domestic interests or when a
government utilizes subsidies to promote exports. This could legitimately be
met with a higher reciprocal tariff level on other important industries.
As a caveat, because this analysis is concerned with domestic interactions
between government and the private sector, it downplays the dynamic nature
of comparative interactions among other government institutions. For instance,
separation of powers between the executive branch and legislature can
influence how and where interest groups spend time and resources to influence
trade policy. 2 Strategic advocacy and planning by interest groups can probe
the dynamics of inter-branch relations to determine how they can best influence
policy-making. And perhaps, if the current legislature supports trade
liberalization, it could leave a lasting mark on trade policy long after its tenure
ends by changing trade policy or rules so that a later executive and legislature,
if more protectionist, could be restrained from making abrupt changes in the
trade framework since its purview of action might be corralled by the
previously established rules.4" Because of the added complexity, applicability
almost solely to governments with strict separation of powers," and frequent
policy-preference shifts in the short-term via electoral cycles, government
policy-preferences will be treated herein as a unified position at the
international level. This means that the private sector influences a "government
position" rather than the position of the executive or the legislature. This is
41. A. Dixit, International Trade Policiesfor Oligopolistic Industries, 94 ECON. J. 1 (Supp. 1984).
42. Specifically, when the executive branch opens negotiations with the expectation of
consummating an agreement with a foreign government over trade, the greater the degree of authority that
the legislature has over agenda setting, amending agreements, ratifying proposals, calling referendums, and
deploying side payments, the more that there is a relative shift in power to the legislature vis-a-vis the
executive. HELEN MiLNER, INTERESTS, INST1nmrnoNs AND INFORMAnON: DOMEsTiC POLmnCs AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 101-12 (1997).
43. Bailey, supra note 32, at 326.
44. Government systems with strict separations of powers are most characteristic of presidential
systems that legally and practically have a strong balance of power between the president and legislature, as
distinguished from parliamentary systems where elected representatives choose a prime minister as the
executive and retains substantial control over that position (i.e., limiting what is perceived as a separation of
powers between the policy-making branches of government). Thus, the United States may be one of only a
few countries in the world that has such a system.
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because the positions of these two institutions may differ based on political
affiliation or constituency allegiances.
While differing political positions, sometimes based on party affiliations,
can provide a predisposition toward a particular trade policy, private sector
collective interests can impact government trade policy in a way that deviates
from predispositions. For instance, a recognizable problem occurs in pluralist
governments because representatives may neither represent the will of the
populace, nor act in a way to protect the long-term viability of the domestic
economy. Instead, they act primarily to further their own self-interested re-
election concerns by accommodating interest groups.45 Such actions, even
though they result in lower aggregate wealth for the populace in the end, are
inherent in democracies.' Regional constituency interests can form
representatives' trade policy preferences.
To summarize the article to this point, within the institutional variations
of statism, corporatism, and pluralism, government interactions with the private
sector differ and dissimilarly influence a government's short and long-term
position on trade issues. While there is an international ideological and
institutionalized propensity to favor policy-positions consistent with the theory
of comparative advantage and liberalizing trade, there are short-term benefits
of protectionism and transition costs for government on long-term efficient uses
of resources. Specifically, the short-term trade position of government will
depend on: 1) the degree to which government is sequestered from pressure
groups representing the private sector, 2) the economic power of the state, 3)
international relations with trading partners and present government dedication
to freer trade, and 4) an assessment of the degree of domestic economic harm
from given imports. The interaction of these variables will be considered in the
successive two sections.
IV. COLLEcrIvE ACTION GROUPS AND POLITICAL
INFLUENCE ON TRADE POLICY
Interest groups can dynamically influence trade policy, particularly in the
context of setting tariff bindings. Interest groups express political support for
candidates and party platforms47 through campaign contributions," in an
45. WuInAM A. BROCK & STEPHEN P. MAGEE, Tariff Formation in a Democracy, in CURRENT
SSUES IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL POUCY AND DIPLOMACY 1-9 (J. Black & B. Hindley eds., 1980).
46. Bailey, supra note 32, at 328.
47. An election between two parties generally consists of a party that represents a more protectionist
position and one that advocates more liberalized trade. The two parties commit to their respective policies
to garner support in the populace to get elected. STEPHEN P. MAGEE ET AL., BLACK HOLE TARmFS AND
ENDOGENOUS POLICY THEORY: POLMCAL ECONOMY IN GENERAL EQUILBRIUM (1989). However, as
mentioned, the degree to which this acts as an essential issue in the mind of voters is questionable.
48. This is the case with political action committees in the United States (PAC contributions). Gene
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amount likely correlated to the extent that tariff preferences are provided.49
These preferences appear in annually "choosing a vector of trade taxes and
subsidies on the various import and export goods."'se However, the domestic
political influence from these collective action dynamics of interest groups will
differ among pluralist, corporatist, and statist governments.
The duty assessed on import classifications of goods will affect domestic
factors of production in industries. A computer manufacturer will want to
attain imported component parts to assemble its product at a lower cost (i.e.
lower tariffs on components), but would not want low tariffs on the import of
competing foreign computers. Consumers or other domestic users would desire
lower tariffs on imported computers to make them less expensive for
purchase.5 The result across all sectors and regions in a country 2 is a
competition for resources where the implementation of one tariff policy will
have a rippling effect across other sectors of society, granting a larger income
share to protected industries than would ordinarily result without the tariffs.
53
The winners in this game of competing interests are those groups that can
best get their position heard and acted upon by politicians. Tariff policy
positions will favor industry groups that are best organized' and have more
resources to influence policy-making bodies." Thus, the general presumption
M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, Protection for Sale, 84 AMER. ECON. REV. 142-53 (1994), available at
http:lwww.jstor.orgfcgi-bin/viewitem.fcg/00028282/ di976326/97p01515/0?currentresl.
49. The more that it is perceived that a politician, group of politicians and/or party grants
preferences to an interest group, the more that it will contribute to those political actors.
50. Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, Trade Wars and Trade Talks, 103(4) POL. ECON. 675,
679 (1995).
51. A macroeconomic example of the conflicting interests that industrialized countries have faced
is the inter-play between generalized interests of agriculture, industry, and consumer preferences. If tariffs
on agriculture are high to protect domestically grown foodstuffs from imports, domestic agriculture interests
will be appeased, but this high tariff will have a negative impact on consumers (assuming no government
subsidization) who will be paying more for food products as well as on industry which will eventually need
to increase labor wages based on a higher cost of living. If tariffs on imports that compete with industry are
high, industry will be delighted because profitability will be higher and domestic labor will be pleased
because protectionism protects labor, while agriculture interests will be distressed because profitability will
be lower due to more import competition. Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey, Specific Factors, Capital Markets,
Portfolio Diversification, and Free Trade: Domestic Determinants of the Repeal of Corn Laws, in 43(4)
WORLD POLrns 545-69 (1991).
52. F.W. TAussiG, THE TARpHI RY OF THE UNrrED STATn 68-108 (1964).
53. Kiyono Kazuharu et al., Industry Specific Interests and Trade Protection: A Game Theoretic
Analysis, in 42(4) ECON. STUDIES QUARTERLY 347, 352 (1991).
54. Grossman & Helpman, supra note 50, at 705.
55. More specifically, one could also posit that organization andcollective action are most effective
with fewer individuals sharing in gains that will be produced by attaining a particular tariff policy. With too
many individuals, there will be "free riders" that will not participate in the action because divided gains from
a changed tariff policy will be smaller than the effort that must be exerted to attain the policy by any one
member. Thus, the optimal time for concerted action or when self-interest will propel action the most is when
and simplified theoretical framework for purposes of this paper is that relatively
more concentrated (and perhaps "scarce") factor endowments will be a unifying
collective force attaining more trade protection.' However, much explication
and many caveats should be added.
As has been previously described, manufacturing firms in the United
States in the post war period sought either free trade or protectionism. This has
also been the case in foreign countries based on the level of that country's
production efficiencies in internationally competing goods. Firms without
foreign operations confronting competition from imports would advocate
protectionism, while multinational firms and export-dominant corporations
would advocate freer trade.-" A simplified dichotomization of what is really a
complicated world of cross-cutting interests, is that firms with a strong position
vis-A-vis international competition will advocate for an open economy world
with little government intervention to hinder free markets. Firms that have a
weak position vis-i-vis foreign rivals will request government protection.5"
Competing interests across these two categorizations can and do exist. For
instance, if a government has dedicated itself via international agreement to
lowering tariffs in the long-run, there may be an aggregate or threshold level of
protection59 that can be provided by the government before it loses trade policy
credibility with trading partners. In that case, affected industries will struggle
amongst themselves for tariff levels and/or quota protection from specific
import items. °
Within this competition among industries, the diversification of that
industry will partially determine the potential for aggregation or political power
of collective influence groups.6 If an industry is highly segmented, that
industry may take longer to aggregate a common position and/or have a less
there is a monopoly or oligopoly in the sector at issue. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COL.ECTIVE ACTION:
PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1968).
56. RONALD ROGOWSKI, COMMERCE AND COALITIONS: How TRADE AFFECTS DOMESTIC
ALIGNMENTS (1989).
57. Milner & Yoffie, supra note 7, at 239.
58. Ferguson, supra note 9, at 53.
59. Aggregate levels of protectionism could moderately shift over time with changes in the
dedication of political representatives to either freer trade or protectionism, and the type of government
(statist, corporatist, or pluralist).
60. Kazuharu, supra note 53, at 348.
61. The Ricardo Viner "specific factors model" is a neoclassical economics trade theory that defines
factor inputs as being either industry specific or inter-sectorally mobile. Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey, Specific
Factors, Capital Markets, Portfolio Diversification, and Free Trade: Domestic Determinants of the Repeal
of the Corn Laws, in 43(4) WORLD POLrIICS 546, 546 (1991), available at http://www.jstor.org/fcgi-
bin/jstor/viewitem.fcg/00438871/di971264/97p/0090g/ 0?curretrest.
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intense influence on government when responding to trade concerns.62 The
more specific that a product or factor of production can become to a smaller or
more closely knit group of economic actors, the more likely that an interest
benefiting that group will get enacted, ceteris paribus. In advanced economies,
factors may become more inter-sectorally mobile and thus domestic policy may
be less emphatic on tariff level changes. This is because of counteracting
interests across sectors, even though several lobbies in a country could pursue
a common goal.63
This private sector competition to sway trade policy preferences and the
extent of influence of these collective action dynamics will be most
conspicuous in pluralist systems because of a more direct private sector impact
on representatives. Collective action winners in the pluralist system should be
more apt to attain amenable tariff bindings or perhaps receive non-tariff barrier
assistance. In statist and corporatist governments, labor and capital cooperate
on trade policy to fashion a more moderate position that should be based on
long-term economic projections and viability of competitive industries, and less
on collective action dynamics. This does not mean that when comparing all
three forms of government, higher tariffs would be less ardently favored on
factors annexed to less identifiable and less aggregated interests or on industries
that are not as important to the domestic economy in statist and corporatist
systems. It means that the institutional variable of government interference in
the market is more dominant in statist and corporatist governments, while the
private sector influence is more dominant in pluralist systems.
This is the case since all three forms of government can have less
diversified economies and central industries. Those dominant industries will
control trade policy on specific goods and have elevated support in government.
The premise is most clear, however, in developing countries where
industrialization has recently emerged and policy-making deference is given to
particular industrialized sectors before agricultural interests. Here, there may
be less lobbying by groups in developing countries to influence politicians to
decrease trade barriers in prime foreign markets on agricultural products as this
might beget a stronger export industry for agricultural products and eventually
push up the price of agricultural goods domestically." This is because
agricultural exports could fetch higher prices in international markets and drain
domestic supply. This could precipitate domestic societal distress and although
62. Michael Porter, The Structure Within Industries and Companies: Performance, 61 REV. OF
ECON & STATS. 217 (1979).
63. Grossman & Helpman, supra note 50, at 685.
64. Gerald C. Nelson, Rent Seeking in North-South Agricultural Trade, 16 EUR. REV. OF AGRIC.
ECON. 53, 54 (1989).
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it is globally a less optimal position, it is one which would appease the
increasingly commanding position of industry in a developing country.
Using the two polarity classification of market segmentation and the
number of firms in an industry (indicating a general propensity for efficacy to
attain policy-change), one can also consider an example where an industry may
have numerous members with more homogenized interest (low market
segmentation) and an industry with a handful of firms with greater diversity of
interest (high market segmentation). In this example, the factors work against
each other. Despite a large number of actors, thirty firms could unite
collectively for an economic interest and advocate for and attain amenable
government trade policies. Conversely, a three firm industry may not be able
to unite because of competitive agendas or the low unity of factor interests. 65
(See Figure 2).
Even with the complexity of existent crosscutting interests, the importance
of private sector influences on trade policy is rather straightforward. If
collective action dynamics can emerge in a country based on attributes of the
economy and industry, that emerging interest should be most influential on
One Firm
More Likely
to Have
Collective
Influence on
Government
N. Interest Significant
No gmntrest InterestSegmentation Segmentation
Least Likely to
Have Colective
Influence on
Government
Numerous
Firms
Figure 2
65. Others have said that in particular instances, such as with the financial community in Britain,
"the more dispersed the institutions, the more likely were they to be driven to formal organization." Moran,
supra note 28, at 386.
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government and lead to more extreme tariff bindings in a pluralist system
because of the direct interest that can be placed on government. If politicians
choose trade policy preferences on tariff bindings unilaterally, without
considering international implications and relations, high tariffs or other
protectionist measures could violate the international trade framework. If a
trading partner recognizes economic losses to its industries based on a
suspected breach of another country's international trade obligations, a trade
dispute may arise. For example, when subsidization,6 dumping,67 or
discrimination" is alleged, the allegations could be matched with
countervailing 9 or antidumping 7° duties. It is the dynamics of this domestic
variable that will be applied to the model in the next section. Section V
describes the influence of the private sector on international negotiations
between governments and nexus between the domestic and international levels
when a trade dispute erupts.
V. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
Many scholars recognize inter-linkages between domestic politics and
international relations. 1 Many have even suggested that "the main purpose of
all strategies of foreign economic policy is to make domestic policies
compatible with the international political economy."72 It is also assumed that
long-term protectionism is not the optimal strategy for any country and that a
government may protect certain industries. Such protection may be desirable
to safeguard a national economic policy, even if doing so undermines
international commitments, or to appease interest groups that are advocating
preferential treatment over other private sector entities 73 and thus influencing
social and economic policy.74 While the last section explained this theme in
relation to tariff bindings, this section offers a theoretical model of private
66. GAT 1947, supra note 6, at art. XVI.
67. Id at art.Vi.
68. This may include discrimination vis-A-vis other foreign competitors (GAIT 1947, art. I), or
discrimination vis-a-vis domestic goods GATT 1947, art. Ill).
69. GATT 1947, supra note 6, at art.Vl. In United States law, see 19 USC § 1671.
70. Id at art. VI. In United States law, see 19 USC § 1673.
71. See, e.g., JAMES ROSENAU, Toward the Study of National-International Linkages, in JAMES
ROSENAU, LINKAGE POLFIrcS: ESSAYSONTHECONVERGENCEOFNATIONALAND INrERNATIONAL SYSTEMS
(1969).
72. PETER J. KATENSTEIN, BETWEEN POWER AND PLENTY: FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES OF
ADvANcED INDUSTRvAL STATES 4 (PETER J. KATZENSrE.N ed.) (1978).
73. James M. Snyder, Jr., Campaign Contributions as Investments: The U.S. House of
Representatives, 1980-1986, 98 J. OF POL. ECON. 1195 (1990).
74. J.J. Pincus, Pressure Groups and the Pattern of Tariffs, J. OF POL. ECON. 757, 834 (1975),
available at http:llwww.jstor.orglfcgi-bin/jstor/viewiter.fcg/00223808/di971065/ 97p024m/0?currentres.
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sector influence when a dispute has arisen. This section will discuss how the
private sector influences trade negotiations" when a dispute involves both the
variables previously discussed-the three forms of government, 76 the impor-
tance of the affected industry to its economy, the ability of the interest coalition
to influence the government's position7-and the bargaining power of the
disputing governments.
A typical scenario that can give rise to a trade dispute and negotiation is
a claim of foreign protectionism. 7 The higher the level of protection by a
country, the more likely an affected company will seek government assistance,
because its market share could drop relative to the level of protection and
elasticity of demand for the foreign product. Thus, pressure is placed on the
exporting country authorities to complain to the importing country government.
For instance, if tariffs are lower domestically than in a protected foreign market,
a multinational industry may complain to its home government that such a tariff
results in lost market share because competitive imports are less expensive,
and/or because the domestic industry's foreign market share is lower because
the industry's product is more expensive in the foreign market.79 The
multinational industry could also claim some other form of an alleged breach
based on an internationally agreed-upon tariff binding or similar non-tariff-
based promise by the foreign country to make concessions. Possible steps for
the government could include raising tariffs domestically for that industry or
claiming a competitive exception."0 Or, if the government wants to dissent, it
could enter into negotiations with the foreign government claiming a violation
of GATT/WTO rules."'
Three caveats extending the analysis froman initial general policy position
of a state on trade to the circumstance which require negotiations to resolve a
trade dispute. First, power-based bargaining positions in the negotiations are
recognized,"2 whereas it has been articulated that when a dispute is brought
75. While many have suggested the importance of other concerns such as social and political
conflicts in determining tariff levels, which is often claimed to be represented in voting behavior, this article
simplifies the analysis by placing primary emphasis on interest groups. KATZENSTEIN, supra note 72, at
333-36.
76. Supra.
77. Supra
78. This could include numerous claims under provisions of the GATr/WTO framework, such as:
Articles I, i, V, X, XI, and XII, to name a few.
79. Of course, if domestic tariffs are lower, but the belief is that international or domestic market
share has not been affected, private sector complaints should not be forthcoming.
80. For example, the "Escape Clause" of Article XIX of the GATr/WTO.
81. Throughout the GATr/WTO agreements are provisions requiring negotiations before a dispute
can be brought before a WTO dispute settlement body.
82. "It is international power that defines legal relationships among states." THOMAS D. LAMSON
& DAVID SKIDMORE, INTERNATIONAL POLITCAL ECONOMY: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND WEALTH 6
(1997).
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before a more institutionalized body, as would be the case with a WTO dispute
settlement panel, influences on the dispute based on power differentials between
parties to a dispute are said to be diminished. 3 Thus, the following analyses are
based on efforts to resolve trade disputes via negotiations, with the analysis
stopping short of submitting a complaint to a formal body, such as the WTO, to
resolve the dispute. Thus, power-based relations will play some role in the
analysis herein, albeit admittedly an arguable one because both expectations of
being haled into a forum that would diminish power-based relations if negotia-
tions fail and an institutionally sanctioned remedial right to apply countervailing
duties might in themselves serve as a catalyst that relatively nullifies the influence
of those assumptions even in the negotiation stage.
Second, there will be a different degree of influence between the private
sector and the executive during the negotiations.8 4 As described, initial
penetrability will primarily be based on the government type classification. But
political allegiance by the interested collective group or industry in the dispute
to the political affiliation of the representative and the importance of the result
to the economy will increase the level of influence. It is also possible that inter-
government institutional relations would designate or reserve a political check
on the negotiating authority. This would be the case if a legislature, in
representing an interest of the private sector, is able to place political pressure
on the executive branch, which fields the trade negotiating team.
Lastly, during trade dispute negotiations, both countries will have a
perceived acceptable range of positions. The parameters representing accept-
able agreements, as defined by the domestic influence on negotiations and
policy positions of the respective executive on the good in dispute, can be
described as a "win-set." 5 A large win-set, often when government positions
83. Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
84. The private sector influence was noted in establishing the initial government position for (or
the degree of protection).a given product classification or industry type in section: "IV. Collective Action
Groups & Political Influence on Trade Policy." Private sector influence on government positions may be the
attribute that caused the trade dispute in the first place. For instance, consider the process for assessing
countervailing duties on imports in the United States, a pluralist country, when government subsidies are
alleged. The International Trade Administration (ITA) is a division of the Commerce Department, which is
part of the executive branch but can also be influenced by Congress. Arun Venkataraman, Binational Panels
and Multilateral Negotiations: A Two Track Approach to Limiting Contingent Protection, 23 COLuM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L 533, 553 (1999). The ITA makes a determination of whether foreign goods had been sold
at less than fair market value in the United States, which, it has found in 97% of the companies the agency
investigates Id. at 555. It has also been said that foreign producers lack faith in the objectivity of United
States domestic courts when they review Commerce Department findings. Id. at 560. If this is true, an already
overly biased and protectionist position is brought by the United States Trade Representative (also a
politically susceptible department as part of the executive) into trade dispute negotiations.
85. See generally Putnam, supra note 4, at 435. Note that Putnam uses other domestic government
influences, such as the legislature, on a general international negotiating position (i.e., not necessarily trade),
rather than the private sector.
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are not far apart and/or are more flexible, makes an international agreement
more likely.86 The stronger the private sector influence on government87 and
the greater the gravity of economic harm at issue, the more that governments
will be restrained, making a smaller win-set."
In the following graphical representations, the governments' initial inter-
national negotiating position without any domestic influences would be based
on the: 1) assessment of the economic importance of the industry to the
economy, as balanced against the 2) current governments' dedication to freer
trade. However, when there is a stronger private sector that is able to have its
position penetrate government negotiations, the influence from the domestic
level on the government's international negotiating position will be dependent
on: 1) the respective industry aggregation of interest (based on the collective
action principles previously discussed), and 2) the type of government structure.
The first example depicts a pluralist government that is economically more
powerful than a rival statist government that complains of the pluralist
government's use of protection in a critical industry with strong interest
representation in the private sector:
No Over4p In
W12s110t
....... .....
Protection of Comlete
Good Free Trade ofGood
Donelk Level <
hSien Itona * VterSt Unifi
Repraealetaa with Goverimut
* rttklmdutry to * ModeratIyIoasmy lnportat Indu7try
Figure 3
86. Putnam, supra note 4, at 437.
87. The assumption here is that only domestic industries influence their respective governments,
but interest groups or coalitions of lobbies need not necessarily be solely of domestic origin. Foreign groups
can influence politicians in a trading country to enact voluntary export restraints, HRIM & URSPRUNG,
supra note 37, at 729, or lessen tariff bindings on imports. T. SCHELLING, THE SRATEGY O1 CONFLICT 209-
10 (1960). Globalization of business illustrates a dynamic process whereby the private sector has cross-
cutting interests that affect trade policy, which makes a simplified domestic analysis seemingly unrealistic.
88. On rare occasion, it is also possible that the populace can influence government trade policy
in highly publicized or media-driven disputes, as has intermittently been the case with Japanese car imports.
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The relative power of a country, generally based on the size of the
economy, can render an important role in bargaining at the international level
and the degree to which a trading partner will grant position flexibility with its
negotiating counterpart. Without the WTO/GATT rule framework, negotiations
between the dominant pluralist government and the weaker statist government
should favor the pluralist government. This is because weaker rule frameworks
often provide fewer and less objective guiding principles to the negotiating
parties and increases the degree to which leverage principles of power play.
Thus, if the dominant pluralist government is being accused of protectionism
by the statist government, negotiators of the pluralist government will be
partially restrained by a dominant ideological framework of freer trade in the
international system, thus relatively off-setting power differentials. While the
impact may be marginal for less important cases (i.e. giving the dominant state
more concessions), for very important circumstances or when there are
accumulated victories for the dominant state on results that seem inconsistent
with international cooperation, a backlash from other trading states may
eventually occur.8 9 The international trade framework should partially restrain
even more dominant states that might have engaged in protectionist measures.
The more pluralistic the government, the more influence the private sector
should be able to place on government trade policy, and the more that trade
positions or negotiations should reflect private sector interests and collective
action dynamics than on independent government economic or public policy
assessments cloistered apart from private sector influences. In the given
example, the dominant pluralist country is apt to elevate economic distortions
by taking a position farther from the optimal freer trade position and protect the
industry with a self-interested but globally sub-optimal negotiating policy
position. This is because the powerful pressure group has an extreme
protectionist position, moving the pluralist government's position away from
enhanced cooperation with the statist government on the issue to a location that
makes a mutually acceptable agreement unlikely.' In this scenario, when there
is no over-lap in the win-set, requesting the assistance of a third-party dispute
settlement institution, such as the WTO, is likely.
Domestic actors outside of government should have little influence on the
statist government's trade position, conferring it a unified international and
89. While policy-makers generally have an incentive to "cheat" on international economic
agreements if it is in their own best self-interest or in the interest of their country, a more dominant country
should be more able to get away with defecting without being penalized. However, the likelihood of defecting
can be reduced by those states that expect to cooperate again in the future. ROBERT AXELROD, THE
EVOLUtION OF COOPERATION (1984).
90. J.M. Finger et al., The Political Economy ofAdministered Protection, 72(3) AMER. ECON. REV.
452, 464 (1982), available at http://www.jstor.org/fcgi-bin/jstor/viewitem.fcg/00028282/di950028/95
pool3f/O?currentres.
Bejesky
domestic disposition toward the dispute. For instance, if the pluralist
government were instead a statist government, the result of negotiations
between two statist governments should provide a larger win-set that is
influenced primarily by the relative power of the states, by what the negotiators
perceive to be in the best public interest of their respective countries, by each
country's dedication to international economic cooperation, by future
expectations about trade with this party, and by independent calculations of the
economic impact of an agreement. Regardless of these considerations, there
would only be one level of consideration during the negotiations for which the
governments should be concerned 9 -unlike the domestic influence when a
pluralist government is involved.
In the example as originally given, because the private sector influence is
so substantial and the industry is important to the economy, the dominant
pluralist government should make it even less flexible and improbable for the
win-set between the countries to over-lap. The probable result is that the
weaker statist government would grudgingly make more concessions than it
would ordinarily make than if the power disparity did not exist. Similarly,
because the statist government regularly interferes in the domestic economy and
the private and public sectors are often perceived as relatively unified,
appeasing an interest outside of government is not of as significant importance
as in a pluralist system. Thus, the government can and will make economic
adjustments domestically through the regular course of policy-making. In fact,
as is often the case in statist governments, economic adjustments will be made
by a counteracting domestic subsidization to the impacted industry, especially
if it is a moderately important industry to the country.
Taking a minor twist on the previous example, if there is a weak industry
representation, or if many over-lapping product interests exist, and it is a less
critical industry to the domestic economy in the dominant pluralist country, a
mutually acceptable agreement is more apt to be concluded because less is at
stake for the pluralist government. Therefore, the government's negotiating
position is more flexible. (See Figure 4 on next page).
With a weaker interest representation and less important industry, the
dominant pluralist government is likely to be more flexible in negotiations. Its
range of acceptable results will be larger and a mutually acceptable agreement
more likely. Also, when there is an overlapping win-set as depicted, it is less
likely that the dispute would be referred to a formal dispute settlement forum.
In the obverse, one might also conclude
91. PETER F. COwHEY, States and Politics in American Foreign Economic Policy, in
1NIERNATIONALTRADE POUCIES: GAINS FROM EXCHANGE BETWEEN ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE
(John S. OdeU & Thomas D. Willett eds., 1990).
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that this result is transpiring because there is a counter-balancing effect
engendered by weakening the domestic influence and strengthening the
importance of the ideological preferences or future expectations about pluralist
government's reliance on mutual cooperation. The only variables that have
changed are the domestic private sector interest and the importance of that
interest to the economy. Thus, the pluralist government's negotiating executive
might be said to be more sequestered from domestic private sector influences
as well as those of a larger scale in the economy.
In changing the scenario again, if a weaker statist government enacted a
protectionist measure on a product of a less important industry to its economy
against i stronger corporatist government with an economically important
export product, a depiction follows. (See Figure 5 on next page).
Because statist governments normally have at least a pseudo-control over
the domestic economy, it might have a natural institutionally based propensity
to be more hostile to opening markets that could undermine its economic plans
and programs. While this is theoretically palatable, statist governments have
also been known to drastically modify trade policy positions. This is particu-
larly true if the country is less democratic in nature, as disappointing experi-
ences may urge leaders to enact extreme protectionist positions, or even rapidly
open markets when assimilating the successes of similarly situated countries.'
This is unlike the situation in consolidated democracies since revolutionary or
abrupt change is often quelled by negotiated positions. The
92. The Asian Tigers are often cited as models of statist governmets that opened their doors to
freer trade and reaped economic success.
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assumption in this example is that the statist government is situated in a
protectionist position on this good, despite that the industry is less important to
its economy (which may in itself be somewhat philosophical and less
pragmatic). Thus, while the corporatist government's position will be
influenced by its private sector (but less so then in a similarly situated pluralist
government), elites in the statist government will be more apt to make trade
policy based on ideology, feasibility and need for cooperating on this good and
expectations about future cooperation, and acceptability of possible change
within domestic economic programs.
Many corporatist governments have been identified as being very
successful at flexibly adapting to open market principles through sagacious
long-term horizons." This is because they have tended to accept open-market
principles and adhered best to the ever-increasingly freer trade system because
domestic interest group structures have been pacified with joint policy-setting
between government and the private sector.9" In the aforementioned example,
93. KAZENSTEIN, supra note 27, at 205.
94. The Western European countries are the best example of corporatist structures. This institu-
tional structure of government was employed to react to the catastrophic economic changes of the 1930s and
1940s by enhanced domestic cooperation between the private sector and government. Business, unions, and
government realized that limiting domestic quarrels were necessary so to better cooperate and adapt to
changing economic conditions in the world within the system of freer trade because the European states were
dependent on international trade and were not powerful enough to control the system. Id. at 30-38.
95. Probably one of the best examples of this close corporatist relationship between government
and business can be found in the European consortium Airbus, a relationship which resulted in a trade dispute
in the early 1990s with the United States claiming subsidization when Airbus significantly increased global
market share. Artemis March, The Future of the U.S. Aircraft Industry, TEht. REv. 26-36 (1990).
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the corporatist government has a moderately freer ideological position on trade.
Further, this particular good is an important export product. Private sector
pressure is diluted because the corporatist government's general policy melds
with the government's long-term economic programs, making a mutually
acceptable trade negotiating result with the statist government more likely.'
On the other hand, because the industry product is not as important to the statist
government, its original protectionist position will be more flexible toward
accepting an agreement with the stronger corporatist state. This is especially
true when the product is an important export product to the corporatist state.
For a final hypothetical scenario, consider a dominant corporatist state
with a critical industry to its economy, and a much weaker pluralist government
that has a minimal interest representation on the good at issue with a less
important export industry to its economy. The corporatist government has
enacted protectionist measures on the import of the pluralist country's good:
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The weaker pluralist government will likely make extensive concessions
because of the negligible domestic interest influence on the international
bargaining position and the less important export industry to its economy. In
fact, given this scenario, the pluralist country would be unlikely to even
complain about the dominant corporatist's protectionist measure, unless other
goods have been debated and disputes have been on-going between the two
countries, such that the current dispute is just more fuel for a recurring fire.
96. This "long-term" program does not have the rigidity of a statist government.
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As is evident when considering these conjectural examples, within all
three government constructs, the states' positions in negotiations will be
dependent on a dedication to freer trade, private sector influence on the states'
position, and also the necessity of relying on trade to support their economies.'
Two governments that are more dedicated to freer trade and rely more on trade
as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) will be more prone to
conclude dispute negotiations in a more mutually satisfactory manner because
of the fear of reciprocal sanctions. The extent to which a government will be
flexible is influenced by the private sector and the severity of harm to the
domestic economy. The more severe the need to protect the domestic economy,
the more likely that a government will submit to protecting its domestic
economy and risk deeper trade cooperation.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper has described the dynamics of private sector-government
relations in statist, corporatist, and pluralist governments within the context of
domestic influences on international trade policy preferences. While it is clear
that the international trading system, as framed in the GATT/WTO, has
structured restraints within which states will act, leaders/politicians have
positions and personal ideological and self-interested preferences on trade
issues that are influenced by the private sector and the domestic economy.
Statist governments have unification between the private and public
sectors on economic issues and a propensity to interfere more with market
mechanisms than other government forms. These aspects facially undermine
the GATT/WTO trade system and its premises regarding comparative
advantage because they are endemic institutional government attributes that
could tend to favor protectionism. However, this is not always the case because
of the oftentimes dependency on external resources and ideological shifts in
statist governments. The other extreme, pluralist governments tend to refrain
from enacting domestic economic regulations that undermines market
mechanisms. However, these governments are also often more susceptible to
protecting industry and sectors of the economy at the behest of private sector
lobbying, with the degree of protection correlated with power bases and
collective action dynamics. Lastly, corporatist systems, in having a pseudo-
unification between the private and public sectors (but still having a defined
private sector), have been said to have more stable, foresighted, and planned
trade policy preferences," generally of a liberalized nature. This is attributable
97. Ronald Rogowski, Trade and the Variety of Democratic Institutions, 41(2) IN'L ORG. 203,
206 (1987), available athttp:/www.jstor.org/fcgi-bin/jstor/viewitem.fcg/ 0020 1 83/ dm980258&98p0l45c/
O?cMuentres.
98. See generally KATZENSTEIN, supra note 27.
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to the aggregation of interests and negotiations between major economic actors
at the national level that would otherwise contend amongst themselves for trade
and tariff preferences. A policy supporting freer trade is generally incorporated
into these domestic level negotiations.
The government forms and subsequent influences by the private sector
precipitate complexities for national representatives negotiating over trade
disputes. When a trade dispute arises, nationally-oriented representatives will
have a policy position dependent on ideology, the states' relative dedication to
the international system of free trade and cooperation (often to the extent that
it has been "locked in" to international agreements by previous governments),
and the importance of the industry to the domestic economy. The collective
action influence from the private sector on the states' trade policy positions
should be influenced most in pluralist systems, depicting when domestic
politics have the most prominent impact on international economic relations.
The impact will be greater when the interest group aggregation is stronger. 9
Corporatist systems would be expected on average to have less extreme
positions being asserted by the private sector at the domestic level because of
aggregated collective bargaining at an earlier period. Therefore, the negotia-
tors' position is more flexible and more apt to result in a mutually acceptable
agreement. A statist government would be expected to witness very little
private sector influence on international negotiations because the private sector
position is conceptually unified in the government's long-term economic
strategy for the country. Thus, the position of these economic production
entities in the economy should be the same as the government's position.
With all of these dynamics, obvious conclusions or generalizations cannot
be drawn about the position of particular governments on trade issues for the
future. The likely trend seems to be that the international trade framework (and
other international law economic agreements) will continue to pressure
domestic government institutions to more fully support market and trade
liberalization principles. Government interests may be privatized, especially
to the extent that intricate relations between government and internationally
competitive production entities may be under constant scrutiny of subsidization
claims by trading partners. 1" This would make countries with statist tendencies
gradually have more domestic private sector influence on government trade
99. For example, special interest groups have been especially visible in international trade
agreements, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement and the Uruguay round of the General
Agreement on Tariff and Trade. Grossman & Helpman, supra note 50, at 675.
100. While this is the trend-removing government from production and subsidization of private
sector production so that market competition consistent with the international trade system will be
fostered--even in countries that have not previously played an intricate role in their economies, they have
over time become more deeply involved in regulating their economies. LAHRSON & SKIDMORB, supra note
82, at 6.
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policies because there would be a loss of control over a portion of the economy.
Those influences may still exist but be derived now, at least legally, from
outside the government, and within a trade framework that is continually
becoming more liberalized by agreements that establish precedence and bind
future governments from straying too far from previously agreed upon
principles. As has been described throughout this paper, this does not mean
that any particular type of state should necessarily be more prone to favor freer
trade or protectionism, but that government institutions that have had a natural
prejudice to support freer trade could be influenced more by ad hoc and
sporadically arising protectionist positions from the private sector (as is more
common in pluralist governments). Given a dispute might result in a similar
trade position that would have existed even without any institutional conversion
but with less government dominance or encompassing economic planning over
that trade policy.
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Like many economies in transition, the Republic of Armenia is in the
process of adopting market-oriented policies and laws. The current tax law' in
Armenia was passed by the National Assembly on April 14, 1997 and was
signed by the President on May 12, 1997. The transition rules were quite
simple. Upon taking effect, the prior law, which was passed on April 19, 1992,
became void.2
I. GENERAL PROVISIONS
The tax procedures in Armenia come from three different sources: 1) tax
legislation and other laws on different types of taxes,3 2) government decrees,4
and 3) legislative norms that are adopted by the Tax Inspectorate or other State
administrative bodies.5 Thus, there are some similarities and differences
between the sources of tax rules in Armenia versus those in the United States
and other western democracies.
In the United States, the legislative branch passes tax legislation. The same
is true in Armenia. However, in Armenia there are also government decrees,
which are not a source of tax law in the United States. The advantage of having
* Professor, W. Paul Stillman School of Business, Seton Hall University.
I. See Generally Tax Code, 1997 (Arm.) (AD references are to the English language version of
the Republic of the Armenia tax law, passed in the National Assembly on April 14, 1997).
2. Tax Code, 1997, art. 39 (Arm.).
3. l at art. 2, sec. a.
4. Id. at sec. b.
5. Id. at sec. c.
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government decrees as part of the legal process is that it allows for faster
changes in the law. If something needs to be fixed, it can be fixed quickly,
without the need to first gather the necessary number of votes from the
legislature. The problem with allowing government decrees to have the force
of law is that there is no legislative input. If those who have the authority to
issue such decrees are incompetent or evil, a great deal of damage may be done.
Such decrees can be used to reward friends or punish enemies. One of the
strengths of the legal system in the United States is the separation of powers.
The legislative branch passes the laws and the executive branch enforces them.
This separation of powers doctrine6 acts as a safeguard against government
abuse. The Armenian tax system, or legal system in general, does not have this
safeguard built into the system to the same extent, although there are three
separate branches of government.
The third source of tax regulations, legislative norms, might be compared
to Internal Revenue Code Regulations that are written by the United States
Treasury Department and to Revenue Rulings and Revenue Procedures, which
are written by the Internal Revenue Service in the United States. In Armenia,
these legislative norms have the force of law. In the United States, Internal
Revenue Code Regulations have the force of law, although occasionally a
regulation is declared to be invalid for one reason or another. Internal Revenue
Service publications like Revenue Rulings and Revenue Procedures do not have
the force of law, but taxpayers who ignore them do so at their peril.
The problem with this source of law is that it is generated by the very
people who are in charge of collecting the tax. Thus, there may be a tendency
to interpret the law, or to make new law, that benefits the tax collector at the
expense of the taxpaying public. One of the main strengths of the Separation
of Powers Doctrine is that it provides a legal structure to prevent this potential
abuse of power.
The Separation of Powers Doctrine has been substantially eroded in the
United States, especially since the 1930s, when a number of administrative
agencies were created in the executive branch. These agencies have grown in
size and power to such an extent that the judges who would hear cases on the
violation of the Separation of Powers Doctrine are afraid to declare some
administrative agency unconstitutional for fear that their ruling would be used
6. The Separation of Powers Doctrine had its origins in the political writings of the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries. The United States was the first country to adopt it as part of its constitutional
structure. The Separation of Powers Doctrine is constructed around the belief that a government that has its
power divided among the executive, legislative and judicial branches has less ability to abuse power than a
government that has these powers centralized in a single branch. The legislative branch makes the laws, the
executive branch enforces the laws, and the judicial branch interprets the laws. A system of checks and
balances is thus established to minimize the amount of abuse that might otherwise take place.
as precedent to eventually hold that all such administrative agencies that
exercise legislative and judicial power are unconstitutional.7
The Armenian tax law states that taxes are compulsory payments, collected
for state and public welfare. They are to be collected from legal and physical
persons and from enterprises.' Those who are philosophically inclined might
question the meaning of state welfare and public welfare, and whether they
might be appropriate or true recipients of tax revenues.
The philosophical problem with collecting tax revenues for state welfare
is that the state is supposed to represent the people, but state welfare, if such a
thing exists, runs contrary to the interests of the taxpaying public. It is in the
state's interest to expand its power and scope, whereas it is in the interest of
individuals to keep the state small enough that it is not able to do much damage
to the individuals within its borders or without. There is a built-in and
irreconcilable conflict between state interests and individuals interests. At least
that is true once the state grows beyond the minimal state.'
Collecting taxes for the public welfare is a benign enough goal. The
problem is that many states collect taxes for reasons that actually harm public
welfare rather than enhance it. An ideal tax, if there is one, has the sole aim of
collecting revenue. The problem is that many taxes are created to further social
engineering goals rather than revenue collection goals. The graduated income
tax, for example, exists mostly to reduce income inequality, which is social
engineering at its worst. Karl Marx advocated a graduated income tax in his
Communist Manifesto as a means of destroying the free enterprise system,
which he disparagingly referred to as capitalism.
Economists have made a number of utilitarian arguments against the
graduated income tax.'0 It destroys incentives of the most productive people.
It retards economic growth by reducing the amount of capital available for
investment and job creation."
7. In the United States, a number of administrative agencies exercise both legislative and judicial
power although they are in the executive branch. For example, the Internal Revenue Service, which is a
subdivision of the Treasury Department, which is in the executive branch, issues pronouncements such as
Revenue Rulings and Revenue Procedures, which have the force of law for all practical purposes, since a
taxpayer who ignores them does so at his peril. The Treasury Department writes the regulations that expand,
clarify, and sometimes alter the tax laws that the legislative branch has passed. The Internal Revenue Service
also has its own court, the Tax Court, which hears and decides thousands of tax cases. It is an administrative
court that is in the executive branch.
8. Tax Code, 1997, art. 3 (Arm.).
9. For more on the concept of a minimal state from the philosophical perspective, see generally
ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA, BASIC BOOK, INc. (1974).
10. WALTER J. BLUM & HARRY KALVEN, JR., TIE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION
(1953); F.A. HAYEK, THE CASE AGAINST PROGRESSIVE INCOME TAXES, FREEMAN 229-232 (1953).
11. KErmI MARSDEN, LINKS BETWEEN TAXES AND ECONOMIC GROWII: SOME EMPIRICAL
EVIDENCE (World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 605, 1983).
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There is also the fairness argument. There are basically only two views
.of government. Either the government is the servant and the people are the
masters, or the government is the master and the people are the servants. The
graduated income tax is based on the view that the government is the master.
As Karl Marx said, "From each according to his abilities; to each according to
his needs."" If government were viewed as the servant, the view might be,
"From each according to the benefits received."
Unfortunately, the tax laws of Armenia tend to be of the Marxist variety. 1 3
The enterprise profit tax, for example, varies between 15% and 25%, which,
although lower than the rates in most countries, is, nevertheless, graduated. 4
The profit tax on gambling games and lotteries, although not graduated, is set
at a confiscatory 70%."s Individual income taxes are assessed at three rates,
15%, 25% and 30%.16
The Armenian tax system engages in other forms of social engineering in
addition to attempting to reduce income inequality. The excise tax law for
example punishes those who sell or consume caviar, alcohol and tobacco
products while rewarding those who make coats from sheep fur for employees
and the army.1
7
The value-added tax (VAT) is assessed at a single rate,"8 although there are
exemptions for certain socially desirable activities and products. 9 Exports are
subsidized by a zero tax rate.'
One concept imbedded in the Armenian tax code that might be adopted by
the United States is the provision relating to when tax law changes should be
made. The Armenian tax law states that changes in tax rates, the introduction
or termination of a tax may generally take place only at the beginning of a fiscal
year.2" That would eliminate the need to allocate by days or to deal with the
complexities that result when the rules are changed during the year, as is so
often done in the United States.
12. GEORGE SELDES, THE GREAT THOUGHTS 274 (1985). The original wording was "Jeder nach
seinen Fahigkeiten, jedem nach seinen Bedirfnissen." Il Louis Blanc, the French socialist, said basically
the same thing in 1848.
13. As are those of the United States and every other country that has graduated tax rates.
14. Tax Code, 1997, art. 33, sec. 1 (Am.) (Law on Enterprise Profit Tax).
15. Id at sec. 2 (Law on Enterprise Profit Tax).
16. Id at art. 18 (Personal Income Tax).
17. Id. at art. 5.(Excise Tax), (signed into law by the President on June 24,1997). The tax rate on
caviar is 200%. Id On tobacco products it is 100%. Id. On alcohol, the rate varies between 50% and 125%.
Id The rate on coats made of sheep fur for employees or the army is zero percent. Id.
18. Id at art. 9 (Law on Value Added Tax) (signed into law by the President on June 16,1997).
19. Tax Code, 1997, art. 15 (Arm.).
20. Id. at art. 16.
21. Id. at art. 8.
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The Armenian tax credit is quite simple. Taxes paid by taxpayers in
Armenia shall be reduced by the amount of tax collected from the taxpayer
outside Armenia.2 This rule is much less complicated than the United States
rule. It avoids the possibility of double-taxation.
Armenia assesses six kinds of taxes,' the enterprise profit tax,' the
personal income tax,' the excise tax,'6 the Value Added Tax, the property
tax28 and the land tax.
II. RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF TAXPAYERS; CONTROL
OVER TAX PAYMENTS
A taxpayer has the following rights:
a. be introduced to the results of checking his activity,"
b. submit to Tax Inspection explanatory notes on tax accounting,
and payment, °
c. appeal against activities of Tax Inspectorate, as in accordance
with the legislation,3'
d. apply for obtaining tax privileges, as defined by the
legislation. 32
A taxpayer has the following responsibilities:
a. to account income, and to submit statement of accounts,33
b. to account amounts of taxes to be paid, and pay them, unless
envisaged otherwise by the legislation,'
c. to submit to Tax Inspection tax reports, and other documents, as
envisaged by the legislation,35
22. Id at art. 11.
23. Id. at art. 12.
24. See generally Law on Enterprise Profit Tax, 1997 (Arm.) (enacted by the National Assembly
on Sept. 30, 1997 and signed by the President on Nov. 27, 1997).
25. See generally Law on Personal Income Tax, 1997 (Arm.) (adopted by the National Assembly
on Dec. 27, 1997 and signed by the President on Dec. 30, 1997).
26. See generally Law on Excise Tax, 1997 (Arm.) (signed by the President on June 24, 1997).
27. See generally Law on Value Added Tax, 1997 (Arm.) (enacted by the National Assembly on
May 14, 1997 and signed by the President on June 16, 1997).
28. Tax Code, 1997 (Arm.).
29. Id at art. 14, sec. a.
30. Id at sec. b.
31. l at sec. c.
32. I at sec. d.
33. Tax Code, 1997, art. 15, sec. a (Arm.).
34. Id. at sec. b.
35. Id. at sec. c.
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d. to pay in due time taxes, and tax advances, if envisaged by the
legislation,36
e. provide necessary conditions for checks, conducted by the Tax
Inspectorate, 7
f. submit documents, verifying his fights for tax privileges,38
g. to make corrections in the accounts, if errors are found during
the checks conducted by Tax Inspectorate. 9
Taxpayers have a month to register for a taxpayer identification number
after receiving a taxpayer's license.' Tax liability is terminated upon death,4"
which is different from the treatment in the United States, where the deceased
taxpayer's estate assumes responsibility for paying the tax. If a legal person or
enterprise is restructured, the outstanding tax liabilities are assumed by the
successor.
42
The restructuring provision is an interesting one because it does not go
into any further detail about what constitutes a restructuring. If the
restructuring is by transfer of shares, it is easy to identify the old and new
owners. But what if the restructuring is by the sale of assets, where the old and
new owners are not quite identical? Who is liable for tax in such a case? The
law is unclear.
If outstanding tax liabilities have been discovered after the liquidation of
a legal person, the court may assign them to the major owners or members of
management if these liabilities arose within one year of liquidation as a result
of mistakes made by these persons.43 Thus, there is a one-year statute of
limitations in which to pierce the corporate veil.
Which major owners or managers would be liable is not stated. Would a
bookkeeper be liable, or would the bookkeeper's boss be liable? Would the
president of the enterprise be liable if it was the bookkeeper who made the
mistake without the president's knowledge? If the president told the
bookkeeper to calculate the amount of tax liability incorrectly, would the
bookkeeper be liable? Would it be joint and several liability with the right of
contribution?
Questions might also arise about what constitutes a mistake. Is an
underestimate of tax liability a mistake, or is it merely an underestimate? What
36. Id. at sec. d.
37. Id at sec. e.
38. Tax Code, 1997, art. 15, sec. f(Arm.).
39. Id. at sec. g.
40. Id. at arL 15.
41. Id. at art. 16.
42. Id.
43. Tax Code, 1997, art. 16 (Arm.).
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if a mistake is discovered that, upon correction, would result in a tax refund?
Who is entitled to receive the refund?
A number of questions arise because the tax law does not cover these
points. Carefully worded language in the corporate charter might spell out who
is entitled to a tax refund in the event of liquidation, but it is unlikely that those
who draft corporate charters would think to include such a provision.
Information obtained illegally during the course of a tax inspection may
not be used to collect taxes." Thus, the tax inspector is not able to benefit by
breaking the law, which reduces the incentive for doing so.
Information may not serve as the basis for accounting and collecting taxes
unless the taxpayer has become familiar with it.45 This provision provides a
measure of basic fairness and allows the taxpayer to introduce information to
challenge the veracity of the information that is otherwise used to assess and
collect taxes.
Legal persons, enterprises without the status of a legal person,
entrepreneurs, and state and local government bodies shall provide the Tax
Inspectorate with information on the activities associated with the taxpayers,
and the income paid to physical persons and taxes collected from the income,
in accordance with procedures defined by legislation. '
M. RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE VIOLATION OF TAX LEGISLATION
Taxpayers, and their management in the case of enterprises, institutions
and other organizations, are responsible for the correct tax accounting and
timely payment unless otherwise envisaged by legislation.4 Taxpayers who do
not submit the accounting documents, or who submit documents that do not
comply with the requirements, shall have the Tax Inspectorate perform its own
accounting, based on the following:"
a. Taxpayer's assets taxed turnover
b. Expenses on the production and turnover
C. Inventory results
d. Information obtained from third persons
e. Prices and costs used by other persons in similar cases
f. Other norms set by the government
44. Id. at art. 18.
45. Id. at art. 19.
46. Id at art. 20.
47. Id. at art. 22.
48. Tax Code, 1997, art. 22 (Arm).
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There are penalties for delay in payment. If there is a 90 day delay in
paying, a fine equal to 0.1% of the total amount is assessed.49 If payment is
delayed by more than 90 days, the fine is 0.3% of the total amount of tax due.50
For taxpayers who understand the time value of money, this provision
encourages them to delay payment and invest the proceeds in some kind of
income generating account.
A fine is imposed if an accounting statement is submitted more than two
months late.5' The fine is equal to 5% of the total amount due for each 15 days
of delay, not to exceed the total amount due.5'
A fine equal to 10% of the outstanding tax liability is assessed if the
taxpayer either did not carry out an accounting or if the accounting was done
improperly.53  This penalty might be exceedingly harsh in some cases. For
example, take the case of a taxpayer who completed 99% of the accounting
properly but made a mistake on some minor item. According to the wording of
this penalty provision, the taxpayer is assessed a 10% fine on the entire amount
of the tax liability, when in fact the mistake that was made might have been
quite minor. What if the mistake was in the government's favor? Apparently,
the taxpayer would still be assessed a 10% penalty, which seems grossly
unfair.54
If an item is not included on a tax declaration, or is partially concealed,
meaning not properly accounted for, the taxpayer is liable for the full amount
of tax plus a 50% penalty. If the taxed object is missing or partially concealed
a second time, the penalty rises to 100%." There is nothing in this tax law that
mentions prison as a possible penalty for concealment of tax liability.56
49. Id. at art. 23
50. Id.
51. Id. at art. 24.
52. Id.
53. Tax Code, 1997, art. 25 (Arm.).
54. Joan Caplin, 6 Mistakes Even the Tax Pros Make, MONEY, Mar. 1998, at 104-106. lfa similar
penalty provision were enacted into the United States tax code, it is likely that every taxpayer that is audited
would have to pay the penalty. In November 1997, for the eighth time since 1987, MONEY magazine
conducted a survey of practitioners to see how accurately they were able to prepare tax returns. In the survey
that was published in the March, 1998 issue, all 46 tax preparers who completed the survey made at least one
mistake. For the seventh time in the history of the MONEY magazine survey, no two tax preparers came up
with the same tax liability. Participants in the survey consisted of 31 certified public accountants, 12 enrolled
agents and three other individuals who prepare tax returns for a living.
55. Tax Code, 1997, art. 27 (Arm.).
56. THE EThnCs OF TAX EVASION 306-314 (Robert W. McGee, ed. 1998); It might be mentioned
that tax evasion is widespread in Eastern Europe and the CIS countries. The main reasons for the widespread
evasion are the belief that the government is corrupt and therefore not entitled to any tax revenue, and the
absence of an infrastructure that lends itself to the easy reporting of taxable income or its collection. For a
discussion of tax evasion in Russia; see VLADIMIR V. VAGUINE, TiE "SHADOW ECONOMY" AND TAX
EVASION IN RussIA, for a discussion of tax evasion in Bulgaria, see GuEORGUI SMATRAKALEV, WALKING
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However, that does not means that tax evaders cannot go to prison because
there is another section in the law that states that other types of penalties and
fines might be imposed if other provisions of the tax laws are violated.-"
If the product of entrepreneurial activity, including goods and services to
be delivered or sold, is not registered in accordance with procedures set forth
by the government, the fine shall be equal to the total cost of production.58 If
the goods or services are sold at a price that exceeds the registered price, the
fine is equal to the difference between the registered price and the actual
price.59 However, neither of these fines shall be collected if the violation occurs
during a period in which the taxpayer provides an accounting declaration.'
Such a provision is totally missing from the United States tax code. In the
United States there is generally no need to report prices to the government.
Setting prices is seen as an activity that is none of the government's business.
It is strange that a government that is trying to convert to a market system
would retain such a provision.
Taxpayers are to pay the taxes and fines within ten days after receiving
notification from the Tax Inspectorate." Failure to do so may result in seizure
of the taxpayer's property.62 The Tax Inspectorate may apply to the court for
seizure.
This procedure seems harsh and subject to potential abuse. What if the
Tax Inspectorate notification states a tax figure that is grossly overstated?
What recourse does a taxpayer have other than paying whatever the Tax
Inspectorate thinks is due? What if the amount due is a few dollars? Does the
Tax Inspectorate have the right to seize all the taxpayer's property?
In the United States, the policy is much different. The Internal Revenue
Service first notifies the taxpayer of the alleged deficiency. The taxpayer has
30 days to respond. A series of 30 day and 90 day letters then go back and
forth. If various levels of administrative review do not resolve the issue, the
taxpayer can petition the Tax Court to hear the case, or can pay the tax and sue
for a refund in either the Claims Court or the appropriate federal District Court.
ON THE EDGE: BULGARIA AND THE TRANSfITON TO A MARKET ECONOMY, in THE ETHIcs OF TAX EVASION
316-329 (Robert W. McGee, ed. 1998); for a discussion of tax evasion in Greece, see APOSTOLOS A. BALLAS
& HARIDIMOS TSOUKAS, Consequences of Distrust: The Vicious Circle of Tax Evasion in Greece, in THE
ETiCS OF TAX EVASION 284-304 (Robert W. McGee, ed. 1998); for a sociological and cultural discussion
of tax evasion, see ALFONSO MORALES, Income Tax Compliance andAlternative Views of Ethics and Human
Nature, in THE ETHICS OF TAX EVASION 242-258 (Robert W. McGee, ed. 1998).
57. Tax Code, 1997, art. 32 (Arm.).
58. Id. at art. 28.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at art. 29.
62. Tax Code, 1997, art. 30 (Arn.).
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Although there are possibilities for abuse in the United States tax system, the
due process afforded most taxpayers minimized the potential for abuse.63 This
level of due process is absent from the Armenian tax system.
Evidence of this lack of due process may be seen in the provision that
allows the Tax Inspectorate to collect even before taxes are due. There is a
provision in the tax law that permits the Tax Inspectorate to collect taxes before
the regular due time if there is evidence that a taxpayer with outstanding tax
liabilities is destroying the objects of income or concealing income, thus
making it impossible to collect taxes. The Tax Inspectorate may require the
submission of accounting statements, declarations or other documents before
they would ordinarily be due."
Such a rule violates due process and may lead to abuse. There really are
no safeguards to prevent the Tax Inspectorate from targeting anyone it wishes,
merely to solicit a bribe. From conversations the author has had with numerous
Armenians, tax inspectors have a reputation for soliciting bribes. Based on the
opinions of the average Armenian, it could be concluded that the average tax
inspector would accept a bribe. Some people become tax inspectors for that
very reason, since the pay is low and the opportunity for making extra income
is great.
IV. GETrING A REFUND
If a taxpayer is entitled to a tax refund, the amount of the refund will be
netted with other tax obligations and refunded to him within 30 days after
receiving the application from the taxpayer.' There is a special procedure for
refunding excess VAT and excise taxes.'
If an employer does not withhold taxes for employees, the amount of tax
due may be collected from the employer.6' The exact language of the English
language translation reads as follows:
If an employer does not collect (keep) taxes from the employee in due
time, the amounts shall be collected from the employer after
discovery, for a period not exceeding the last three months, and the
remaining tax obligations shall be covered by the employer."
63. GEORGE HANSON, TO HARSS OUR PEOPL± ME IRS AND GOVERNMENT ABUSE OF POWER
(A Positive Publications Book, 1984). Although the system in the Unites States goes a long way toward
eliminating abuse by tax authorities, it has not been able to eliminate abuses. See also, DAVID BURNHAM,
A LAW UNTO ITp. POWER, PoLricS AND TE IRS (Random House, Inc., 1989).
64. Tax Code, 1997, art. 31 (Arm.).
65. Id. at art. 33.
66. Id.
67. Id at art. 34.
68. Id.
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If the employer withholds too much from the employee's wages, the excess
shall be returned within 30 days after discovery, for the period of the previous
three years. 69
Taxpayers who incur a loss as the result of the Tax Inspectorate's
violations shall be reimbursed in accordance with legal procedure.7° This
provision is much better than the provision in the United States tax code. In the
United States, the IRS can unjustly confiscate a taxpayer's house and sell it for
ten cents on the dollar. If it later turns out that the house was wrongly
confiscated and sold, the taxpayer is only entitled to the ten cents the IRS
collected, not the market value of the house. Worse yet, the taxpayer might
have to sue the IRS to get even that. In one case, a taxpayer who was entitled
to such a refund had to agree not to sue the IRS as a condition of having the
property returned, even after the court said that the taxpayer was entitled to a
refund."'
V. OTHER PROVISIONS
Taxpayers may appeal activities of the Tax Inspectorate officers to the
senior body within the Tax Inspectorate within 30 days. 2 A decision regarding
the appeal shall be made within thirty days thereafter. Appeals against these
decisions may be appealed to a higher body or to the court within one month
after receiving notification. 3 The taxpayer and/or his representative may be
present during the examination of the appeal. 4 An appeal against the activities
of the Tax Inspection officers does not suspend further collection of taxes.
However, the tax body that examines the appeal may suspend tax collection
until a decision is made. 5
The provisions of an international agreement take precedence over the
provisions of the tax law for those international agreements that were entered
into after the current law was passed.76 The previous procedures will be
effective for international agreements signed before the current tax law took
effect.77
69. Tax Code, 1997, ar. 34 (Arm.).
70. Id. at art. 35.
71. GEORGE HANSON, To HARASS OUR PEOPLE: THE IRS AND GOVERNMENT ABUSE OF POWER
(A Positive Publications Book, 1984). For numerous documented cases of IRS abuse, see also DAVID
BURNHAM, A LAW UNTO ITSELF: POWER, POLnrzcs AND THE IRS (Random House, Inc., 1989).
72. Tax Code, art. 36 (Arm.).
73. id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at art. 37.
76. Id at arts. 38,44.
77. Tax Code, 1997, art. 44 (Arm.).
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VI. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
For one who is familiar with the United States tax code, one is struck by
the relative simplicity of the Armenian tax law. The Armenian tax law has little
or no complexity compared to the mammoth United States tax law, which has
evolved over more than eight decades.7 8 On the other hand, there is not nearly
as much guidance, which leaves room for interpretation. But the United States
tax code also leaves a lot of room for much interpretation. The Armenian tax
system has some provisions that could lead to abuse and there are inadequate
safeguards to prevent abuse. The United States tax system has safeguards, but
IRS officials have often ignored those safeguards and have abused the law on
numerous occasions. Such abuses have led Congress to pass several
Taxpayers' Bill of Rights legislation. So even if the Armenian legislature
amended the tax law to include safeguards,just having them on the books might
not be sufficient to prevent abuses. But it might help.
Armenian tax rates are lower than those in most other countries. Thus,
Armenia is at a competitive advantage, all other things being equal. All other
things are not equal, of course. After the breakup of the Soviet Union there
remains a bit of an anti-capitalistic mentality, which impedes investment and
economic growth. This mentality is present in all countries to a certain extent.
However, it is more prevalent in former Soviet countries, especially those that
became part on the Soviet Union in the early days, as Armenia did. 9
Fortunately, Armenia does not seem to be infected by this anti-capitalistic virus
to the same extent as most other countries of Eastern Europe and the CIS that
I have visited. One hesitates to say that Armenians have entrepreneurship in
their blood without empirical evidence and scientific studies of genes to back
up the statement, but it seems to be true. After the 1915 Diaspora brought on
by the Turkish genocide, Armenians fled to the Middle East, Europe, North
America and elsewhere. Many of them became quite successful in business.
There is also rampant corruption. As mentioned previously, tax officials,
the police and the army are known for taking bribes. Corruption deters some
foreign investment but not all foreign investors refuse to invest in countries that
are corrupt. Some investors probably prefer such an environment.
Foreign investors hesitate to invest in a company that does not issue
financial statements that they can place confidence in. Armenia has gone a long
way toward eliminating that competitive disadvantage by the partial adoption
of International Accounting Standards. It adopted 15 International Accounting
78. U.S CONST. amend. XVI.
79. LuDWIG VON MISES, THE AmN-CAPALISTIC MENTAIrTY (1956); ROBERT SHEAFFER,
RESENMENT AGAINST ACHIEVEMENr UNDERSTANDING THE ASSUALT UPON ABILrY (1988); HELImu
SCHOECK, ENVY: A THEORY OF SocIAL BEHAvIOuR (1966).
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Standards toward the end of 1998 and has plans to adopt most or all of the rest
of them within the next two years. Some officials in the Tax Inspectorate resent
that they were not consulted before the adoption process was in the final stages.
The Armenian accounting system is fine just the way it is. Some of the people
who were involved in the adoption of International Accounting Standards in
Armenia are concerned that tax inspectors will punish Armenian companies
once they convert their internal accounting records and procedures to comply
with International Accounting Standards. The tax inspectors do not have any
training in International Accounting Standards, they do not understand them;
and what they do not understand they will not approve. The accountants who
work in the private sector also are not familiar with the International
Accounting Standards, for the most part. How the accounting community of a
whole country can get up to speed on International Accounting Standards in a
short period of time will be quite a feat. But they are trying, as are the
accountants in a number of CIS republics.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1999, worldwide financial losses to business software piracy were
estimated at $12 billion.1 Although worldwide piracy rates dropped between
1994 and 1999, possibly due to increased availability of legal software and
increased government cooperation in enforcing penalties,2 business software
* J.D. Candidate, Class of 2002, Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center, Fort
Lauderdale, Florida.
1. BusINEss SOFrWARE ALLIANCE, 1999 GLOBAL SoPTwARE PIRACY REPORT - A STUDY
CONDUCTED BY THE INTERNATIONALPLANNING AND RESEARCH CORPORATION IORTIHE BusINESS SOFTWARE
ALLIANCE AND SOFTWARE& INFORMATION INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION 8 (2000) (presenting a table of financial
losses to piracy by country, region, and world from 1994 through 1999). All financial information in this
Comment is presented in United States dollars.
2. Id. at4.
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piracy remains a pressing issue in Asia.3 While North America and Western
Europe, at 30% each, accounted for the largest percentages of money lost to
business software piracy in 1999, Asia and Pacific Rim countries followed
close behind at 23%."
As China seeks accession to the World Trade Organization (hereinafter
"WTO"), its software anti-piracy enforcement efforts will be scrutinized and
may be found lacking. If China accedes to the WTO, it will be required to
comply with the WTO' s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS) standards for intellectual property protection. United
States non-governmental organizations (hereinafter "NGOs"), such as the
Business Software Alliance (BSA) and the International Intellectual Property
Alliance (IPA), are willing to help China reduce its rate of software piracy.
These organizations have experience working in the United States and other
countries to educate software users, encourage software piracy reporting, assist
law enforcement agencies, gather market information, and recommend software
anti-piracy strategies to businesses and governments. However, China's
political, legal, and social structures present special challenges to these NGOs.
This Note will first discuss transnational software trade in China with an
emphasis on United States concerns over the piracy of its software products.
Second, it will examine China's current software anti-piracy initiatives. Third,
it will outline TRIPS requirements and discuss how China's current software
anti-piracy initiatives fall short of TRIPS's standards. Fourth, this Comment
will introduce two NGOs, the IIPA and the BSA, explain their software anti-
piracy capabilities, and examine their current activities in China. Finally, it will
identify problems NGOs may encounter as they seek to help China comply with
TRIPS and make recommendations for future NGO software anti-piracy
activities in China.
II. TRANSNATIONAL SOFTWARE TRADE IN CHINA
Software is a booming business in countries across the globe, and China
is no exception. A November 1998 study reports that China's software industry
is growing by 28% per year and projects a total economic impact of $6.2 billion
by 200 . As the software industry grows, so grow its associated problems. In
3. I
4. Id
5. PRicEwAmRhiOUSECOOPsPs, CONTRIBUTION OF THE SOFTWARE INDUSTRY TO THE CHINESE
ECONOMY - A SwtDY CONDUCTED BY PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, COMMISSIONED BY THE BUSINESS
SOFTWARE ALIANCE I (1998) [hereinafter CONTMIMBtON OF TiE SOFTWARE INDUSTRY TO THE CHINESE
ECONOMY).
a recent worldwide study, China, with a 91% rate of software piracy,6 was
second only to Vietnam (at 98%) in its utilization of pirated business software.'
Business software piracy8 takes several forms: downloading software from the
Internet, making multiple copies of a program when a license has been bought
for only one user, creating or copying compact disc read-only memory
(hereinafter "CD-ROMs"), or loading software without license onto new
computers before sale.9 Because pirates can instantly redistribute their spoils
worldwide via the Internet, and because purchasers of pilfered software have
an attractive choice of media, software piracy is not merely a local problem but
a national and transnational concern.
For China, national protection of intellectual property'0 is both an internal
and an external issue: first, China must protect its own software developers'
work from piracy by others (a problem beyond the scope of this Comment), and
second, China must protect the intellectual property of its transnational trading
partners. With a WTO membership on the horizon, China is focused on the
second tier of the problem: reassuring the international community of its
concern for other nations' intellectual property, including software copyrights.
H-istorically, China's failure to provide adequate copyright protection"' to
other nations' software products discouraged transnational software trade,
especially with the United States. The United States Trade Representative's
Office (USTR) has for years kept China on its watch list," although in the wake
6. "Rate of software piracy" refers to the percentage of software applications in use that were not
purchased at retail, but pirated (copied) from a private source and redistributed through various means
without license from the original author. BUSINESS SOFTWARE AujANCE, CONTRmUTIONS OF THE
PACKAGED SOFrwARE INDUSTRY TO THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 13-14 (1999) [hereinafter CONTRutmoNs OF
THE PACKAGED SOFrWARE INDUSTRY].
7. lId at 13.
8. "Software Piracy is the use or reproduction of a software product without the express consent
of its author." Id.
9. Id.
10. "Intellectual property, very broadly, means the legal rights which result from intellectual activity
in the industrial, scientific, literary, and artistic fields." IDnELLECUAL PROPERTY READING MATEAL, at
3, WIPO Pub. No. 476(e), available at http://www.wipo. org/about-ip/en/ (last visited July 30, 2000).
Software protection is a facet of intellectual property protection. Ia
11. The question, "what is software?" has spawned interesting debates: is it mathematical
expression, a written work, or an electronic pattern? Is it mere command, or expression? Is it tangible or
intangible, and what sort of legal tool can best deter its unauthorized use? Should it be patented, copyrighted,
or trademarked? For an introductory discussion in the context of copyright law, see Rafael A. Declet, Jr.,
Protecting American Intellectual Property in China: The Persistent Problem of Software Piracy, 10 N.Y.
INT'L L REV. 57, 70-71 (1997). See also Karl F. Jorda, Software Protection: Copyrights, Patents, Trade
Secrets and/or sui generis, 4 ELSA J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 337, 337 (1998) (advocating sui generis protection
for software).
12. "Countries listed on the [USTR's] Priority Watch List, Watch List, and Special Mention list
are subject to increased bilateral scrutiny but are not subject to immediate trade sanctions ... Priority
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of recent trade agreements the USTR demoted China from a high-scrutiny
status13 to one of continued monitoring. 4 The United States voted in May 2000
to grant permanent normal trade relations (hereinafter "PNTR") status to
China. 5 This optimistic development, however, pales in comparison to China's
piracy-related trade losses, which were measured in 1998 at $808.4 million for
commercial software applications alone. 6
Over the last twenty years, China has tried to become the friendliest child
on the transnational software trading playground. Recent trade agreements
ostensibly reflect deep concern for protecting other nations' intellectual
property. During trade negotiations with the United States between 1980 and
1995, China designed new copyright laws as a concession to the United States'
concern over intellectual property protection. 7 The Sino-German Accord
signed this summer emphasized intellectual property protection and "technol-
ogy cooperation.""' A May 2000 trade agreement with the European Union
Foreign Countries under Special 301 become subject, after 30 days, to a Section 301 action... [emphasis
sic]." Press Release, International Intellectual Property Alliance, USTR Again Names China as a Priority
Foreign Country Under Special 301 (Apr. 30, 1996) (on file with author) [hereinafter USTR Again Names
China as a Priority Foreign Country].
13. "Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 is the principal United States statute for addressing
foreign unfair practices affecting United States' exports of goods or services. Section 301 may be used to
enforce United States rights under international trade agreements ...." Press Release, Office of the U.S.
Trade Representative, Monitoring and Enforcing Trade Laws and Agreements (2000) (on file with author).
The WTO has held that Section 301 activities are in compliance with WTO member guidelines. Press
Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, WTO Adopts Panel Findings Upholding Section 301 (Jan.
27, 2000) (on file with author).
14. The USTR ended its Special 301 investigation of China in February 1995 when the United
States and China entered into a bilateral trade agreement. The investigation had been initiated in May 1994.
USTR Again Names China as a Priority Foreign Country, supra note 12. As of May 1, 2000, and at the time
of this writing, the USTR is monitoring China at the "Section 306" level, which "monitors how countries are
complying with their agreements with the U.S. - to ensure that the countries are implementing the reforms
to which they have committed themselves." Press Release, International Intellectual Property Alliance, IIPA
Lauds USTR's Continuing Pressure On Countries To Improve Copyright Protection and Enforcement
Through the Special 301 and TRIPS Processes (May 1, 2000) (on file with author) [hereinafter UPA Lauds
USTR's Continuing Pressure].
15. See, e.g., US House Passes Bill on China's PNTR Status, CHINA DAILY (May 25, 2000),
available at httpJ/www.chinadaily.comcn/highlightstwto/reaction/pntr.525.html.
16. INTERNATIONAL INTELILECAL PROPERTY ALLIANCE, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY ALI.ANCE 2000 SPECIAL 301 REPORT PEOPLE'S REPUBuC OF CHINA 27 (2000) [hereinafter
INTERNATIONAL INTEuEcruAL PROPERTY AuIANCE 2000 SPEcIAL. 301 REPORT] (presenting a table of
financial losses to software piracy from 1994 through 1999).
17. See, e.g., Kenyon S. Jenckes, Note, Protection of Foreign Copyrights in China: The
Intellectual Property Courts andAlternative Avenues of Protection, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY LJ. 551,
557 (1997) (discussing highlights of the 1995 Intellectual Property Agreement between the United States and
China).
18. Agence France Presse, Chinese Prime Minister Wins German Assurances on Taiwan, Opens
Rule of Law Dialogue, INSIDE CHINA TODAY, July 2, 2000.
emphasized access and ownership in mobile telecommunication markets. 9
China has also made international treaty commitments to intellectual property
protection. In 1980, China joined the World Intellectual Property Organization
(hereinafter "WIPO"),2 ° an agency of the United Nations system.21 In 1985,
China became a member of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property,' which provides for reciprocal intellectual property protection among
the states of its Union.23 In 1992, China became a party to the Berne Conven-
tion, which establishes copyright protection guidelines for its member
24countries.
China has, at least on paper, backed its international commitments with
national action. It has launched internal software anti-piracy initiatives
designed to reduce the rate of software piracy in China. These initiatives will
form the backbone of China's TRIPS compliance strategy should China accede
to the WTO.
M. CHINA'S SOFTWARE ANTI-PIRACY INITIATIVES
China's internal anti-piracy initiatives include creating laws against
software piracy, establishing courts to deal with intellectual property rights
violations, and establishing government offices to coordinate law enforcement.
First, as a result of United States trade pressure and China's desire for
WTO membership, China has made significant changes in the "substantive
aspect of copyright enforcement in China," i.e. its copyright laws." Copyright
laws are held by "international consensus" to be an appropriate, albeit not ideal,
means of software protection.' The United States has been a driving force in
19. BBC News Online, EU-China Agree Trade Deal, available at http'/news6.thdo.
bbc.co.uk/hi/english/businesstnewsid%5F755000/755139.stm (last modified May 19, 2000).
20. World Intellectual Property Organization, Contracting Parties ofTreatiesAdministeredby the
WIPO - Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, at http'//www.wipo.int/
eng/ratifilc/doc/e-berne.doc (last visited July 30, 2000).
21. World Intellectual Property Organization, What is WIPO, available at http'//www. wipo.org
/eng/newindex/about.htm (last visited July 31, 2000).
22. World Intellectual Property Organization, Contracting Parties of Treaties Administered by the
WIPO -Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, at http://www. wipo.int/eng/ratific/doc/d-
paris.doc (last visited July 30, 2000).
23. World Intellectual Property Organization, Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property, available at http://www.wipo.org/engiplex/wo-parO-.htm (last visited July 26, 2000).
24. Gregory S. Feder, Note, Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in China: You Can Lead
a Horse to Water, But You Can't Make It Drink, 37 Vat. J. INT'LL 223,226-27 (1996) (citing generally the
Berne Convention for the Protection of Lteray and Artistic Works).
25. Julia Cheng, Note, China's Copyright System: Rising To The Spirit of TRIPS Requires An
Internal Focus and WTO Membership, 21 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 1941, 2006 (1998).
26. See Jorda, supra note 11, at 337 (noting an "international consensus" in favor of copyright
protection for software, but advocating sui generis protection).
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China's copyright law development, successfully urging through trade pressure
that China enact "modem" intellectual property legislation. Second, China
has created an intellectual property court system. The intellectual property
courts, which have been in place since 1993, were specifically created to deal
with copyright, patent, and trademark litigation.29 Finally, China has created
government offices and agencies to enforce software anti-piracy measures. The
IIPA reports that in 1999, two government offices emerged as leaders in
China's fight to enforce its copyright laws.3 China's State Intellectual Property
Office (hereinafter "SIPO") was established in 1998 to monitor and centralize
intellectual property protection enforcement.3 China has also created the
Office of National Antipiracy and Pornography (hereinafter "NAPP"), which
the IIPA reports has "assumed control over coordinating all copyright
enforcement throughout China."32
IV. THE CHALLENGE OF TRIPS
China's desire for WTO membership33 is viewed as the solution to its
ongoing software piracy problem. The prevailing attitude is that China would
not dare endanger its quest for WTO-member status, or its status if achieved.'
If it accedes to the WTO, China will be obligated to comply 5 with the
27. Assafa Endeshaw, Commentary, A Critical Assessment of the U.S.-China Conflict on
Intellectual Property, 6 ALB. LJ. So. & TECH. 295,312-13 (1996).
28. See, e.g., Declet, supra note 11, at 70.
29. See Gregory S. Kolton, Comment, Copyright Law and the People's Courts in the People's
Republic of China: A Review and Critique of China's Intellectual Property Courts, 17 U. PA. J. INrL ECON.
L 415,436-37 (1996).
30. INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ALLIANCE 2000 SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note.
16, at 30.
31. OFFCE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIvE, 2000 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON
FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 50 (2000) [hereinafter 2000 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT].
32. INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ALLIANCE 2000 SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note
16, at30.
33. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations Final Act
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994,33 LLM. 1125,1150-51
[hereinafter WTO Agreement]. Although a signatory to the WTO Agreement, China is not yet a member of
the WrO. Article XI II of the WTO Agreement only incorporates the European Communities nations and
nations that were signatories to the 1947 GATr. Md China, not in either of these classes, must comply with
a Schedule of Specific Commitments. If it complies, it will be designated an original WTO member. Id.
34. 'The financial promise of WTO membership and the tremendous volume of Chinese exports
to the United States have become too important to the future of the Chinese economy for Beijing to risk the
consequences of non-compliance." Jenckes, supra note 17, at 571. Declet agrees, saying WTO membership
is the "long-term solution" to China's software piracy problem. See Declet, supra note 11, at 76.
35. Some WTO member obligations, including TRIPS obligations, were scheduled for
implementation over a period of time beginning April 14, 1994 (the date of the Uruguay Round's Final Act).
Countries acceding to the WTO after April 14,1994 must also meet these obligations. Further, the standards
Miller
intellectual property protection standards set out in the WTO's Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights."'
On its face, TRIPS does not overburden China. TRIPS allows members
to implement existing laws in pursuit of TRIPS-defined objectives, and it does
not require members to create special legal channels for intellectual property
enforcement.3" The substance of the Berne Convention, of which China is
already a member, serves as the basis for TRIPS guidelines," and the Berne
Convention requirements are incorporated into the current WTO standards for
intellectual property protection.39
However, TRIPS is more than a legislative drafting checklist. TRIPS also
provides for compliance monitoring, identifies information that WTO members
are required to disclose upon request, sets forth guidelines for enforcing TRIPS,
and creates a body charged with overseeing member compliance.' These
provisions are the ones that might cause trouble for a WTO-member China,
because they do more than set legal standards. They require actual deterrence
of intellectual property infringement and disclosure of results to the WTO.
First, TRIPS specifies that members "provide for" criminal penalties,
fines, and imprisonment that will deter "willful... copyright piracy on a
commercial scale."' TRIPS specifically states that "remedies available shall
include imprisonment and/or monetary fines sufficient to provide a deterrent [to
piracy and counterfeiting]."' 2 Although TRIPS does not set forth any standard
or formula for measuring whether a nation is providing sufficient deterrents,
this language certainly implies that TRIPS is outcome-based. Common sense
applicable to existing WTO members will be applied equally to the new country when it accedes, i.e., a
latecomer to the WTO must, at the time of its accession, compare favorably to countries that have been
working on their implementations for years. See WTO Agreement, supra note 33, at 1151.
36. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) is Annex I c
to the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, which is embodied in the Uruguay Round
GATT concluded in Marrakesh on April 15, 1994.
37. "Mhis Part does not create any obligation to put in place ajudicial system for the enforcement
of intellectual property rights distinct from that for the enforcement of law in general, nor does it affect the
capacity of Members to enforce their law in general." Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations Final Act
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 LLM. 1125, 1214
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
38. Cheng, supra note 25, at 1946.
39. World Intellectual Property Organization, International Protection of Copyright and
Neighboring Rights, at http://www.wipo.int/eng/general/copyrght/bern.htm (last visited July 31, 2000). The
WIPO's online information about the Berne Convention notes that all members of the WTO are also bound
to the terms of the Convention, with some exceptions for parties that are not signatories to the Convention.
40. See generally TRIPS Agreement, supra note 37, at 1213-20 (setting out general member
obligations to enforce TRIPS).
41. Id. at 1220.
42. Id.
200
118 ISA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 7:111
indicates that the "sufficiency" of a penalty could vary from nation to nation,
so the most simple way to determine whether piracy is reduced is an empirical
one: find a way to measure a nation's rate of software piracy and monitor the
nation for a decline in that rate. Therefore, it is reasonable to infer that WTO
members are expected to comply with TRIPS by finding ways to reduce their
measurable rates of software piracy.
Second, TRIPS created The Council for Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (hereinafter "Council for TRIPS"), which reports
to the General Council of the WTO.43 The Council for TRIPS monitors TRIPS
member compliance and works in cooperation with WIPO to carry out duties
assigned to it by TRIPS members." TRIPS charges the Council for TRIPS with
reporting and evaluating TRIPS-related complaints. 5
Finally, TRIPS requires WTO members to publicize TRIPS-related laws,
judicial decisions, government administrative rulings, and agreements among
domestic government agencies to their fellow members.' It also specifically
requires members to provide their legislative, judicial, and administrative
information to the Council for TRIPS upon request. 7 Presumably these
provisions not only encourage transparent cooperation among member
countries, but also allow the Council for TRIPS to evaluate whether each
member country is complying with its TRIPS obligations.
Disputes arising under TRIPS" are governed by the GATT.49  The
GATT' s dispute resolution procedures provide for three levels of response to
a complaint against a member: first, to "secure the withdrawal of the measures"
that conflict with a WTO member agreement; second, to provide compensation
to a member claiming injury,' and finally, "as a last resort," to suspend
"concessions or obligations . . . on a discriminatory basis" in favor of the
complaining member.5" In plain language, trade sanctions may be authorized
against a WTO member that fails to comply with TRIPS provisions.
At first glance, China appears to be ready for WTO membership.
Technically, TRIPS requires only that member countries have "enforcement
43. See generally WTO Agreement, supra note 33, at 1146 (creating the Council for TRIPS and
defining its reporting relationship to the General Council of the WTO).
44. TRIPS Agreement. supra note 37, at 1223.
45. Id. at 1221.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Presumably, such disputes include allegations of member failures to comply with TRIPS
guidelines; TRIPS makes no other specific provision for penalizing member non-compliance.
49. The TRIPS Agreement refers the reader to "Articles XXII and XXIII of GAIT 1994 as
elaborated and applied by the [accompanying) Dispute Settlement Understanding." TRIPS Agreement, supra
note 37, at 1223.
50. Compensation is an interim remedy until the offending measure may be withdrawn. ld at 1227.
51. Id
procedures... available" to protect intellectual property and to "constitute a
deterrent to further infringements. 52 China's laws, courts, and government
offices ostensibly meet this requirement. However, TRIPS also requires that
WTO members effect measurable drops in their rates of software piracy. Thus,
China's TRIPS compliance troubles will arise not from a dearth of laws, but
from an apparent inability to apply them.
V. CHINA'S ENFORCEMENT PROBLEM
If China is obligated to comply with TRIPS's standards for intellectual
property protection, it will have to improve its legislation and its law enforce-
ment. China's legislative drafting efforts, its law enforcement systems, and its
government agencies have all been criticized for failing to meet the latest
international standards.
First, China's existing laws and proposed amendments have garnered
criticism. Arguably, China's existing laws do not adequately protect other
nations' intellectual property rights.53 The IIPA notes that even the latest
revisions to Chinese legislation, while possibly TRIPS-compliant as drafted,
will probably not meet TRIPS requirements as applied.' The USTR agrees,
noting in a discussion of China's 1999 trade law reforms, "the vague wording
of many Chinese laws and regulations often leads to conflicts with other laws
or broader trade and investment policies, and makes compliance difficult."55
Also, as one commentator succinctly observes, merely establishing copyright
laws does not "automatically lead to their enforcement."'
China's present law enforcement is also inadequate. China's intellectual
property courts report only spotty success in resolving copyright infringement
cases. The court system has been criticized for inadequately training its judges
and allowing itself to be used as a tool of the Communist Party.57 Chinese
courts have also been accused of slow claims handling time and a burdensome
requirement that the complaining party produce evidence before a court will
decide whether to hear a case.5" One writer observes that it is "not a cost-
52. Id at 1213-14.
53. For additional discussion of whether China's existing copyright laws adequately protect
software, see Declet, supra note 11, at 70.
54. International Intellectual Property Alliance, People's Republic of China, at
http://www.iipa.com/htmilrbc-china-301-99.html (last modified Feb. 15, 1999) [hereinafter People's
Republic of China] (providing excerpts from the EPA's 1999 Special 301 Recommendations to the USTR).
55. 2000 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT, supra note 31, at 42.
56. Endeshaw, supra note 27, at 314.
57. Declet, supra note 11, at 71-72.
58. Jenckes, supra note 17, at 556.
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effective investment" to bring suit in China.59 Although China has created
government offices and departments to execute its new intellectual property
protection policies, the international community and the United States are
suspicious about whether these departments are able to, or wish to, perform
their intended tasks. The USTR observes that, "[w]hile [establishing SIPO] is
a positive step, SIPO has yet to establish that it can manage its responsibilities
effectively."' In 2000, the United States Department of State reported that
"[a]lthough China has revised its laws to provide criminal penalties for
intellectual property violations, the United States remains concerned that
penalties imposed by Chinese courts do not act as a deterrent."'6 ' The IlPA
concurred, reporting that "actions by [government agencies] are too sporadic
and the administrative fines are simply too low to deter piracy."'62
VI. THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE
In short, China's efforts do not appear to impress the United States or the
international community as a whole. Even in the wake of this summer's trade
accords that anticipate WTO backing from trading partners,63 China is being
asked to tighten its existing intellectual property protection practices. In a
March 2000 report, the United States Department of State affirms that it intends
to continue Section 306' monitoring to ensure that China is complying with its
651oexisting United States trade agreements. In July of 2000, European Union
officials called for better cooperation between China's government and law
enforcement branches, presenting China with a list of 400 Chinese companies
suspected of infringing on European Union member software copyrights.'
Though trading partners disapprove of China's status quo, China does not
seem to be getting the international help it needs to correct its anti-piracy
59. Id. at 569. Although Jenckes is discussing difficulties encountered by American businesses,
the expense of proceeding in a Chinese court may be reasonably inferred to apply to other international
plaintiffs.
60. 2000 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT, supra note 31, at 50.
61. BUREAU OF ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS AFFAIRs, U.S. DEPARTmENToF STATE, 1999 COUNTRY
REPORT ON ECONOMIC POLICY AND TRADE PRACTICES - CHINA sec. 8 (2000) [hereinafter 1999 COUNTRY
REPORT].
62. INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ALLANcE 2000 SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note
16, at 31.
63. Agence France Presse, EU Calls on China to Reign In Rampant Copyright Theft, INSIDECHINA
TODAY, July 26, 2000, at http://www.insidechina.cominvestorinsightbusiness.php3?id=I 82651 (last visited
July 26, 2000) [hereinafter EU Calls On China]. See also Agence France Presse, supra note 18; EU-China
Agree Trade Deal, supra note 19.
64. Section 306 is a trade status of continued monitoring. See HPA LAUDs USTR'S CONTINUING
PRESSURE, supra note 14.
65. 1999 COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 61, at sec. 8.
66. EU Calls on China, supra note 63.
enforcement problems. In its 1995 trade agreement with China, the United
States made only vague promises of "technical assistance." '67 Although the
European Union signed an intellectual property enforcement assistance
agreement with China and opened a patent office in Beijing last year,6" it still
claimed that Chinese companies were infringing on its copyrights.
Nor is the WIPO providing focused assistance to China. Article 4(1) of
the 1995 agreement between the WIPO and the WTO promises that "[t]he WTO
Secretariat shall make available to Member States of the WIPO which are
developing countries and are not WTO Members the same technical coopera-
tion relating to the TRIPS Agreement as it makes available to developing
country WTO Members."69 However, China is not identified by the WIPO as
a Least Developed Country (hereinafter "LDC"), and therefore presumably not
a candidate for the specialized WIPO anti-piracy enforcement programs
referenced in Article 4(1).70
VII. THE POSSE COMES TO TOWN: UNITED STATES
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
Given China's existing anti-piracy enforcement problems, other nations'
failure to actively help China solve those problems, and China's ineligibility for
the WIPO's LDC assistance, China will have to seek other allies in its war on
software piracy if it accedes to the WTO. NGOs, experienced in anti-piracy
lobbying and enforcement, can help China comply with the provisions of
TRIPS. Two NGOs have taken a dedicated interest in China: the International
Intellectual Property Alliance and the Business Software Alliance.
A. The International Intellectual Property Alliance
Formed in 1984, the IPA is an umbrella organization for seven private
trade associations, "each representing a significant segment of the United States
copyright community."'" The EPA works worldwide with governments and
67. Endeshaw, supra note 27, at 328. Endeshaw also notes that the United States made no
"substantial concessions" to China in this agreement, and that it is unclear whether the agreement is designed
to assist China or merely protect the United States trade interests. Id.
68. Eubusiness, EU- China Intellectual Property Rights Cooperation Programme, at http:J/www.
eubusiness.com/cgi-binitem.cgiid--9951&d=101&dateformat=%o-%B (last modified June 30, 1999).
69. Agreement Between the World Intellectual Property Organization and the World Trade
Organization, Dec. 22, 1995, 35 LLM. 754, 758 art. 4 (1996).
70. See generally World Intellectual Property Organization, Establishment of the Least Developed
Countries Unit, at http:J/www.wipo.org/eng/ldc/index.htm (last modified July 30, 2000) (identifying Least
Developed Countries (LDCs) and outlining WIPO's intent to help the governments and industries in these
countries create and maintain intellectual property protection systems).
71. International Intellectual Property Alliance, International Intellectual Property Alliance 1, at
Miller2000]
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private industries to deter copyright infringement in music recording and
publishing, written publishing, computer software, computer gaming, videos,
and motion pictures.72 In the United States, the IIPA reports to House and
Senate subcommittees on member activities in China.73 The IIPA also makes
recommendations to the USTR during the USTR's annual Super 301 trade
review process and generates reports for the USTR's Special 301 trade
review.74 Internationally, the IIPA participated in TRIPS development for the
WTO.75 The BIPA is also a non-governmental organization participating in
WIPO,76 and it participates in "regional initiatives," notably the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation."' The IPA actively monitors China's software piracy
problem, and in February 2000 it wrote in support of United States congressio-
nal approval for permanent normal trade relations between the United States
and China.7"
While the IIPA gathers information, participates in international
discussion, and reports on activities in China, one of its member organizations,
the BSA, works at the local level in China to effect change.
B. The Business Software Alliance
The BSA, a member of IIPA,79 is a software industry trade organization
with ten "worldwide members," all of which are software companies incorpo-
rated or headquartered in the United States.' The BSA Policy Council includes
http:/www.iipa.com/FACLSHEET.PDF (last modified Aug. 2000) [hereinafter International Intellectual
Property Alliance].
72. Id. at 2-3.
73. See, e.g., Press Release, International Intellectual Property Alliance, IIPA Reports to Joint
Senate-House Hearing That China Fails to Comply with the 1995 IPR Agreement (Mar. 7, 1996).
74. See, e.g., USTR AGAIN NAMES CHINA AS A PRIORIrY FOREIGN COUNTRY, supra note 12.
75. International Intellectual Property Alliance, supra note 71, at 1.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. International Intellectual Property Alliance, An Open Letter In Support of China PNTR From
America's Creative Industries, available at http://www.iipa.com/2000_CHINA_PNTR. PDF (last modified
Feb. 23, 2000).
79. International Intellectual Property Alliance, supra note 71, at 2.
80. Business Software Alliance, Business Software Alliance, at http://www.bsa.org/
tour/members/index.html (last visited Aug. 7, 2000) [hereinafter Business Software Alliance). The BSA's
membership list, provided in the BSA's online brochure, lists the following companies as "worldwide
members": Adobe Systems, Inc. (www.adobe.com); Autodesk, Inc. (www.autodesk.com); Bentley Systems,
Inc. (www.bentley.com); Corel (www.corel.com); Lotus Development Corporation (www.lotus.com);
Microsoft Corporation (www.microsoft.com); Network Associates (www.nai.com); Novell, Inc.
(www.novell.com); Symantec Corporation (www.symantec.com); and Visio (www.visio.com). The investor
relations and legal information on each of these companies' websites reveals that, although many have
transnational presence and trasnational business partners, all of them are United States-based corporations
or business entities and/or traded on United States stock exchanges.
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all ten worldwide members, plus seven additional members, all of which are
also incorporated or headquartered in the United States."'
Like the IPA, the BSA participates in domestic and transnational policy
discussions. It encourages legislative software protection efforts by promulgat-
ing its Cyber Champion awards in the United States. 2 Recently, United States
Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky received the award for her efforts
to promote intellectual property protection agendas in China-United States trade
matters.83 BSA representatives testify before United States legislative bodies,8 '
and in 1999 the BSA spent over $1 million on domestic lobbying activities."
The BSA was also active in WIPO's treaty organization 6 and maintains an
ongoing presence in WIPO's regional initiatives.87
The BSA exists to stop software piracy. It employs a variety of tactics in
the United States and in other countries to encourage piracy reporting and to
enforce software anti-piracy laws. In the United States, the BSA brings suit
against private companies and even government offices.88 One source reports
that "the [BSA] investigates an average of 500 cases a year [in the United
States] and has collected more than $10 million in penalties." 9
On its website, www.bsa.org, the BSA provides reading material,
educational material, and downloadable freeware9' to help United States
81. The seven Policy Council members who are not also BSA "worldwide members" are Attachmate
(www.attachmate.com); Apple Computer (www.apple.com); Compaq Computer Corporation (www.compaq.
com); IBM Corporation (www.ibm.com); Intel Corporation (www.intel.com); Intuit Corporation (www.intuit.
corn); and Sybase, Inc. (www.sybase.com). Business Software Alliance, supra note 80.
82. Bryan Rund, Legal Business - Honors and Appointments, LEGAL TIMES, November 15,1999,
at 25.
83. Id. Although Rund does not specifically cite the Special 301 review process, the BSA publicly
endorsed Barshefsky's decision to place China and other countries on the USTR Priority Watch and Watch
lists. See Press Release, BusINEss SOFWAREALLANCE, STATeMENTFROM BSAPREsIDENT&CEO ROBERT
HouEYMANSUPPORINGUSTR'SEMPHASISoNTRPSCOMPuANCEIN ANNUAL SPECIAL 301 DESIGNATION
ANNOUNCEMENT (May 1, 2000) (on file with author).
84. See, e.g., Press Release, Business Software Alliance, Leading Software Industry ExpertTestifies
Before Congress (June 29, 2000) (on file with author).
85. Center for Responsive Government, 1998 Data - Business Software Alliance, at
http://www.opensecrets.org/lobbyists/98profiles/3593.htm (last visited Aug. 7, 2000).
86. Brenda Sandburg, High Tech Takes Center Stage In Washington, THE RECORDER (San
Francisco), Sept. 11, 1998, at 1.
87. World Intellectual Property Organization, Governing Bodies of WIPO and the Unions
Administered by WIPO 34, athttp://www.wipo.int/engtdocument/govbody/wo_.gb-ab/pdf/ab3l5.pdf(last
modified Aug. 29, 1997).
88. News, J. RECORD, July 3, 1997, available at 1997 WL 14394866.
89. Software Piracy Probe Nets Florida Firms, MIAMI DAILY BUS. REV., June 27, 2000, at 3.
90. 'Treeware," often distributed over the Internet, does not require users to pay a license fee to the
developer as long as the freeware is used in the manner specified by the developer.
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companies track software licenses and conduct internal licensing audits.9' The
BSA also provides transnational Internet resources. Its websites offer corporate
educational materials and model corporate policies for the United States and
United Kingdom.92 Further, the BSA maintains a worldwide network of
websites in member countries' native languages, offering e-mail piracy
reporting forms, toll-free telephone numbers for software piracy reporting
hotlines, and links to online BSA reports and resources."
The BSA does not confine itself to the virtual world; it also works directly
with law enforcement agencies worldwide to conduct undercover sting
operations and raids on commercial software piracy operations. In 1997, BSA
member Microsoft and the BSA conducted 51 raids on software pirates in
Singapore, resulting in several jail sentences.' In 1998, the BSA filed over 750
lawsuits in Latin America on behalf of Microsoft." In 1999, the BSA reported
successful coordination with the Danish National Computer Crime Unit to
break a European software counterfeiting ring.'
The BSA's current activities in China include filing lawsuits, conducting
government and industry cooperative programs, and monitoring China's
software market and piracy activity. In 1995, the BSA announced its first in-
court legal victory when a Chinese court found in favor of BSA members
Autodesk, Microsoft, and Novell against China's Juren Computer Company.
The court held that Juren had illegally distributed BSA members' software.'
As part of the 1995 United States-China trade agreement, the BSA was allowed
to establish offices in China to help implement a "title verification system" that
identifies original compact disc and laser disc products.9" The BSA also works
with the provincial offices of China's official Administration for Industry and
Commerce (hereinafter "AIC'),' and this work has given rise to software
licensing audits by the AIC and a letter-writing campaign to educate corporate
91. Business Software Alliance, BSA Freeware, at http'//www.bsa.org/freewaret (last visited Aug.
7, 2000).
92. Id.
93. Business Software Alliance, supra note 80.
94. U.S. Help Is Sought In Fight In Singapore Against Counterfeiters, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 1998,
at All.
95. Jim Oliphant, Booty and the Counterfeiting Beast - Microsoft Has Set Up a Unique Unit of
Undercover Operatives and Specially Trained Investigators in Fort Lauderdale Devoted to Thwarting
Software Piracy in South Florida and Latin America, PALM BEACH DAiLY Bus. REv., Oct. 1, 1999, at 12.
96. Wendy Leibowitz, Lawyers and Technology, N.Y.LJ., Feb. 16, 1999, at 5 col. 1.
97. U.S. Software Makers Win Copyright Ruling in China, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 1995, at B3.
98. Jenckes, supra note 17, at 556, (1995 testimony of Ambassador Michael Kantor and Eric Smith,
IIPA President, before the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Trade).
99. People's Republic of China, supra note 54.
end-users about software piracy."° In addition, the BSA offers computer
hardware and technical assistance to Chinese law enforcement agencies.' °"
The BSA also coordinates efforts with the private sector.
PricewaterhouseCoopers, working for the BSA, recently conducted a study of
100 Chinese software-related companies to evaluate the Chinese software
industry."°2 In June of 2000, the BSA signed an agreement with Hong Kong
Internet service provider Asia Online to crack down on software piracy via the
Internet.'03 Finally, the BSA monitors China and strives to increase its presence
and promote its image there. Although the BSA only reports two affiliated
companies in Asia, " it publicly supports Chinese anti-piracy initiatives through
its Internet outlets.'0 5 In 1999, the BSA openly announced that it "stands ready"
to support the Chinese government in software anti-piracy efforts.'06
VIII. CAN NGOs FILL CHINA'S ENFORCEMENT GAPS?
United States non-governmental organizations are present and active in
China, but if China accedes to the WTO, it will need to correct its software anti-
piracy enforcement problems to comply with the outcome-based TRIPS
provisions. At that point, NGO presence will only be relevant if those NGOs
are helping China comply with TRIPS.
China will have to fight on multiple fronts to comply with TRIPS. It must
improve its laws, effectively promulgate them, and consistently enforce them.
It must also show meaningful cooperation among its governmental branches and
private industries. It must reduce its measurable rate of software piracy enough
to convince the WTO that it is creating the intellectual property infringement
deterrents TRIPS requires. The international community, as a whole, has not
offered much internal law enforcement help to China. NGOs are equipped to
100. Id
101. International Inteilectual Property Aliance, China, athttp:/www.iipa.com/htl/ bcchina301
_98.html (last visited Aug. 20, 2000) [hereinafter China] (containing excerpts from the International
Intellectual Property Association's 1998 Special 301 Recommendations issued on Feb. 23, 1998).
102. See CONThXtIrON OFTHE SOFWARE INDUSTRY TOTHE CHINESE ECONOMY, supra note 5, at
20.
103. Press Release, Business Software Alliance, Asia Online Joins BSA in Fight Against Software
Theft Amid Growing Threat of Internet-Based Piracy (June 12, 2000) (on file with author).
104. Business Software Alliance, About BSA, at httpJ/www.bsa.org/hongkong/about/(last modified
1998).
105. The BSA maintains a special website for its activities in the "Asia Region" at
http:/www.bsa.orglasiapr/ and another for Hong Kong at http://www.bsa.orghongkong/.
106. Press Release, Business Software Alliance, Chinese Government Issues Decree Requiring All
Government Entities to Clean Up Internal Software Piracy (Apr. 7, 1999) (on file with author). This 1999
decree expressed China's commitment to enforcing its 1995 official directive that Chinese government offices
use only legal software.
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fill some of these anti-piracy law enforcement gaps, but all NGO activity will
rely on China's cooperation in deed as well as in word.
A. Drafting Laws
China's 1990 "two-tiered" copyright laws are inadequate because they
provide more protection to other nations' intellectual property than they provide
for Chinese intellectual property.0 7 TRIPS requires that each member provide
to other nations a level of protection no less favorable than the protection the
country provides to its own people.'0 8 The UPA believes that TRIPS requires
equal protection for nationals and non-nationals; it was allowed to review
proposed amendments to the "two-tiered" laws in 1999.'09 It reported that the
amendments were still inadequate, and that as of 2000 the Chinese government
neither enacted the amendments nor provided a progress report to the IIPA."0
NGOs can help with legislative drafting. As discussed above, both the
HPA and the BSA have experience lobbying in, reporting to, and testifying
before the United States government, governments in other countries, and the
WIPO. WIPO and the Council for TRIPS already have a formal cooperative
relationship,"' and the IUPA is a WIPO participant. Therefore, the IlPA has
access to the latest international trends in intellectual property enforcement and
could provide specific information to help Chinese legislators tighten the gaps
between existing law and TRIPS-compliant law." 2
NGOs must note, however, that a Chinese commitment to drafting new
laws does not guarantee that those laws-are appropriate for the problems and the
people affected by them. " The legislative drafting urged by the United States
during trade negotiations and the values that NGOs bring to China's
policymaking efforts may be in fundamental conflict with the social and legal
structures formed by China's communist and imperial history. The political
developments that led to China's current copyright laws reflect a blend of
107. See People's Republic of China, supra note 54 (noting that China's latest laws provide more
protection for "foreign rightholders" than for Chinese software developers).
108. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 37, at 1198-99.
109. People's Republic of China, supra note 54.
110. INTERNATONAL bmauEmL PROPERTY AIUANCE 2000 SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note
16, at 34.
111. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 37, at 1223.
112. See, e.g., People's Republic of China, supra note 54. The section entitled "New Draft
Copyright Law" contains a point-by-point UPA analysis of potential TRIPS and Berne convention
shortcomings in China's new laws. Ia
113. Endeshaw, supra note 27, at 308. Endeshaw observes that when a less-developed country
enacts "borrowed legislation" that is ill-suited to its current industrial development status, there is little
incentive to "work earnestly towards implementation" of the new laws. Id.
Marxism, Maoism, and Confucianism." 4 The BSA, however, is capitalistic to
the point of jingoism. For example, the BSA urges in an online Special Focus
report, "Let American ingenuity and creativity thrive. Deregulation, competi-
tion and entrepreneurship will foster our success. Regulation, government
interference and managed competition will dash prospects and stunt pro-
gress."' 5  These two sets of values stand in direct conflict. In a historical
perspective, individual intellectual property ownership is a new concept for
China," 6 and China's expressed willingness to change its law does not
necessarily evince a cultural shift." 7
If NGOs intend to help China with its legislative drafting, they will have
to convince the Chinese government that the values embodied in TRIPS are
appropriate for China's government and people. Despite the valid policy
question of whether leading economic powers should impose their legal and
social values upon other countries," 8 the fact remains that the WTO's present
standards are not compatible with China's social values. China's ongoing
failure to enforce its existing copyright laws with respect to United States
software developers gives rise to a sneaking suspicion that China has adopted
a "say anything" policy in the last two decades. If China is cheerfully re-
drafting its laws to secure desirable trade relationships but has no true interest
in enforcing them; the best NGO efforts in the legislative drafting arena will be
irrelevant to TRIPS-mandated outcomes.
B. Promulgating Laws
Once China drafts adequate laws, they must be promulgated, and the
people affected must be educated about their benefits. This is where NGOs will
shine. The BSA already has excellent channels for Internet information
dissemination. Via the Internet, the BSA promotes its software piracy reporting
114. See generally Jenckes, supra note 17, at 552-55 (providing a concise overview of historical
developments in Chinese legal ideology).
115. Business Software Affiance, The Information Marketplace: The Perspective of the Software
and Computer Industry, at http://www.bsa.org/statisticslsummary_c.html (last modified 1998).
116. Alexander C. Chen, Climbing the Great Wall: A Guide to Intellectual Property Enforcement
in the People's Republic of China, 25 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 10-11 (1997).
117. The sociological impact of China's new trade policies is well beyond the scope of this
Comment, but sources observe that these new international economic relationships will drive massive political
reforms in China. See, e.g., Jason Kindopp, Trade with China Promotes Political Reform - Period, CHINA
ONUN, athttp://www.chinaonline.rom/commentary-analysis/wtocm/currentews/securcOOO7244.asp
(last modified July 26, 2000). The USTR agrees, observing that "[bly encouraging structural reform and the
rule of law, [China's] accession to the WTO will... support China's own domestic reform process." 2000
NATIONAL. TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT, supra note 31, at 41.
118. The WTO's intellectual property protection standards have been criticized for reflecting the
values and enforcement capabilities of nations, primarily the United States, with mature technology
industries. For a detailed analysis, see Endeshaw, supra note 27, at 304-05.
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hotlines, provides real-time piracy reporting forms, posts model policies for
corporations, and offers reports and educational materials for end users. These
BSA educational tools are already in place in the United States and should not
be difficult to implement in China. The BSA merely needs to create Internet
sites for Chinese use and translate and customize its information for the local
market. Although Internet-based initiatives rely on technological infrastructure,
China is gradually improving its Internet access capabilities. For example, this
summer the United States hardware giant Intel announced a co-operative effort
with a major China telecom company to provide Internet hosting in south
China." 9
End-user education programs are not difficult to design or implement, but
they will be challenged by the cultural gap discussed above. If consumers
believe there is nothing really wrong with using pirated software, they are
unlikely to curtail or report software piracy. For example, in response to a 1998
industry study, only 50% of Chinese software-related businesses responded that
they believed software piracy "hampers the healthy development of [the]
software industry."" 0 In the same study, 51% of the responding businesses
reported that they take no action to identify or control piracy by competitors or
counterfeiting organizations." If the concern over piracy is so low within the
software industry itself, it is reasonable to infer that non-software companies
in China, potential end-users of pirated business software, are similarly
apathetic. This does not bode well for NGO educational efforts.
Again, NGOs face the task of changing China's cultural norms before they
can implement a meaningful end-user anti-piracy education plan. Within the
software industry, NGOs might have some success. Of the Chinese companies
surveyed in 1998 that responded to a question about whether consumer
education could help reduce piracy, 25% believed that it would. 2 Although
this number is rather low, it indicates that China's software industry, at least,
is aware of potential benefits from end-user education. The NGOs' best
strategy in China would be an educational program to convince Chinese
corporate end-users, both inside and outside the software industry, that they
must actively protect intellectual property to attract and maintain transnational
trade.
119. Press Release, Intel Corporation, Intel Announces Internet Exchange Tm Architecture
Development Center in People's Republic of China (July 26, 2000) (on file with author).
120. CON'rRIBUTOiN OFTHE SOFrWARE INDUSTRYTO THE CHINESE ECONOMY, supra note 5. at 25
(presenting chart, "Software Piracy Impedes Market Development and Reduces Benefits").
121. Id. at 25.
122. Id. at 39.
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C. Promoting Legal Action
Even good laws and an educated populace do not ensure that the laws will
be applied. Sixty-six percent of Chinese software companies responding to a
1998 BSA-sponsored survey agreed that "limited risk for high profitability" is
the primary reason that software is pirated in China.' Provided this is true,
increasing piracy's risk or lowering its profitability should reduce the rate of
software piracy in China.
NGOs could do in China what they have done in other countries: bring
suit on behalf of interested software developers. The BSA's 1998 study of
China's software industry speculates that Chinese software companies believe
that current legal penalties do not deter piracy, and that legal action is too
difficult or expensive to pursue. 24 NGOs and their members do not necessarily
share this doubt and could lead by example in China, filing suit in Chinese
courts for copyright infringement with respect to NGO members. The BSA has
the financial resources to undertake high-profile litigation because its United
States activities help finance transnational software anti-piracy efforts.'25
If NGOs pepper China's courts with United States copyright infringement
suits, they will probably improve Chinese pirates' awareness of piracy risk."
Securing fines and damages on behalf of NGO member companies will also
lower pirates' profitability. However, these actions will also raise the question
of whether NGOs are truly interested in helping China enforce its software anti-
piracy laws and thereby comply with TRIPS, or merely interested in protecting
NGO members' interests. Even in the United States, the BSA and its founding
member Microsoft have been criticized for being too quick to act against
alleged infringers. 2 ' Further, the BSA has garnered criticism in its own country
for being a mouthpiece for its member Microsoft Corporation's policy
decisions. "
Thus, NGOs have a difficult balancing test in China: they must support
NGO -members' interests while maintaining the image of a helping-hand
organization. This might be difficult. In 1999, a United States company's
piracy case against a Chinese corporation was dismissed; a report from the IUPA
123. Id. at 36 (presenting chart, "Reasons for Production and Sale of Pirated Software").
124. Id. at 26.
125. Oliphant, supra note 95.
126. Of course, this assertion presumes that Chinese media report and disseminate the litigation
outcomes.
127. Oliphant, supra note 95.
128. See generally T. R. Goldman, How Microsoft Gets Its Way in Washington, N.J.L.J., Nov. 4,
1996, at 4 (discussing Microsoft Corporation's lobbying activities and its prominent position in the BSA).
Cf. Robert W. Holleyman 11, Letters: Group Acts by Industry Consensus, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 18, 1996,
(asserting in a letter to the editor that the BSA acts only by consensus, not in response to the influence of
certain members).
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implies the dismissal was due to "antiforeign sentiments" in the Chinese court
system. 29 NGOs would have to conduct careful public relations campaigns to
effectively raise piracy risk awareness. As discussed below, such an effort
could require governmental cooperation that China is not ready to provide.
D. Securing Government Cooperation
NGOs can provide critical market information to China's government. As
discussed above, the EPA and the BSA both have experience conducting
industry surveys, creating reports and recommendations for legislators,
testifying before domestic and international policymakers, and assessing
software anti-piracy enforcement efforts.
However, NGOs cannot act in a vacuum. They need Chinese government
cooperation and reliable sources for industry information, and at present both
appear limited. The BSA has reported success in reducing software piracy rates
in other Asian countries because "[Korean and Taiwanese] governments took
the problem seriously and acted." 30 In China, however, the IIPA reports
difficulty getting information from government sources about whether China's
commitments to enforcement are working. 13' Some evidence indicates China
does not even want enforcement help; for example, the IPA reported in 1998
that local Chinese law enforcement agencies turned down an offer of donated
computer hardware (designated for law enforcement activity) without any
explanation.13 1
The BSA's studies rely on information provided by the CCID-MIC, the
"R&D arm" of the China's Ministry of Industrial Information. 3  This is
government-disseminated information, not market information. Market
information is difficult to obtain. For example, the IIPA's 1999 Special 301
report notes that information about China's CD factories, requested by foreign
market researchers, was withheld with the claim that those data were "national
confidential documents."'' A 1999 report from the United States Department
of State summarizes another problem:
129. INTERNATIONAL INTEI.zcrUAL PROPERTY ALLIANCE 2000 SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note
16, at 33.
130. Roberts. Greenburger, Software Theft Etends Well Beyond China, WALL ST. J., Oct. 20,1996,
at Al.
131. INTERNATIONAL INTELLECIUAL PROPERTY ALLIANCE 2000 SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note
16, at 26.
132. China, supra note 101.
133. CONTRIBUTON OF THE SoFrWARE INDUSTRY TO TIE CHINESE ECONOMY, supra note 5, at 42-
43.
134. INTERNATIONAL INTELLECruAL PROPERTY ALLIANCE 2000 SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note
16, at 32.
[Chinese regulations] require all foreign companies conducting
market surveys in China to go through an annual registration process
... [they] stipulate that all survey activities undertaken by foreign
institutions, or domestic agencies employed by foreigners, must first
be approved... Finished survey results must also be cleared with the
approving agency. The regulations... will be expensive and time
consuming to comply with... [and] have the potential to limit the
freedom of legitimate firms to conduct market research. In addition,
the potential for compromise of confidential business information is
substantial. 35
NGOs might not have direct influence over Chinese government offices,
but they can continue work with WIPO and the Council for TRIPS to effect
enforcement through trade pressure. NGO representatives can also work on a
personal, local level to provide knowledge, experience, and advice to the
Chinese agencies responsible for investigating piracy allegations.
E Encouraging Industry Participation
China's business community seems willing to cooperate with NGOs. A
1998 press release from the BSA was optimistic about the cooperative efforts
between the BSA's survey designer and private industry in China.'36 Private
industry could do much to further NGO educational efforts. Chinese companies
could commit to eschewing pirated software in their own businesses, dissemi-
nate information about piracy and its risks in the workplace; create and enforce
corporate policies against software piracy, and conduct self-audits to be sure
that the software they are using is legal.
Unfortunately, these glowing proposals could be premature when over half
of China's surveyed software companies have reported that the primary reason
software is pirated in China is because consumers do not have the income to
purchase legal software.'37 If legal software is simply not available, it is not
realistic to expect Chinese companies to abandon any pirated software they are
profitably using. Nor is it realistic to believe those companies will invite NGOs
to enter their offices and conduct software licensing audits. NGOs will have to
either offer these companies licensing amnesty or increase the companies'
access to legal software that performs like the pirated software.
135. 1999 CouNTRY REPORT, supra note 61, at Section 6.
136. Press Release, Business Software Alliance, New Study: Contributions of Software Industry to
Chinese Economy BSA is Committed to Working with All Relevant Parties in China to Combat Piracy (Dec.
8, 1998) (on file with author).
137. CONTRIBUTON OF THE SoFrwARE INDUSTRYTO THE CHWNSE ECONOMY, supra note 5, at 28.
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IX. CONCLUSION
China's existing problems with software anti-piracy enforcement will
probably not keep China out of the WTO. China is already attempting to
conform to a Schedule of Specific Commitments in keeping with its participa-
tion in the GATT. 138 Although the IHPA reports some ongoing problems with
China's legislative drafting, 139 TRIPS itself does not pose a major barrier to
China's accession. Despite EPA's report to the contrary, 14° at least one
commentator believes that China's laws already generally comply with TRIPS
standards.1
4
'
If China accedes to WTO membership, its challenge will be improving its
intellectual property rights enforcement, then maintaining that enforcement at
the "actual deterrent" level required by TRIPS. If China fails to do so, it could
be the subject of irade sanctions with respect to other WTO members.
NGOs can help China draft its laws and promulgate them. They can
promote China's existing legal system and legal remedies, advise Chinese
policymakers and government agencies, and work with private industry to
ensure a commitment to preventing end-user software piracy. Although NGOs
cannot fix all of China's enforcement woes, they certainly can help.
However, NGOs must do more than provide publicity or fill a law
enforcement gap. They must fill a cultural gap as well. To do their jobs
effectively, NGOs need cooperative commitments from the Chinese govern-
ment. They also need cooperative commitments from China's business
software end-users and the Chinese software industry. China has sought little
hands-on law enforcement help from its international neighbors, and it does not
seem to be doing so now. If China joins the WTO, only time will tell whether
Chinese policymakers' desire for transnational software trade is strong enough
for them to embrace TRIPS's value system and welcome NGO participation in
its fight against software piracy.
138. See WTO Agreement, supra note 33, at 1150-51.
139. People's Republic of China, supra note 54.
140. Id
141. Cheng, supra note 25, at 2006.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The potential plaintiff is in Dallas, the potential defendant in Tiruporur,
and the mediator in Hong Kong? They never leave their home cities. They
never meet face to face. Yet they are mutual parties in an online dispute
resolution process. Cyberspace is putting all new meaning to Alternative
Dispute Resolution. Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) plays an essential
function in the role of settlement and resolution processes. In addition, ADR's
role in the international business arena is expanding and developing rapidly.'
However, the past few years have taken ADR further than ever. "1999 was a
year in which a variety of Internet entrepreneurs decided that there were
commercial opportunities in online dispute resolution,"2 and thereby created an
all new dimension to ADR. The use of online dispute resolution has already
proven itself effective in the battle over domain names Several domain name
disputes have been settled utilizing online processes.' As ADR services
* JD candidate, class of 2002, Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center, Fort
Lauderdale Florida.
1. I'll See You Out Of CourtAs ADR Grows Globally, So Do Disputes About It, lO Coap. LEGAL
TIMES, Feb. 2000, at 17 [hereinafter I'll See You Out Of Court].
2. Ethan Katsh, The New Frontier Online ADR Becoming a Global Priority, 6 No. 2 DisP. RESOL.
MAG., winter 2000, at 6.
3. Business This Week 1 (Cybersquatting): New Online arbitration service has domain name
casesfiled, IRISH TIMES, Feb. 25,2000, at 60; See also The WIPO Dispute Settlement Process, WIPO MAG.,
Feb. 2000.
4. Id.
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become more popular online, questions onjurisdiction, privacy, uniformity, and
enforcement must be resolved.
The United States government defines the Internet as "[t]he international
computer network of both Federal and non-Federal interoperable packet
switched data networks."5 This definition makes the Internet sound like
something out of a science fiction movie. In reality, this network connects
cultures, people, laws, businesses, and inevitably creates an entirely new global
legal arena. Are we, as legal professionals, ready to be thrust into this arena?
Encompassing such a potentially broad range of legal issues and conflicts
necessitates moderation and management in online ADR to safeguard the
already recognized benefits of more traditional approaches. This international
step must be taken gracefully so it will not disrupt the positive international
business relationships that already exist. Proper training, cultural sensitivity,
established guidelines, and a governing mechanism must be established before
the spread of ADR to the Internet jeopardizes the preexisting success of ADR
in the global marketplace.
Part one of this article will discuss and define ADR generally. Part two
will examine the use of ADR internationally. Part three will demonstrate, using
Hong Kong and India as examples, the differences in ideology and practice of
ADR. The fourth section will focus on the role ADR has played, and will
potentially play in the future, on the Internet. Part five will examine some of
the problems faced by the Internet expansion of ADR. Finally, part six will
conclude with a forecast of the future role the Internet will have on ADR.
II. THE ROLE OF ADR IN THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS
ADR serves as a mechanism for opposing parties to find solutions without
resorting to litigation. ADR generally refers to "any procedure that is used to
resolve issues in controversy, including, but not limited to, conciliation,
facilitation, Mediation, factfinding, minitrials, Arbitration, and use of
ombuds."6 The most common forms, and the forms addressed in this paper, are
Arbitration and Mediation.7 Both serve substantially different roles in dispute
resolution processes. Arbitration is a procedure in which a dispute is:
[S]ubmitted, by agreement of the parties, to an arbitrator or to a
tribunal of several arbitrators who give a decision on the dispute that
is binding on the parties. In contrast to a Mediation, once the parties
have freely agreed to submit a dispute to Arbitration, a party cannot
5. 15 U.S.C. § 5501(C)(aX2) (2000).
6. 5 U.S.C. § 571 (2000).
7. TERRYTRANIrAAn Attorney's Guide ToAlternative Dispute Resolution (ADR): "ADR 1.01,"
in CORP LAW & PRACHCE HANDBOOK (1999).
unilaterally withdraw from the Arbitration. Mediation (also known
as conciliation) is a procedure in which a neutral intermediary, the
mediator, endeavors, at the request of the parties to a dispute, to assist
them in reaching a mutually satisfactory settlement of the dispute. The
mediator does not have any power to impose a settlement on the
parties. Mediation is also voluntary in the sense that either party may,
if it so chooses, abandon the Mediation at any stage prior to the
signing of an agreed settlement 8
As this paper will display Arbitration plays the leading role in the international
realm.
Il. THE USE OF ADR INTERNATIONALLY?
International business is not a new phenomenon; neither are international
disputes. Modem technology is only making both more commonplace. In the
world of international business disputes, Arbitration is the resolution tool of
choice.9 Estimates indicate ninety percent of international contracts include an
Arbitration clause."° The role of Arbitration on an international scale is
comparative to the role litigation plays in the "litigation happy" United States.
Arbitration is by far, the international king of ADR.II International Arbitration,
is Arbitration that concerns international transactions, as well as Arbitration
between different entities from different countries involving issues that extend
further than domestic law."
The presence and broad use of Arbitration internationally begs the
question, "Why not Mediation?" The United States seems to be fighting the
Mediation battle alone. Although there is pressure to establish and update
Mediation rules at the International Chamber of Commerce, (ICC) the pressure
is coming solely from the United States. In the United States, there are
organizations and educational services that teach, practice, and embrace
Mediation techniques. 3 This is not necessarily indicative of the international
8. The WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center, at http://arbiter.wipo.int/center/index.html (last
visited Sept. 15, 2000).
9. Christopher R. Drahozal. Commercial Norms, Commercial Codes, and International
Commercial Arbitration, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNATL L 79,94 (2000).
10. Id. at 73.
11. R. Doak Bishop & James D. McCarthy, Toning Up For International Fights, LEGAL TIMES,
Aug. 3, 1998, at 32.
12. I'll See You Out of Court, supra note 1, at l8.
13. Ole Amundsen, ADR 101: Finding a Course that Suits Your Needs, at
httpj//www.conflict-resolution.net/articlesrmdex.cfm?doc=raining.cfm&title (last visited Sept. 14, 2000).
"A wide variety of training programs are available, which can accommodate a range of time constraints and
cost concerns. Basic programs that introduce participants to various techniques in ADR are available through
universities, private consultants, and state offices of dispute resolution." Id.
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perception of Mediation. "Since the demand is only coming from the United
States, the ICC is not taking [it] as seriously as it needs to" the international
role of Mediation. 4 Mediation is perceived as an American product, and its
domestic popularity has not diminished. The American Arbitration Association
reports an increase in the use and interest of Mediation in the United States. 5
Under different names, Mediation has been used in other countries.
However, resistance to using Mediation has been fed by the perception that the
United States pushes its use internationally. 6 Countries are not comfortable
utilizing a system they are unfamiliar with, nor are they willing to use a system
they see being pushed solely by the United States. 7
Fifteen years ago, in Europe, Mediation and other ADR attempts were met
with animosity.' 8 Only recently has Mediation made its way on the
international agenda of ADR. Lately, there have been numerous ADR
organizations formed. The involvement of European legislatures resembles the
behavior that preempted the use of Mediation in the United States.' 9 This
propensity indicates Mediation may be at an early stage of development in the
international marketplace.
This is not to say there is no current international support for Mediation.
The London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) is adopting rules to
assure that there are qualified mediators available.2" "That's the cornerstone of
the problem. You can't have Arbitration panels migrate to Mediation. Many of
them are not trained in Mediation, they have a different outlook, they are more
decision-making oriented than facilitative and evaluative oriented."2 Although
this preparation indicates a concern for the future of Mediation, today the
method of choice for resolving international disputes is unquestionably
Arbitration.
Cost effectiveness and speed have been the emphasis in the recent
international rule changes to national arbitral laws.22 These changes have
further defined the popularity of Arbitration over Mediation.' Several noted
reasons for Arbitration's international supremacy include; its enforceability
through treaty obligations, its ability to provide a neutral forum, its ability to
14. I'll See You Out Of Court, supra note 1, at 18.
15. RICHARD HIWL, PRIMER ON INTERNATIONAL ARBIRATION (1995).
16. I'll See You Out Of Court, supra note 1, at 18.
17. Id.
18. ld. at22.
19. Id. at 18.
20. Id. at 17.
21. I'll See You Out Of Court, supra note 1, at 17.
22. Bishop, supra note 11, at sec. 32.
23. Id.
allow experts in the field of the dispute to be the decision makers, and it's
becoming faster, and cheaper.'
While these characteristics feed recent excitement and expansion of
international Arbitration, there is fear that as American ideals, driven by
litigation desires, become more influential, these characteristics may be
threatened.' There are plenty of American attorneys who are trying to turn
Arbitration into litigation.26 The United States needs to take a cautious role not
to push Arbitration internationally, and jeopardize an international backlash.
Lack of enthusiasm for Mediation, driven by fear of American persuasion,
should serve as an example to our leaders that aggressiveness may lead to
international resistance in the use of Arbitration as well.
International Arbitration is supported and allowed by national laws.'
Companies either agree via contract that Arbitration will be the means used to
solve potential disputes, or, there is an agreement to arbitrate after a dispute
arises. Primarily, Arbitration is prescribed by contractual agreement.' Five
key elements of an Arbitration clause include: 1) a choice of law clause; 2) the
venue; 3) the language to be used in the proceedings; 4) the number of
arbitrators; and 5) the method of appointing arbitrators.29 Arbitration is used
successfully throughout the global marketplace. It is imperative the
development and expansion of this process happen globally. To force
American ideals through a global network will only threaten the historic
success of ADR. "International cooperation is necessary to conduct
harmonious trade and business relations, now being increasingly conducted in
cyberspace.""
IV. THE ABSENCE OF GLOBAL CONSISTENCY IN THE USE OF ADR
Successful network expansion of ADR techniques compels thorough
understanding of the role ADR currently plays internationally. With
recognition of the various perspectives and practices of ADR, a globally
amicable system is more likely. An understanding of the domestic role
Arbitration plays in countries like Hong Kong and India illustrates the
ideological differences this international step must consider. The following
information does not intend to summarize the entire practice of ADR in either
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. I'll See You Out Of Court, supra note 1, at 22.
27. Hill, supra, note 15.
28. Id.
29. I'll See You Out Of Court, supra note 1, at 17.
30. Pornographers & Cybersquatters, THE STATESMAN (INDIA), Apr. 2, 2000, available at 2000
WL 3896303.
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place. Each would require, at minimum, a separate article. However, the
glimpse provided serves to exemplify the differences that currently exist
globally.
Hong Kong demonstrates enthusiasm in the increased use of Arbitration.3
The Hong Kong International Arbitration Center (HKIAC) serves to help
consumers in both domestic and international affairs. 2 The center provides
services in negotiation, conciliation, Mediation, Arbitration, and litigation.33
HCIAK incorporates the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law (UNCITRAL) model law for international cases. The Laws of Hong
Kong govern the domestic situations.3" The strength of the system is that it
combines "[mi]aximum of independence from the court system, with a strong
regime of court support in areas where this is required." '36 In Hong Kong,
Negotiation is the most common form of dispute resolution. Hong Kong is
currently attempting to expand the use of ADR to less typical areas. Currently,
a pilot program is being tested to see if ADR can be used to solve divorce
disputes.38 This attempt serves to reduce the caseload of the court systems.39
Hong Kong exemplifies the progressiveness of ADR. In Hong Kong, there is
statutory law' that governs, one organization that assists clients, and an
established ideology that ADR is very distinct from the court system.
India illustrates the newly recognized ability of ADR to empower the poor.
In India, there is the general perception that the laws are tools to help the rich.4
Certainly with the increased association of ADR and technology, this
perception will need to be addressed. Similar to the concept in Hong Kong,
India attempts to separate ADR approaches from the court system.42 India also
31. David W. Rivkin, Arbitration In P. R. China And Hong Kong, DisP. RESOL. J. (Sept. 1994)
(reviewing NEIL KAPLAN, JLLSPRUCE, & MiCHAEL. J. MOSER, HONG KONG AND CHINA ARBITATON: CASES
AND MATERIALS (1994)).
32. Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre, HKIAC Guide For The Appointment of an
Arbitrator, at http://www.hkiac.org/guide.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2000) [hereinafter HKIAC].
33. Id.
34. In June 1985, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)
adopted the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (Model Law). Pierre Comout, The New
InternationalArbitration Rules Of The AmericanArbitration Association And The UNCITRAL Model Law:
A Comparative Overview, INT'LL PP.ACICUm, Autumn 1993, at 20.
35. HKIAK, supra note 32.-
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Hong Kong: ADR Developments, WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP., June 1999, at 159.
39. Id. at 159.
40. For the relevant laws, see the Arbitration Ordinance Chapter 341, of the Laws Of Hong Kong.
41. D.K. Sanpath, The View from India: Credibility is the Problem Reaching the Powerless with
Mediation and Legal Advice, 17 CONFLIUCr RESOL NOTES 4 (April 2000), available at http'/lwww.
conflictorg/vo174/credibility.hml.
42. Id.
incorporates the UNCITRAL model for international ADR and relies on Indian
law for domestic situations.4" Although there has been contract law and ADR
practiced historically in India, only in the past twenty years has it been able to
shed its pro-court bias." The recent opening of the Tiruporur Mediation Center
attempts to change the perception that resolution always favors the wealthy.
The center emphasizes "[flair play, justice, and give and take." ' It also utilizes
local villagers in the operation of the center. Here, Mediation is the mechanism
most utilized. Mediation has made great strides domestically to alleviate the
powerlessness felt by the poor in India.' People once feeling powerless, now
feel powerful. India's ADR practices are delicately emerging to include a
population of people who other wise feel left out. The technological future of
ADR must be cautious not to reaffirm the traditional fears of the poor, in India
and around the world, that this is a system for the wealthy.
The state of ADR in Hong Kong and India exemplifies the concept that the
world is not necessarily on the same page. The use and recognition of ADR
techniques is far from globally consistent. ADR's multi-faceted role needs to
be realized before a safe path for its future can be determined. Although the
spread of ADR to the Internet offers exciting changes, its growth must promote
the perception that this tool is not only for the wealthy. Likewise, the
recognized success of ADR should encourage its expansion. The progression
needs to be made with the knowledge of the differences that exist.
While the focus of this paper is on the international impact of this new
technology, cultural sensitivity to the different domestic ADR practices is
essential. The exchange of information internationally directly effects
international relations.47 Internet expansion has resulted in the common use of
"global communication." With an awareness of the different uses of ADR,
43. "India passed the Arbitration and Conciliation Ordinance in January 1996. It is based on the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Model Lawon International Commercial Arbitration
(UNCITRAL). Goals of the new law are (1) to encourage alternative dispute resolution, establish an
internationally-recognized legal framework for arbitration, consolidate domestic and international law, and
(2) to ensure enforcement of foreign awards." Carolita L Oiveros, International Distribution Issues:
Contract Materials, A.LI., Mar. 2000.
44. Fali. S. Nariman, Courts And Arbitrators: Paradigms Of Arbitral Autonomy, 15 B.U. INT'L
LJ. 185, 189 (1997).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. HowARD H. FREDERICK, GLOBAL COMMUNICATION & INTERNATIONAL REL&TIoNs (1992).
48. Id. at 11. The author defines "Global Communication" as the "[i]ntersection of disciplines that
studies the transborder communication of values, attitudes, opinions, information, and data by individuals,
groups, people, institutions, governments, and information technologies, as well as the resulting controversial
issues arising from the structure of institutions responsible for promoting or inhibiting such messages among
and between nations and cultures." Id.
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the current Interet expansion will not jeopardize the existing international
relations.
V. ADR ON THE INTERNET
It is logical that online ADR began with disputes arising out of Internet
regulation. It is also not surprising that the "litigation-loving" United States
was the origin of this new trend.49 As of May 1, 2000, there have been 531
cybersquatting cases filed with the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO).5' United States Senator Spencer Abraham introduced the Anti-
cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, establishing misdemeanor penalties
for first time cybersquatting offenders, and Class E felony penalties for repeat
cybersquatting offenders.5 Today, Cybersquatting is a crime.52
The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) is
a non-profit organization that controls domain name a 3management.54 As part
of the options for resolving cybersquatting disputes, they offer opposing parties
the ability to solve these disputes online. 5  There are a few providers
recognized by ICANN to solve these domain name disputes.56 One of the
largest providers of online settlement processes for cybersquatting, is WIPO's
global online Arbitration system.57 "The Arbitration service, which enables
companies to avoid costly lawsuits, aims to tackle obvious cases of people
49. Lesley Stones, Online Arbitration Takes Off, 20 Bus. DAY, Mar. 23, 2000 at 20, available at
2000 WL 745266.
50. The WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center, at http://arbiter.wipo.int/center/index.html (last
visited Sept. 15, 2000).
51. Peter Brown, New Media and the Internet: Staying Interactive in the Hi-Tech Environment,
590 P.L.I. (2000).
52. "A person shall be liable in a civil action by the owner of a mark, including a personal name
which is protected as a mark under this section, if, without regard to the goods or services of the parties, that
person- (i) has a bad faith intent to profit from that mark, including a personal name which is protected as
a mark under this section; and (ii) registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name that- (1) in the case of a mark
that is distinctive at the time of registration of the domain name, is identical or confusingly similar to that
mark; (1) in the case of a mark that is distinctive at the time of registration of the domain name, is identical
or confusingly similar to that mark; (I) in the case of a mark that is distinctive at the time of registration of
the domain name, is a trademark, work, or name protected .. " Steven R. Borgman, The New Federal
Cybersquatting Laws, 8 TEx. INTEL PROP. L J. 265, 268 (2000).
53. Domain names are artificial constructs that aid Internet users in identifying and distinguishing
different sites on the Internet by providing a recognizable textual address. Jonathan Gaskin, Policing the
Global Marketplace: Wielding a Knife in a Gunfight, COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L 19,23 (1999).
54. eResolution Online Arbitration System Targets Cybersquatters, ASIA PULSE, March 2, 2000,
available at 2000 WL 2683898.
55. Id.
56. Thomas F. Gibbons, Mediation, Arbitration Venture Into Brave New World, 146 CI. DAILY
L. BULL., July 19, 2000, at 141.
57. Brown, supra note 51.
registering domain names in which they have no rights or legitimate
interests...."" The caseload has doubled in less than a month.59 The director
of WIPO'S Arbitration and Mediation center interprets these statistics to
"[rieflect the market's growing confidence in the procedure and it's efficient
and balanced handling.. ." Although, the execution of this program started
out focusing on a narrow range of disputes, it has triggered a whole new
phenomenon in online dispute resolution.
The phrase 'Online ADR' generally refers to the "application of dispute
resolution skills and resources over a network."' This definition goes far
beyond settling domain name disputes. New trends in ADR on the Internet
imply that we are just beginning to see the impact of this technology on the
world of ADR. Cybersettle is part of the new genre of online options to settle
all types of disputes.62 Although Cybersettle' s online service is new, it utilizes
very simple traditional strategies: 63
Typically an insurance carrier representative will enter three
confidential settlement offers through Cybersettle's secure website,
Cyberdocket.com. The claimants' attorney is then contacted by
claims facilitators from Cybersettle and invited to participate in the
online resolution of the case. If the claimant's attorney agrees, he
submits three demands, one for each three rounds, via a secure input
at the same website. If the offer and demand are within... 30 percent
of the original demand, the case settles immediately for the average
of the two amounts. If there is no settlement after three rounds,
neither side is prejudiced because all the figures are held in strict
confidence."
This technique has been used in traditional negotiations, designated as blind
bidding,65 but now it's being done over a network, rather than a conference
table. Cybersettle has been party to over 400 resolutions.' More than twenty
58. Business This Week 1 ,supra note 3, at 60; The WIPO Dispute Settlement Process, WPO MAG.,
Feb. 2000.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Katsh, supra note 2, at 6.
62. Daniel Eidsmoe, Calling Their Bluff Settlement Rates Low But Hopes Still High for Online
Resolution of Personal Injury Claims, 6 no. 2 DISP. RESOL MAO., Winter 2000, at 9.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 10.
65. "Blind Bidding" refers to the process of both parties putting down on paper what they would
accept as a settlement, giving the paper to the clerk, and splitting the difference in the numbers were within
a given range. Kate Marquess, Point, Click-Settle Quick! Online Negotiations Hailed for Efficiency, But
Some Prefer Face to Face, 86 APR. A.B.A. J. 82 (2000).
66. Scott Brede, Cyber$ettle-An Electronic Messiah Whose Time May Not Yet Have Come Before
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insurance carriers have used the service.67 One of the keys to the success of
online services like Cybersettle, is that it does not allow ego and personality to
interfere with settlement, as they do in face to face negotiations."
Cybersettle is not alone. There are several existing websites where
disputes can be settled over the Internet. 9 Furthermore, domain name disputes
and insurance claims are not the only disputes being resolved. Another United
States based service, clickNsettle.com,7 ° currently offers Arbitration service for
contracts, personal injury, commercial liability, medical malpractice, and
employment practices.7  London Resolve 2 a similar service out of the United
Kingdom, specializes in online resolution of defective software and other
computer crime cases.73 NovaForum.com74 a Toronto, Canada based operation,
has contracted arbitrators from around the world, and guarantees online
disputes will be settled within seventy-two hours.7 5 The Toronto group sees
their service as essential in bolstering consumer confidence in the online
market.76 "Burchetta, Goetz, and Roy Israel, CEO of National Arbitration and
Mediation (NAM) Corp., contend their services can help settle any dispute as
long as the question is "How much?"' The question of 'how much' is inherent
in the majority of, if not all, disputes. The confidence in these online systems
Settling Claims in Cyberspace, Says One Wag, Lawyers Should First Learn How to Use the Internet, 25 THE
CONN. L. TRm., June 7, 1999, at 7.
67. Id. at 5.
68. Id.
69. Some of the other providers of similar services include: clickNsettle.com; eResolution.com;
Settlementnow.com; and Online Ombuds Office, WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center, Resolution Forum
Inc., i-courthouse, Keylaw.com.
70. Why clickNSettle.com?, at http-//www.cficknsettle.com/why-ns.cfm (last visited Sept. 14,
2000). "[C]lickNsettle.com offers a wide range of innovative dispute resolution products designed to meet
the changing needs of businesses and individuals worldwide. From complete solutions for insurance
companies, corporations, law-firms and c-commerce providers to highly customized individual programs,
clickNsettle.com has the experience, services and technology... clickNsettle.com enables you to settle any
dispute, anywhere in the world." Id.
71. Stones, supra note 49, at 2.
72. ConflictResolution, athttp://www.londonresolve.com/Conflict.htm (last visited Sept. 8,2000).
Provides, "[oln-line and in-person process and expert alternative dispute resolution and consulting services
that include: Negotiation, Settlement Negotiation, Mediation/ Conciliation, Meeting Facilitation, Co-
mediation, Conciliation, Settlement Conference ....
73. Id.
74. NovaForum.com, The Right Platform to Power Online Dispute Resolution Services, at
http'/www.novafo-unm.com/methods.stm (last visited Sept. 10, 2000). This service "[c]ombines online
collaboration tools, video, live chat, text and transcript capabilities with full case management, fact
assessment, analysis, and weighted issue/interest variables." Id.
75. Financial Post, eWorld, NAT'L POsT, June 8,2000, available at 2000 WL 21838421.
76. Id.
77. Marquess, supra note 65, at 82.
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indicates online Arbitration and Mediation services may redefine the world of
ADR.
The most blatant benefit of using cyberspace as a venue, is that distance
between parties becomes irrelevant. This characteristic clearly leads to the
conclusion that online Mediation will be especially critical in the world of
international Arbitration.78 The biggest expense in disputes that cross
international borders is travel time. Conducting these encounters online
eliminates those expenses.79 Without time or travel concerns, online dispute
resolution can bring experts from all over the globe together.' "It could also
resolve cross-border litigation. Instigating legal action in another jurisdiction
is so complex and expensive that many cases never reach that stage.""'
Cybersquatting is an international problem. Estimates suggest disputes of
generic domain names could escalate into the tens of thousands. 2 Disputes
arising from Internet activity will certainly add to the assortment of
international legal issues. "It should also be noted that national registrars are
moving to the adoption of complaint management procedures with regard to
domain names, which means that in the near future we can expect disputes over
national identity domains."' 3 The solutions to the domain name disputes
illustrate the ability to utilize this technology to solve international disputes.
Already, parties to WIPO's dispute resolution service come from all over the
globe. "Given the global nature of e-commerce and the small dollar value of
most consumer transactions, trying to settle disputes in court is probably not a
practical option for most consumers and businesses... ADR can provide this
option. "' The global marketplace is becoming more and more intertwined
through technological advances. ADR has proven effective and popular in the
global marketplace. The Internet has provided a neutral, nearby venue for
resolving long distance disputes. The combination of technology and long
standing ADR techniques offers new opportunities to develop and control
business relationships regardless of distance.
VI. HURDLES FACED BY ONLINE EXPANSION OF ARBITRATION
Only time will tell what, if anything, stands in the way of online ADR
becoming as popular as traditional settlement options. However, even at the
early stage it is in now, there are already hurdles that need to be overcome.
78. Benjamin Wittes, The Office Of The Millenium, 2 LEGAL TIMES 27, 44 (1997).
79. Id.
80. Stones, supra note 49, at 4.
81. Id. at 4-5.
82. eResolution Online Arbitration System Targets Cybersquatters, supra note 54.
83. Id.
84. Gibbons, supra note 56, at 24.
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This technology requires trained experts, of which there is an apparent
shortage. 5 Additionally, if this expansion is going to be successful, there has
to be willing consumers. Currently, the consumer base is hesitant to jump
online to solve disputes.86 The potential of online expansion to destroy and
cheapen the legal profession needs to be understood.8" The high potential for
fraud must be addressed. 8 Jurisdiction and choice of law in cyberspace, remain
the subject of much intellectual debate. 9 Questions of Internet privacy and
consumer confidentiality must also be answered. This section of the article
could not possibly discuss all the problems online ADR faces, they are
unknown. The next few paragraphs will discuss the most prevalent problems
that will likely test our abilities to carry out online ADR successfully. This
article will consider the lack of trained individuals, then consumer
confidentiality and privacy concerns.
Technology is not going to sit idle while the legal profession waits to get
comfortable with modem changes. Historically the legal profession as a whole
is reluctant to technological advances. In the United States, the birthplace of
online ADR, the fear is that our legal professionals are not prepared for the new
role the Internet will play in their occupation. "Lawyers who don't or can't see
that e-law represents the future may be quickly left behind."9 The majority of
people who use the Internet are not very sophisticated users.9 There are still
many people who are not even connected to the Internet.92 Overall, the general
public is fearful of conducting such consequential matters online.93 Moreover,
many attorneys have never ventured into cyberspace.9 "Even some of the
biggest promoters of ADR think the young industry isn't ready to make the
85. Stones, supra note 49. A general trend in recent articles discussing the Internet expansion of
ADR point to the lack of trained professionals, as a problem faced by this technological advance. See, e.g.,
Jean Hellwege, Nothin' But Net: Will E-Law Change the Practice of Law., 36 JUN. TRIAL 12 (2000).
86. Stones, supra note 49.
87. Hellwege, supra note 85, at 16. "Mhe new technology could degrade the profession. Several
sites are full of slick content that cheapens what we as lawyers do." Id.
88. Id. "[Tihe Internet offers increased opportunities for consumers to become unsuspecting
victims of fraud. The potential for fraud is magnified considerably when you're using joethelawyer.com."
Idat 15.
89. See, e.g., Joanna B. Bossin, What Constitutes Minimum Contacts in Cyberspace?, 521 U.L
REv. (1997); Dan L Burk, Jurisdiction in a World Without Borders. I VA. J. L & TECH. 3 (1997); Mattew
R. Burnstein, Conflicts on The Net: Choice of Law in Transnational Cyberspace, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L 75 (1996).
90. Hellwege, supra note 85, at 16.
91. Dave Thom, E-mail Arbitration Takes ADR to Cyberspace, N. J. L. J. Apr. 15 1996, at 15.
92. Id.
93. Stones, supra note 49, at 6.
94. CatherineJ. Lanctot, Attorney-Client Relationships in Cyberspace: The Peril and The Promise,
49 DUKE L. J. 147 (1999).
move to the Internet." The services being provided online do not replace the
roles of the trained professional. The goal of the online expansion, is not to
replace lawyers; it is to adjust the role of lawyers in light of the available
technology.' Ensuring these systems operate successfully, at a professional
level, requires professionals that fully comprehend and are comfortable using
the systems.
Although there is little consensus as to the best strategies and techniques
for online ADR, there is little doubt that the need for those who understand the
process of dispute resolution, and are comfortable with the machines being
employed, is a necessity.9' To assure quality service is being provided,
professionals must be properly trained. Not only in the technological workings
of the systems, but in their advisory positions. Both mediators and arbitrators
must understand, and be trained in, their respective roles.9 There is a lack of
experienced arbitrators willing to preside online." Although online services are
being offered today, there is no way to assure a qualified representative and not
a 'computer geek' is on the other end of the terminal."°
A classic advantage to ADR is confidentiality,1"' leaving the secrets of the
parties private, in case trial is inevitable. The expansion of ADR to the Internet
compounds the concern of confidentiality in ADR, with the concern of privacy
of Internet use. In the United States, for example, statutory law mandates that
"[a] neutral in a dispute resolution proceeding shall not voluntarily disclose or
through discovery or compulsory process be required to disclose any dispute
resolution communication or any communication provided to the neutral."'0 2
Who has access to the information once it has been electronically transferred?
The concern over Internet privacy increases with our use and dependence on the
world of cyberspace. As the information on the Internet becomes more
personal and consequential, the trouble over who may access the information
grows.
Currently, the strongest existing safeguard to Internet privacy is a public
key encryption.0 3 Although it's not comforting to Internet users, as you
95. Id.
96. Julie Brienza, "Web-Footed" Lawyers Dip, Not Plunge, Into the Internet, 35 DEC. TRIAL 12
(1999).
97. Katsh, supra note 2, at 6.
98. Id.
99. Stones, supra note 49, at 5.
100. id.
101. ADR and Technology, Special Supplement ADR, 2000, CPR's Online Seminar, 18 ALTHCL
129 [hereinafter ADR and Technology]. "Obviously one traditional lure of ADR from some parties
standpoint is to preserve confidentiality." Id.
102. 5 U.S.C. § 574(a) (2000).
103. "Encryption allows an individual using cryptographic algorithm and a key, to tum a message
into gibberish. Once the message is sent to the intended recipient, the gibberish is decoded and becomes
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browse, every electronic move you make, may be being watched, tracked, and
recorded. °4 The Federal Trade Commission suggests four necessary elements
to assuring privacy online. They propose; commercial operators should provide
notice to their customers about how their personal information is used, offer the
consumer a choice on whether their information is used, secure the information
that is gathered, and allow the consumer access to their information to
encourage accuracy. ' °' Adopting an international model incorporating these
elements will give the consumer more control. With increased control and
increased confidence in the online process, perhaps more consumers will utilize
the procedure. Moreover, with these additional safeguards, concern of who is
watching our cyberspace activity will diminish.
While securing the information disclosed with encryption techniques, there
is still the concern over whether the traditional confidentiality found in ADR
will remain a feature in cyberspace. International arbitration is a highly
competitive business."°6 Use of ADR techniques is consensual by the parties. 0 7
Different commercial providers of ADR services utilize different rules. 108 "In
June 1985, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL) adopted the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration
.... The Model Law represents a modern procedural framework which is
liberal in its provisions and de-localized, without neglecting fundamental
requirements of procedural justice or due process.""'" Under the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules, confidentiality is granted by article 25 and article 32. Article
25 asserts that hearings shall be held in camera unless the parties agree
otherwise, and article 32 provides that the award may be made public only with
the consent of both parties. 0
Considering the lack of uniformity in international ADR, there is
inherently lack of uniformity in online ADR. In order to assure the consumer
is protected by the traditional concept of confidentiality in an ADR proceeding,
in cyberspace, commercial providers must make their rules unambiguous to
users. "' Furthermore, the old saying "buyer beware," applies full force. Online
consumers must understand that Internet activity is vulnerable to fraud and
readable." Sheri Hunter, The Internet & Communications Law: Defamation and Privacy Laws Face The
Internet, 17 CoMM. LAw. 16, al 1999, at 21.
104. /d at 20.
105. Id.
106. Drahozal, supra note 9, at 83.
107. ld. at 82.
108. Viviene M. Ashman, UNCITRAL Initiatives To Further Harmonize And Modernize
Arbitration Laws, Rules And Practices 624 P. L I. 635, 638 (2000).
109. Cornout, supra note 34, at 20.
110. Ashman, supra note 108, at 638.
111. Hunter, supra note 103, at 20.
Turner
privacy invasion. Consumers must also understand the rules of the ADR
procedures that are being offered by a particular provider. This is not to
suggest there is no governing body of law that applies to the Internet, or that
there is no protection if laws are violated in cyberspace. "All existing national
laws apply to cyberspace, in theory; the difficulty is knowing how to apply or
interpret them.""1
2
VII. CONCLUSION: FORECAST ON "CYBER-SETrLING"
"ADR took a long time to take root in the legal profession, and online
ADR is one of those things we're going to have to do very slowly and let people
get comfortable with.""' 3 There are mixed predictions on what role the Internet
will have on ADR, but there is no denying the Internet will have an impact on
ADR and the legal profession in general. Supply and demand will dictate the
growth of this new commercial phenomenon. Consumers that currently use
ADR generally look for speed, effectiveness, expert knowledge, and cost in the
dispute resolution mechanisms they employ."
4
Certainly, the idea of conducting Mediations and Arbitrations in
cyberspace would have sounded delusional to our legal predecessors. However,
online ADR may become more expansive than ever imagined. The idea of an
entire online courthouse was made a reality over a year ago:" 5
I-Courthouse provides jury trials for the Internet community. The
firm provides a service to individuals and businesses interested in
having their disputes evaluated or decided online by a jury of their
peers. The service is also marketed to attorney's who wish to conduct
mock trials to gauge their strengths and weaknesses of their case
before trial 116
In this system, everything takes place online. The use of audio, video,
graphic, and other digital media allows for evidence exhibits. There is a jury
selection process, and of course verdicts and verdict summaries.17 The
ingenuity clearly exists to expand online options. The question is: Will it
work?
After all the exciting options this new technological step offers, there
seems to be two major setbacks. The predominant criticism is that the
112. Richard Hill, Will Cyberspace use Cybercourts? INT'L COMM. 1IrGATATION, Oct. 11, 1997.
113. Thom, supranote91,at 15.
114. Hill, supra note 15, at 34.
115. Gibbons, supra note 56, at 6.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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technology will detract from the human aspect needed in ADR, and as a result,
the application is limited to more impersonal situations. "Once you start the
practice of law in the virtual setting, a degree of personal touch disappears to
become nothing more than cook-book law . . ,"1 Of course, there is
additional criticism and obstacles, but the majority of the negative commentary
concentrates on this theme. Perhaps this is a real concern, or perhaps this
concern is the reaction of professionals unwilling to venture into the new world
of jurisprudence that cyberspace encourages.
The forecast for the future of online ADR is certain. It is not the future;
it is now. The future is the expansion of its use, and the adaptability of its
services. It is only a matter of time until there is comfort in conducting ADR
online and the services that provide online ADR take off."9 As the richness and
adaptability of online communications continues to flourish, online
opportunities for ADR will too.'2 There is still a severe need to improve the
software that operates these systems." 'But it's early and technology will
certainly change as rapidly as e-commerce itself."' 22
In conclusion, it seems we are on the brink of an online revolution. The
technology already marginally exists to conduct online ADR. There is software
that allows it to operate. There are willing participants, willing clients, and
more and more disputes with every business and Internet transaction. Test
programs and pioneers in the industry demonstrate money making potential and
success. It is very inviting to jump in and get started, but there is a lot more on
the line thanjust getting "online". This technological advance will undoubtedly
affect international business relationships. The integrity of the global legal
profession also hinges on how seriously we consider each move. It is far more
important to be patient and ensure proper training, international education,
consumer protection guidelines, and some international order of information
than to jeopardize failure.
118. Heflwege, supra note 85, at 16.
119. Brede, supra note 66, at 5.
120. ADR and Technology, supra note 101.
121. Gibbons, supra note 56, at 6.
122. Id.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In a world where global communications are increasingly dependent on the
Internet,' traditional geographic and territorial borders are disappearing, leaving
in their wake important and unanswered questions. Cyberspace is different
from the "real world" because it is boundary-less. This lack of defined,
territorial borders has necessitated exploration into new areas of law that is
developing to regulate this technological arena. International Jurisdiction is one
of the most important areas of the law. It requires new ways of thinking to
develop ideas on adapting and regulating cyberspace. Many of these new ideas
are similar, yet different from traditional forms of legal thought.
Amongst the emerging issues evolving in the new field of cyberlaw, none
is more important and difficult to define than Jurisdiction.2 Traditionally,
territorial borders separating countries into distinct entities marked which laws
would be used to resolve a conflict. Every country in the world with an
organized legal system has its own variation of Civil Procedure. The question
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, May 2001. Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad College
of Law and a Junior Staff Member of the ISA Journal of International and Comparative Law.
1. IDC estimates that the number of Internet users worldwide will grow from approximately 97
million at the end of 1998, to approximately 320 million by the end of 2002. This reflects a compound
annual growth rate of 34.8%. The rapid growth in popularity of the Internet is due in large part to increasing
computer and modem penetration; development of the Wide World Web; the introduction of easy-to-use
navigational tools; and utilities and the growth in the number of informational, entertainment, and
commercial applications available on the Internet, at http://www.idc.com (last visited Oct. 27, 2000).
2. In July of 1999, an Internet Law and Policy Forum took place in Montreal, Canada. One of the
major topics of the conference was "Jurisdiction: Building Confidence in a Borderless Medium". Many
experts in the field of law and technology made presentations on the subject. Several of these experts are
cited throughout this article.
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of where jurisdiction lies in order to solve a conflict and why it should lie there
is essential to Civil Procedure. Jurisdictional problems come to the forefront
of a conflict when a legal dispute occurs in a world without borders. The
Internet provides an "information superhighway" that is accessible any place
in the world where a person has access to a telephone wire.' If a legal conflict
occurs resulting from information or content found on the Internet, where will
the conflict be resolved and whose law applies? There are several competing
theories that have developed to address this difficult question. This article will
illustrate the traditional concepts for solving international conflicts over
Jurisdiction. It will then present several theories on how to confront these
conflicts when they occur in Cyberspace. Analysis of the best methods for
confronting the issue of global jurisdiction in cyberspace will follow, leading
to a conclusion.
I. WHAT IS THE INTERNET?
In order to understand the problems that the Internet presents to traditional
notions of International Jurisdiction, one must have basic knowledge of the
Internet. One must know what the Internet is and where it came from. The
Internet is a product of the United States Department of Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (ARPANET).4 While it is highly doubtful that the
developers of ARPANET had the modern evolution of the Internet in mind at
the time of its creation, there was the idea of using the network for education.5
Today, education is only one of the endless applications of the Internet. An
infinite stream of information on subjects ranging from Astronauts to Zebras
can be located with the click of a computer mouse.
The modem Internet is a huge network that spans the globe. The basic
make-up consists of local computer networks that are connected to regional
networks that come together to form national and international systems.6 These
systems form "webs" that are connected to each other, essentially creating an
"information superhighway" commonly known as the Internet.
Communications on the Internet are in a machine language called Internet
3. According to NUA Ltd., An Internet Survey site, through various measurements and surveys,
have estimated the number of users online to be 359.98 million worldwide. The following is a breakdown
of the numbers by region. Africa, 3.11 million; Asia/Pacific, 89.43 million; Europe, 94.22 million; Middle
East, 2.40 million; Canada & USA, 157.24 million; Latin America, 13.4 million, at
http'//www.nua.ietsurveys/how-many-online/index.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2000).
4. Juliet M. Oberding & Terije Norderhaug, A Seperater Jurisdiction for Cyberspace, at
http://www.ascusc.org/jcmc/ vol2/issuel/juris.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2000).
5. Id.
6. Dan L Burk, Jurisdiction in a World Without Boarders, 1. Va. J.L & Tech. 3 (Spring 1997),
available at http://vjot.student.virgina.edu/graphics/voll/voll-art3.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2000).
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Protocols.7 This language is transmitted over the Internet in packets of data that
are broken up and sent through the network at whatever pace the connection can
capacitate. The address of the final destination identifies these data packets.
Each packet travels over different routes depending on available capacity and
speed from computer to computer until it reaches its intended destiation.8
Once they reach their destination, these packets of data come together to form
the requested page.
The route that the final product takes may travel through various states of
the United States as well as through various countries of the world. The
network design is to move information as quickly as possible along the system
and does not recognize any defined territorial borders. Because of this
objective, it is likely that information will travel through several different
jurisdictions before it reaches its final destination.
There is no real way to monitor the information that passes over the
Internet. Additionally, there are no realistically feasible ways for countries to
block Internet transmissions. Internet protocols do not recognize geographic
location.9 This lack of ability to control and screen information transmitted on
the Internet leads to legal problems. Without a specific authority to oversee
these problems, the question becomes, how can legal conflicts be resolved.
Who has jurisdiction to decide and solve these problems?
Ill. TRADITIONAL JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES
In order to file a lawsuit in the United States, the court hearing the case
must have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the issue and over the
defendant(s). Subject matter jurisdiction in federal cases depends on the
diversity of citizenship between the parties. It also depends on whether a
specific issue of federal law arises.10 The more complex issue is whether the
court can assert personal jurisdiction over the defendant. For a court to have
personal jurisdiction over a person, the court must conclude that the person has
"minimum contacts" within the forum state, so as not to offend traditional
notions of due process.1 ' A defendant must purposely avail himself or herself
within the forum state by being present in the state, doing business within the
state, or maintaining certain activities within the state. The defendant must
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. FED. R. CIV. P. § 1331.
11. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,316 (1945). The Due Process Clause of
the 14th Amendment permits the courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over persons with sufficient
minimum contacts. Id
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have had sufficient, continuous contacts within the forum. 2 Therefore, non-
residents of one state are still subject to the jurisdiction of the court in that state
if the court finds that they maintained the necessary minimum contacts required
for asserting personal jurisdiction.
A significant problem arises when actions filed are a result of conflicts
arising in cyberspace. The Internet flows freely and is available in every state
and every country. This creates a direct challenge to the minimum contact rule.
Courts are examining what constitutes minimum contact with respect to Internet
issues. It may not be enough to say that a person has established minimum
contacts in a forum just because another person was able to gain access to a
website within the forum. If this were true, every state in the United States and
every country around the world with similar minimum contact standards would
be able to claim personal jurisdiction over anyone with a website. Legal
scholars propose that well defined standards be established when determining
personal jurisdiction based on cases dealing with conflicts originating in
cyberspace.
United States' Courts are making efforts to clarify the question of
jurisdiction for cases arising from conflicts originating on the Internet. One
factor for determining whether minimum contacts exist in a forum is by
deciding if a particular website is passive or active.13 Weber v. Jolly Hotels
used a test based on this issue. The defendant in that case was an Italian hotel
that advertised on the Internet. The plaintiff booked a room in the hotel through
a licensed travel agent in New Jersey. The plaintiff's injury occurred while in
the hotel in Italy. The issue presented in the case was whether a corporation's
advertisement on the Internet was enough to support general jurisdiction. The
Weber Court held that advertising on the Internet, without further solicitation,
could not support jurisdiction in this case. The Court asserted that the nature
and quality of contacts is key when determining whether personal jurisdiction
can be asserted in Internet cases.14 A determining factor is whether a
defendant's website simply places information on the Internet, or whether the
website facilitates a means for soliciting and conducting business. The Court
reasoned that without deciding the characteristic nature of the website, a
defendant could be open to legal action anywhere that the website is
accessible. 5 This departs from the well-established precedent that a person
needs to be 1) present in or 2) purposely availing ones self of the forum state
that is attempting to establish personal jurisdiction in order for there to be
minimum contacts.
12. Id. at 317-19.
13. Weber v. Jolly Hotels, 977 F. Supp. 327 (D. N.J. 1997).
14. Id. at 330-31.
15. Id. at 333.
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While it may be a valid assertion that the nature and quality of contacts is
a significant factor in determining whether personal jurisdiction can be asserted
in Internet cases, this is not as simple as it seems. Many websites are
established with the purpose of providing information and not for advertising
or for the solicitation of business. However, this does not mean that they are
not actively making contacts within a forum. A leading case in this area is
Zippo Manufacturing Company v. Zippo Dot Com. 16 Although this is a case
involving United States jurisdictions; it should be persuasive with respect to
how international law may want to address jurisdictional issues. Zippo
involves trademark infringement on the Internet. Trademark infringement is a
problem that will have a significant impact on the international community. For
example, a French company could be using a trademark to do business on the
World Wide Web as a United States company conducting business with the
same or similar trademark. Anyone doing business with these companies may
experience confusion from the similarities of the trademarks and consequently,
conflicts could arise. Trademarks used by a French Corporation in France will
no longer have an effect on a United States Corporation using the same or
similar trademark. The effortless ability to access the Internet has made the
world smaller, thus facilitating the need to protect companies and individuals
intellectual property rights.
The Zippo Court addressed trademark infringement on the Internet in the
United States when the Zippo Manufacturing Company, a cigarette lighter
manufacturers domiciled in Pennsylvania, brought suit against a California
Internet news service company, Zippo Dot Coin, for trademark infringement.
Zippo Dot Coin's website advertised its service and had an electronic
application used to subscribe to their service. They had contracts with Internet
providers in Pennsylvania and had subscription agreements with 3000 residents
of Pennsylvania. The Court held that jurisdiction in Pennsylvania was proper
because Zippo Dot Corn had purposely availed itself of the law and economy
of Pennsylvania." The Court, specifying that this was a distinctive situation
because it was an Internet case, applied the International Shoe"' minimum
contacts analysis. The court in Zippo established a "sliding scale" which
measures the degree of interactivity of the website."9 The Court broke the
scale down into three levels. The first is a passive website. A passive website
is a site that merely distributes information.' The second level is an
16. Zippo Manufacturing Company v. Zippo Dot Corn, 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
17. Id. at 1126.
18. International Shoe, 414 U.S. at 316. In International Shoe, the court defined for the first time
what contacts a defendant would have to establish in a particular forum so as to have "minimum contacts"
within the meaning of the law. Id.
19. Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1119.
20. Id. at 1124.
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intermediate website. Intermediate websites are able to exchange information
between the host and the user.2' The third level is an active website. An active
website enables the host to conduct business over the Internet. The Court
defines conducting business over the Internet as entering into a contract over
the Internet and/or knowingly and continuously engaging in the transmission
of computer files over the Internet.22
In order to satisfy due process requirements, a defendant, acting as a
reasonable person, would have to anticipate being haled into court in the forum
that the activity that is conducted.' The Zippo Court in fact did believe that
Zippo Dot Corn should have foreseen jurisdiction in Pennsylvania. According
to the Court, the level of activity was sufficient to subject the defendant to the
laws of that forum.
The test established in Zippo is a model from which to base new
international laws on jurisdictional conflicts arising on the Internet. While the
laws of various countries may differ with respect to jurisdiction based on "real
world" conflict, compromises are necessary when it comes to the Internet.
Everyone conducting activity on the Internet should be guaranteed due process
of law. The type of conflict that is causing the dispute will often determine the
solution, but in many circumstances, the ruling described in Zippo can provide
a basic test to use as guidance. If a company or individual transmits
information over the Internet, and a conflict occurs, one should examine the
nature of the information. In addition, an analysis must be conducted to
determine whether the website is passive, active, or intermediate. Finally, a
determination as to whether a reasonable person could anticipate being haled
into court in that forum is determined. With respect to cases of international
conflict, if a person should have anticipated that the information they were
disseminating over the Internet would possibly cause a problem, they should
foresee judgment in the forum where the conflict occurs. It is entirely feasible
that an American using a website to post information or conduct business may
have to face suit in Argentina. This would be true if it is determined that a
reasonable person conducting that activity should have foreseen that problems
could occur in Argentina. Naturally, these situations are determinable on a
case-by-case basis, but this is a starting point for handling the complicated
litigation that will arise over international jurisdiction conflicts.
IV. INTERNET JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES
There are an infinite number of Internet issues that will give rise to
conflicts overjurisdiction. Consequently, varieties of scholars have commented
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. World-Wide Volkswagon Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,297 (1979).
on the conflicts that have arisen and could arise with respect to jurisdictional
issues on the Internet.
Hypothetically, international jurisdiction problems could arise involving
hate speech on the on the Internet. The First Amendment of the United States
Constitution protects pro Nazi material on the Internet.24 This information,
originating in the United States, is accessible in Germany. However, German
law restricts the proliferation of Nazi material and information in Germany.
This raises the question of the German government's ability to have jurisdiction
over the person who places such information on the World Wide Web. Should
the German government have personal jurisdiction over the creator of the
website created and domiciled in the United States?
Applying the interactivity test set forth by the Zippo Court to the
aforementioned hypothetical is challenging. However, if the international legal
community starts to analyze these issues in the same manner, specific tests can
evolve based on the facts of each individual conflict.
In analyzing whether the German government should have jurisdiction in
this situation, the first issue addressed is to determine the website's level of
activity. This is an issue not easily answered and is a strong argument for
creating legislation to deal with conflicts of this nature.
If the website is passive and only distributes information, it would be
inconsistent with due process for the Germany to have personal jurisdiction
over the defendant in Germany. The website would not be purposely availed
to any forum in particular. The German government may argue that the laws
of its country are different from most others when it comes to this type of
information. Germany may argue that those who established the website should
have known that the website is accessible in Germany and therefore should
have expected being haled into court in Germany.
If the level of activity of the Nazi material website is deemed intermediate
or active, different conclusions result regarding the jurisdictional question. If
the nature of the website is to actively exchange information between users and
the host, then purposeful availment to the benefits of the forum occur.
If it is determined that business is being conducted over the website, it may
be concluded that minimum contacts are being maintained within the forum.
In these cases, the German government would have a strong argument that
jurisdiction should lie in Germany. The border-less nature of the Internet is
evident to those that participate in the medium. If the website is actively
conducting business in a forum, the hosts should expect to be subject to
jurisdiction in that forum.
24. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Jurisdiction and the Internet: Basic Anglo/American Perspectives, Internet
Law and Policy Forum, Jurisdiction: Building Confidence in a Borderless Medium, Montreal Canada, at
http:llwww.ilpf.orgtconfer/present99/perrittpr.htm (July 1999).
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Another issue that could present itself on the Internet involves professional
licensing.25 For instance, if a doctor in England offers medical advice over a
website, does the United States government have jurisdiction to say that the
doctor is practicing medicine in the United States without the proper license?
If the medical website is passive, it is only distributing information. The
website should clearly disclaim that the content is for informational purposes
only, not to offer medical advice or diagnosis. This being the situation, it
would be unlikely that personal jurisdiction in the United States would be
consistent with due process.
If the website features an exchange of information between the user and
host and this information is in the form of medical advice, an intermediate level
of activity will exist. In this case, the totality of the circumstances should be
examined to determine the nature of the information exchanged and if the
defendant should have anticipated being haled into court if problems arose over
the exchange of the aforementioned information. In a situation such as this,
whether medicine is being practiced without a license will be have to be
determined based on the kind of information being exchanged. Heightened
scrutiny is required on a case-by-case basis for intermediate level websites.
Whether those responsible for offering information should have to answer suit
in foreign jurisdictions will depend on the specific nature of the information
exchanged.
For personal jurisdiction to be consistent within the forum, a website must
be actively conducting business. If a doctor in England is offering medical
advice, or attempting to dispense medications in exchange for payment, in the
United States there is a strong likelihood that the doctor is practicing medicine
without a license. In these cases, personal jurisdiction lies within a United
States forum. Again, the level of activity of the website lends to determining
a good starting point for deciding issues of internationaljurisdiction for Internet
conflicts.
It is important to realize that the Zippo test is only a starting point for
answering the question of international jurisdiction on the Internet. Different
variations of Civil Procedure exist from country to country. Certain
perspectives in the United States regarding enforcing jurisdiction are
fundamentally different from other countries. For example, Japanese Civil
Procedure states that the general grounds for jurisdiction depend on the
domicile of the defendant.26 Therefore, the plaintiff can sue the defendant in
25. Id.
26. Kazunori Ishiguro, Traditional Legal Concepts for the Internet and the Global Information
Infrastructure; A Japanese Perspective, Internet and Law Policy Forum, Montreal, Canada, at http:Ilwww.
ilpf.org/confer/present99/ishiguropr.htm (July 1999).
the defendant's domicile. The United States Supreme Court" has ruled that a
foreign plaintiff can sue a defendant in the United States domicile of the
defendant only in cases where it is not precluded by forum non-conveniens.'
The differences between the United States and Japan are indicative of the
variations that exist between countries throughout the world.
One manner in which we could resolve the variations that exist in civil
procedure laws between countries is to form a treaty standardizing laws in
cyberspace. However, the constitutional systems of participating countries in
a treaty will still create an imbalance in the harmonization of a standard rule
system.29 University of Tokyo Professor Kazunori Ishiguro illustrates this
conflict. He notes that in the United States a treaty has the same rank in terms
of judicial importance as a federal law. The rank of international law is lower
then that of federal law, but higher than state law? ° In Germany, international
law is considered above federal law, but a treaty is generally treated the same
as federal law.3" According to the Japanese Constitution, international law and
treaties take precedent over national law.32 These fundamental differences
among countries will be an impediment to harmonizing the international law
dictating jurisdiction on the Internet.
V. DIFFERING VIEWS ON THE INTERNET JURISDICTIONAL PROBLEM
There are several different theories on the number of problems that
jurisdictional issues will cause in cyberspace. There are also several theories as
to what the solutions to those problems should be. Professor Henry H. Perritt,
Jr. illustrates in his article three examples of conflicting hypotheses on the
Internet Jurisdiction issue.33 Jack Goldsmith of the University of Chicago
offers the first hypothesis. David R. Johnson' and David G. Pos 5 present
contradicting views on the issue. Peter Swire offers a compromised view of the
first two.
Jack Goldsmith of the University of Chicago has set forth one prominent
theory. 6 He asserts that the "hype" created by Internet jurisdictional issues are
just that, "hype." He is of the opinion that well-established theories of
27. Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254 (1981).
28. Ishiguro, supra note 26.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Perritt, supra note 24.
34. Chairman of Counsel Connect and Co-Director of the Cyberspace Law Institute.
35. Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center and Co-Director of
the Cyberspace Law Institute.
36. Jack L Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. Chi. L Rev. 1199 (1998).
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international law that have been in place for many years will provide the
answers to any questions raised in cyberspace, the same as they do with
traditional jurisdictional conflicts.
It is likely that the issue of Internet Jurisdiction will cause a great deal of
over-excitement as new cases arise at a rapid pace in the near future. This
would seem to be natural when a new medium is expanding as quickly as the
Internet. However, to say that new laws and dramatic variations on current
doctrine are not necessary to deal with the legal complications resulting from
the Internet is overly optimistic. Jurisdiction in the real world depends on clear
territorial divisions between nations. Once these divisions disappear, as they
disappear on the Internet, new regulations must be enacted. Traditional law is
important and not to be discarded. Current rules will be the basis for the ever-
expanding set of regulations that will need to be established and used to deal
with conflict resulting from disputes in cyberspace.
David R. Johnson and David G. Post37 suggest a theory that contradicts.
Goldsmiths. They assert that a whole new area of law needs to arise to deal
with the rising issues of jurisdiction on the Internet. Their article provides an
example of how the United States government could traditionally not impose
United States trademark law on a Brazilian business operating in Brazil. Post
and Johnson explain that this is impossible because it would require that the
United States be able to assert physical control over those that run the business
in Brazil. This would be in direct contradiction to the Brazilian government's
right to be the only governing body to have such control over its citizens. This
control comes from physical territorial borders, and as previously illustrated,
physical borders do not exist in cyberspace. Governments have responded to
the lack of physical borders by attempting to regulate the flow of electronic
information as it crosses their borders.38 This is a difficult undertaking that
most likely is impossible and impractical. Johnson and Post conclude that the
World Wide Web has created a new arena where new rules must evolve. They
assert that this area should be distinct from current doctrine and new regulations
need to develop based on the special characteristics of cyberspace.
The inherent border-less nature of the Internet will necessitate an evolution
in jurisdictional doctrine in order to regulate legal conflicts on the Internet.
However, traditional international law provides the building blocks for future
regulations. The concepts of minimum contacts within a forum and a defendant
anticipating facing suit in a forum are good starting points for creating
Jurisdiction rules in cyberspace. These concepts must be adapted to fit legal
issues that arise on the Internet depending on the nature of the website.
37. David R. Johnson & David 0. Post, Law and Borders - The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48
STAN. L REv. 1367 (1996).
38. Id. at 1374.
A third theory offers a compromising position to the aforementioned two.
Peter Swire suggests that the size of the entity providing the Internet service
will determine jurisdiction issues.a9 Entities such as large multinational
corporations will likely have significant physical presence in countries that have
access to their Internet services or products. Therefore, traditional notions of
jurisdiction apply. However, Swire suggests that new concepts and variations
on traditional laws will need to be created for the smaller entities in countries
that have access to Internet services or products.
This theory is provocative in that it concentrates on the "real world"
concept of physical presence. While the size of the entity may have a
connection to the issue of jurisdiction, the type of website that the entity
maintains will give a better result.
Regardless of which theory best addresses the problem of Internet
jurisdiction; using the test suggested by the Zippo Court is a logical starting
point. All websites, whether they are active, passive, or intermediate are judged
according to the Zippo test. This focuses attention on the website itself as
opposed to the size of the entity behind the site. By focusing on the
characteristics of the website, real world concepts, which do not appear in
cyberspace, such as size and physical presence, will cease to exist.
VI. CONCLUSION
Jurisdiction in cyberspace is a very important area of the law. Current
international law is not well equipped to handle all of the complex issues that
will arise from conflicts based in cyberspace. However, the current law is a
good basis from which to mold laws that will fit questions ofjurisdiction on the
Internet. United States courts have started to address the question of where
jurisdiction should lie in cases arising from conflicts occurring on the Internet.
In addition to the courts concern with the potential problems arising in
cyberspace, users of the Internet are policing each other. Websites now contain
legal disclaimers that suggest what kind of information is contained on the site.
The legal ramifications of accessing the webpage are clear and rules are set for
using the information contained. This self-regulation by creators and hosts of
websites is the best, first line of defense for preventing legal conflicts from
occurring.
As the Internet continues to grow, the cyber-community as a whole should
become more responsible for monitoring what is being proliferated over the
system. Court should not be responsible for addressing every problem that
arises in cyberspace. Most Internet users will not be able to afford defending
39. HenryH. Perrit, Jr., Jurisdiction and the Internet: BasicAnglolAmerican Perspectives Internet
Law and Policy Forum, Jurisdiction: Building Confidence in a Borderless Medium at http://www.ilpf.org
confer/present99/ perrittpr.htm (July 1999) (citing Peter Swire).
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suits in multiple jurisdictions or complying with different regulations of the
various jurisdictions through which they might electronically venture.' In
order to avoid these pitfalls, efforts must be made to continue; 1) creating
uniform international laws pertaining to the Internet; 2) increase self-regulation
by hosts and users; and 3) better educate law makers of how the Internet and
World Wide Web function.
No other medium has created a global community as widespread and
accessible as the Internet. Without physical boundaries to block the free flow
of information, people have been able to come together and communicate
around the world like never before. The Internet has made it possible for
people of all levels of social and economic backgrounds to have a voice in a
plethora of issues. Enacting and enforcing international laws and regulations
will protect the interests of all of the entities communicating in cyberspace.
This will be a complicated process, but one that is essential for the protection
of a world advancing towards free flowing communication and cooperation.
40. Burk, supra note 6.
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I. INTRODUCTION
As we approach the end of the first year of the new millenium, we see a
rapid growth in the enactment and evolution of legislation regarding the use and
validity of digital signatures in countries throughout the world. Digital
signature legislation has been established with the purpose of giving digital
signatures the same validity and effect as handwritten signatures.' Digital
signatures are alluring to those involved in international e-commerce, because
through their use, parties are able to significantly minimize the distance and
physical obstacles associated with international transactions.2 Unlike other
forms of electronic signatures, a digital signature is a secure communication,
which can ensure that electronic documents signed by one party and sent
electronically to another are done without a compromise of security.3 However,
the differences in various laws create a problem for the use of digital signatures
across national boundaries.4 "The development of international electronic
commerce requires cross-border arrangements involving third countries; in
order to ensure operability at a global level, agreements on multilateral rules
* J.D. Candidate, Class of 2002, Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center, Fort
Lauderdale, Florida.
1. See S. Res. 761, 106th Cong. (2000) (enacted); Council Directive 99/93 of 13 December 1999
on a Community Framework for Electronic Signatures, art. 5, 1999 O.J. (L 13) 15; See generally Draft guide
to enactment of the UNCITRAL Uniform Rules on Electronic Signatures, U.N. UNCrTRAL, 37th Sess., art.
6 (2000), available at httpJ/thomas.loc.gov (last visited Sep. 13, 2000).
2. W. Everett Lupton, The Digital Signature: Your Identity by the Numbers, 6 RICH. J.L & TECH.
10(1999).
3. Id.
4. Id.
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with third countries on mutual recognition of certification services could be
beneficial."' In order for the use of digital signatures to be a success in the
international forum, several barriers must be tackled. This article will focus on
three barriers: 1) the conflicting technical requirements of digital signatures;
2) the ability to limit potential liability of Certificate Authorities; and 3) the
conflicting legal requirements regulating digital signatures and contracts.
The creation and verification of digital signatures is done through
cryptography, with the use of mathematics, which transforms messages.6
Digital signatures generally require the use of two keys, a "private key" and a
"public key."' The signatory uses the "private key" exclusively in the creation
of the digital signature, while the "public key," which can be widely known, is
used by the party relying on the signature to verify the authenticity of the digital
signature.' The private key is the tool used by the signatory to encrypt the text
of the document.' Then, the recipient of the document uses the public key to
decrypt and verify the authenticity of the document.'" The encrypting and
decrypting of the document occurs through a mathematical relationship between
the two keys, which makes it "computationally infeasible to deduce the private
key solely from knowledge of the public key.""
Another process used in the creation and verification of a digital signature
is a hash function. "A hash function is an algorithm which creates a digital
representation or 'fingerprint' in the form of a 'hash value' or 'hash result' of
a standard length which is usually much smaller than the message but
nevertheless substantially unique to it."1 This process creates a digest, which
is a string of characters that maps the text.'3 This ensures that if any portion of
the original message is changed, the digest will also be changed."' These keys
5. Council Directive 99/93 of 13 December 1999 on a Community Framework for Electronic
Signatures, art. 23, 1999 O.J. (L 13) 13 [hereinafter Electronic Sign].
6. American Bar Association, Digital Signature Guidelines Tutorial, at http://www.abanet.org
scitech/ec /isc/dsg-tutorial.html (last visited Sep. 4, 2000).
7. id.
8. Draft Guide to Enactment of the UNClTRAL Uniform Rules on Electronic Signatures, U.N.
UNCITRAL, 37th Sess. (2000). [hereinafter Draft Guide].
9. Sanu K. Thomas, The Protection and Promotion of E-Commerce: Should There be a Global
Regulatory Scheme for Digital Signatures?, 22 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 1002, 1013 (1999), relying on R.R.
Jueneman & R.J. Robertson Jr., Biometrics and Digital Signatures in Electronic Commerce, 38 JJRIMET1cS
J. 427 n.26 (1998).
10. Id., relying on Jane Kaufman Winn, Open Systems, Free Markets, and Regulation of Internet
Commerce, 72 TUL. L REV. 1177,1219 (1998).
11. Id., relying on R.R. Jueneman & R.J. Robertson Jr., Biometrics and Digital Signatures in
Electronic Commerce, 38 JURIMETRICS J. 427 n.26 (1998).
12. American Bar Association, supra note 6.
13. Lupton, supra note 2.
14. Id.
Lester
are issued by a trusted third party, generally referred to as a Certification
Authority. 5 Digital signatures can be described as the use of cryptography and
a hash function to transform a message.' 6 Whoever is in possession of the
initial message and the public key of the signer can accurately verify that the
transformation was done through the use of the private key of the signer, and
whether the original message has in any way been altered.17 A digital signature
is not a handwritten signature electronically stored; it is a secure communica-
tion used to verify a signatory. 8
II. CONFLICTING TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS OF DIGITAL SIGNATURES
Digital signature laws provide for different technological requirements in
various areas of the world. Legislation has been enacted in several jurisdic-
tions, which either recognizes or regulates the use of digital signatures.19
However, the approach taken regarding the legal and technical issues has been
significantly different in each jurisdiction.2" While some countries focus on
only the technical standards, others have touched on a wide variety of issues,
including the establishment of a regulatory agency whose function is to oversee
Certificate Authorities.2 Different jurisdictions have set up different
requirements for a Certification Authority. For example, Singapore has a
Controller of Certification Authorities whose responsibilities include licensing,
certifying, monitoring, and overseeing certification.' However, the Singapore
law does not require that all Certification Authorities be licensed; it simply
provides for a greater assumption of validity and limitation on liability.23 In
contrast, a valid digital signature in Italy must be certified by a Certification
Authority that has been accredited through the fulfillment of specific conditions
set by the law.' Additionally, the European Union encourages Certificate
Authorities to include in their certificates the name, address, social-security
15. Draft Guide, supra note 8.
16. Lupton, supra note 2 (defining digital signatures and explaining the procedures associated with
the issuance and usage of digital signatures).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Thomas, supra note 9, at 1026.
20. Id.
21. Internet Law & Policy Forum, Survey of International Electronic and Digital Signature
Initiatives., at http:/filpf.org/digsigtsurvey.htm (last visited Sep. 13, 2000) [hereinafter Digital Signature].
22. 1998 Singapore Electronic Transactions Act, June 29, 1998, available at
http://mbc.comleommercefiegis/sigapore.html.
23. Id.
24. Interdisciplinary centre for Law & Information Technology, The Legal Aspects of Digital
Signatures, at http://www.law.kuleuven.ac.belicri/projectstreport.data/executive.htm, (last visited July 25,
2000).
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number, tax and credit information, and specific licenses and certifications.2"
The European Union's goal is to have the Certificate Authorities offer a wider
variety of services.2
6
With so many different variations of requirements for Certification
Authorities, it will be difficult to conduct international transactions through the
use of digital signatures. In order to be successful across international borders,
Certification Authorities will be required to fulfill the requirements set forth by
every area in which it will conduct its business. For a Certification Authority
to be successful internationally, it would quite possibly have to acquire licenses
in several jurisdictions, a task that would prove to be expensive.' The costly
price of acquiring licenses in different jurisdictions would be shifted to the
consumers of the Certificate Authority. This would discourage the use of
digital signatures on the international level, and quite possibly stifle growth and
progression. Due to the varying conditions of licensing, becoming licensed in
different jurisdictions could be virtually impossible. Additionally, some laws
regarding the requirements for Certification Authorities are unclear, making the
task more difficult. 28 A harmonization of the licensing requirements of
Certification Authorities must come about in order to secure a future for
international digital signatures.
Ill. THE ABILITY TO LIMIT LIABILITY OF CERTIFICATION AuTHORMIES
Anyone can download digital signature Software on the Internet and create
a digital signature." For this reason, any message using a digital signature
should be authenticated by a Certification Authority to minimize the occurrence
of fraud.' It is the duty of the Certification Authority to ensure the identity of
the user, and verify that both the public key and private key used belong to that
individual." The Certificate Authority will then issue a certificate, which gives
the digital signature a presumption of validity.32 Upon issuance of a certificate,
the Certificate Authority could possibly be held liable for negligence in
performing its functions by providing certificates that contain false or
misleading information, and breach of contract. 33
25. Lupton, supra note 2, relying on European Commission, European Parliament and Council
Directive On a Common Framework for Electronic Signatures, Explanatory Memorandum, at 1, available at
httpJ/www.ispo.cec.be/eif/policy/com98297.hul (last visited Oct. 14, 1999).
26. Id.
27. Digital Signature, supra note 21.
28. Id.
29. Lupton, supra note 2.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
The next barrier to the international progression of digital signatures is the
ability of Certification Authorities to limit their liability. A Certification
Authority is subject to strict liability for failure to follow issuance requirements
and for losses caused by reliance on an inaccurate certificate under the
European Union Directive. 4  However, the European Union allows a
Certification Authority to limit its liability.35 The European Union Directive
allows Certification Authorities to limit their liability by indicating the
beginning and end period of a valid certificate, limiting the scope and use of a
certificate, and the value of transactions in which the certificate can be used.36
Other areas, such as Singapore and Malaysia, require that a Certification
Authority be licensed in order to place a limitation on its liability for the
certificates it issues.37 The major problem with this requirement is whether
being licensed or accredited should be a prerequisite for Certification
Authorities to place a limit on their liability. While some jurisdictions require
licensing and some do not, several jurisdictions have not addressed the issue of
liability at all.38 Some assert that addressing the issue at this stage is premature,
while others are simply opposed to the idea of a system based on strict liability,
which permits Certification Authorities to state limitations on liability.39
With so many conflicting views on how and when a Certificate Authority
can limit its liability, difficulties will arise for Certificate Authorities and users
of digital signatures. With these conflicting views and laws, Certificate
Authorities will be hesitant to converge into the spectrum of cross-border
transactions. For example, there could be instances in which one jurisdiction
requires that a Certificate Authority complete a step that another jurisdiction
prohibits.4 In an instance such as this, there is no easy solution to this problem,
but only the creation of more complexities. The conflicting laws in the various
jurisdictions would expose Certificate Authorities to possible unlimited
liability. With the uncertainty of liability exposure, Certificate Authorities
would be unable to determine how much liability they would accrue when they
become involved in cross-border transactions.
34. Digital Signature, supra note 21.
35. Id.
36. Electronic Signatures, supra note 5, at 18.
37. Digital Signature, supra note 21.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Raymond T. Nimmer, International Information Transactions: An Essay on Law in an
Information Society, 26 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L 5,20 (2000).
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IV. THE CONFLICTING LEGAL REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO DIGITAL SIGNA-
TURES AND CONTRACTS
In almost every jurisdiction, legislatures are enacting laws regarding the
use and regulation of digital signatures. The enactment of these laws will lead
to confusion and complications in the use of digital signatures at the interna-
tional level. Supporters of the enactment of international regulations for digital
signatures assert that such regulations will provide certainty and guidance, thus
promoting e-commerce and eliminating conflicting laws.41 In contrast,
opponents argue that the enactment of such laws would bring about burdensome
regulations that would inhibit e-commerce transactions.42
The main purpose of digital signature legislation is to give equal legal
effect to digital signatures as to handwritten signatures. 3 The ability to bind
parties to contracts and agreements online in much the same way as handwritten
signatures is the greatest strength of the digital signature." The differences
among the laws of different jurisdictions pose a problem for use and acceptance
of the technology at the international level.4" Some jurisdictions have laws,
either enacted or proposed, which require that the states be significantly
involved in the regulation of digital signatures." Other jurisdictions have
enacted more lenient, flexible standards.47 Although some jurisdictions may
have similar laws enacted, the manner in which the courts interpret and apply
those laws could be significantly inconsistent." Additionally, the absence of
regulations in other jurisdictions also poses a problem. The jurisdiction of the
courts and revenue, regulatory, and government authorities of a country are
usually confined to the physical boundaries of that country.49 Currently, it is
not clear when one country has the authority to assert jurisdiction over an
Internet user located in another country." The use of digital signatures and the
Internet dispel the idea that the jurisdiction of a country stops at the country's
borders because they allow people to interact with one another while in
41. Thomas, supra note 9, at 1044, relying on Ira H. Parker, Why Digital Signatrues Matter, 1
ELEC. BANKINGL & COM. REP. Z (1997).
42. Id.
43. Supra note 1.
44. Kalama M. Lui-Kwan, Digital signatures: Recent Developments in Digital Signature
Legislation and Electronic Commerce, 14 BERKEY TECH. LJ. 463,468 (1999).
45. See id.
46. Thomas, supra note 9, at 1006, relying on Kimberly B. Kiefer, Developments Abroad May
Influence U.S. Policy on Electronic Banking, 17 No. 4 BANKING POL'Y REP. 1, 8 (1998).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1007.
49. Peter Steyn, Tech Werks (Technology Law News) available at http:llwww.mbendi.co.zal
werksmns/techwks3.htm (last updated Jul. 21, 1998).
50. Id.
different countries.5 This poses the question: how does one determine what
laws guide international transactions over the Internet?
Generally, the location of a transaction, location of performance, and the
location of an effect are used to determine what law applies to international
transactions.52 However, these elements are virtually irrelevant because of the
fact that physical location in e-commerce has minute importance.53 It is
presently unclear exactly how to determine what laws the user will be subjected
to when conducting transactions over the Internet through the use of digital
signatures. For example, in Taiwan, the law provides that in the case of
Internet transactions, the laws of the country in which the offer of a contract
originated should govern the contract.' However, it is not always clear when
an offer is made, and who actually made the offer. Additionally, the law in
Taiwan grants only limited recognition to acts of persons twenty-years and
younger." This is different from the United States, in which the age of majority
is eighteen-years of age. These differences create a problem for not only a
Certification Authority, but also for anyone in an area outside of Taiwan, in
which the age of majority is less than twenty-years old.
First, a Certification Authority would be required to know all of the laws
of majority in every jurisdiction in which it wishes to conduct business. This
is not only time consuming, but also quite costly. Second, suppose a citizen of
the United States accepts an offer through the use of a digital signature from a
nineteen-year-old in Taiwan. The law of Taiwan requires the nineteen-year-old
to have a legal representative act for him or her, or else the contract is
unenforceable.5' In this situation, where the offer originated in Taiwan, the law
of Taiwan would be binding on the contract. Thus, the contract will be
unenforceable and the Certificate Authority would not be liable because, in this
situation, the Certificate Authority only issued a digital signature to the United
States citizen, and would not be responsible for the inability of the nineteen-
year old to fulfill the terms of the contract. Suppose that the legal representa-
tive of the nineteen-year old acquired a digital signature for the nineteen-year
old, but did not act on behalf of him or her or approve the contract. The
problem is that the digital signature was acquired from the Certificate Authority
and issued by them rightfully to the legal representative. However, the minor
used it without the approval of the representative. Who would be liable in this
51. I.ui-Kwan, supra note 44, at 468.
52. Nimmer, supra note 40, at 19.
53. Id.
54. George C.C. Chen, A Cyberspace Perspective on Governance, Standards, and Control:
Electronic Commerce on the Internet: Legal Developments in Taiwan, 16 J. MARSHALL . COMPUTER &
INFO. L. 77, 89 (1997).
55. Id. at 82.
56. Id.
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instance? There is no clear answer to this question. It appears that to some
extent, the Certificate Authority could be held liable. However, one way in
which the Certificate Authority could limit its liability in this instance is to
provide a limitation on the use of the digital signature. The limitation could
contain a notice that the representative must first approve the use of the digital
signature. This would put the other party on notice that the nineteen-year old
is not able to act on his or her own.
These variations of laws in different jurisdictions will cause a reluctance
to use digital signatures in the formation of contracts on an international level.
One possible solution to this problem is through a choice of law clause in the
agreement. If the parties can select the law that will govern their agreement,
and be confident that the courts will uphold their choice, the transaction costs
will decline.5" For example, if a Certificate Authority can include a choice of
law provision stating that it will abide by the rules of the United States, this
could eliminate the need to know the laws of all of the other jurisdictions in
which its certificates will be used. Although a choice of law provision can be
a tool to limit liability, this does not solve the Certificate Authority's problem
of fulfilling all the requirements necessary to issue a valid certificate in the
different jurisdictions.
Although one can acquire some protection by specifying which country's
law will govern the contract, a country may still assume jurisdiction when the
interests of a citizen or the country are affected.5" One instance is the
mandatory rule of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), which states that the
laws of the country in which an online merchant is established will regulate the
online merchant.59 Some jurisdictions have rules that are mandatory and can
not be contracted around through the use of a choice of law provision.' In
contrast, under European laws, those engaged in commercial transactions are
allowed to agree to what laws will govern their contract.61 However, in Europe,
choice of law clauses in consumer agreements are invalid and the law of the
consumer's residence or the place of the transaction will govern these
agreements. Although there is the possibility of using a choice of law clause,
it is still necessary to have some grasp of the laws in the jurisdiction in which
agreements are made. It is important to know if there are any laws or rules that
cannot be circumvented through the use of choice of law provisions.
57. Maureen A. O'Rourke, Progressing Towards a Uniform Commercial Code for Electronic
Commerce or Racing Towards Nonuniformity?, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L. 635,654 (1999).
58. Steyn, supra note 49.
59. O'Rourke, supra note 57, at 654, relying on Mathew S. Yeo & Marco Berfiri, Conflict Looms
Over Choice of Law in Internet Transactions, ELECTRONIC COM. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 4, at 87 (1999).
60. Id., (quoting U.C.C. 2B-107(a) (Dec. 1998 Draft).
61. Nimmer, supra note 40, at 22.
Lester
In the face of conflicting laws governing to the use digital signatures, the
various jurisdictions should recognize and enforce the choice of law provisions
of an electronic transaction.62 The only instance in which a government should
be reluctant to, or refuse to not enforce such an agreement is to prevent abuses
or to protect public policy.63 However, absent these instances, a choice of law
provision designating that a particular state should govern the contract should
be recognized and enforced."
It is clear that there is a need for international harmonization of the laws
and rules that govern the use digital signatures. However, the lack of consensus
regarding the various elements of the rules and requirements of digital
signatures will prove to be a significant obstacle in the creation of international
standards.6" There are various suggestions for ways to go about creating
uniform legislation for the use of digital signatures in cyberspace. The ideal
digital signature legislation would encourage the development of electronic
commerce by addressing the needs of companies, as well as protecting the
privacy of consumers who engage in online transactions."
The United Nations has agreed that the uniform rules of digital signatures
should deal with the issues of 1) the legal basis of the certification process; 2)
applicability of the certification process; 3) how risks and liabilities should be
allocated among users, providers and third parties; 4) use of registries for
certification; and 5) incorporation. 67
With these issues in mind, the United Nations Commission on Interna-
tional Trade Law Working Group on Electronic Commerce (UNCITRAL)
drafted the UNC1TRAL Uniform Rules on Electronic Signatures.6 Although
the work of UNCITRAL has proven to be extremely beneficial when drafting
national digital signature legislation, governments are not obligated to follow
UNCITRAL. 69 The UNC1TRAL rules could possibly evolve into the basis for
international harmonization for the use of digital signatures. However, these
rules, if enacted, would only be enforceable on its signatories. It is highly
unlikely that all jurisdictions will be signatories to these rules. Because digital
signature legislation is such a new area, it is possible that it may take some time
and persuasion for countries to be comfortable enough to agree to the
legislation set up by UNCITRAL.
62. Id. at 21.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Digital Signature, supra note 21.
66. LuiKwan, supra note 44, at 477.
67. Supra note 8, Relying on Official Records of the General Assembly, 50th Sess., Supp. no. 17
(A/5 1/17), paras. 380-383.
68. See generally id.
69. Digital Signature, supra note 21.
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Another approach to legislation is the "admiral" approach.70 "The Internet
can be analogized to the high seas: 'Just as the territory a ship traverses is not
subject to any one state's exclusive jurisdiction, so too the user in cyberspace
traverses a sovereignless region that is not subject to any state's exclusive
jurisdiction." 7 Following this approach, the location of the physical jurisdic-
tion of the access provider would decide choice of law on the Internet. 2
Unfortunately, this is not helpful if the parties have different service
providers. 3 The physical jurisdiction in which the Certificate Authority is
located could govern the contract. By following this approach, not only would
the governing jurisdiction be clear, but the transaction costs could be reduced.
For example, suppose a citizen of the United States wanted to contract
with a citizen of Italy. Both parties obtain a digital signature for this transaction
from a Certificate Authority in European Union. There are clearly three
different nations involved in this example. By using the "admiralty" approach,
the jurisdiction of the Certificate Authority would govern the contract.74 There
are several advantages to this way of deciding what jurisdiction will govern.
First, the Certificate Authority would only be required to know the laws of the
jurisdiction in which it is physically located. This eliminates the cost of the
Certificate Authority to know the laws of every jurisdiction in which it has
customers. By cutting the cost to the Certificate Authority, the costs to the
consumer are also reduced. Second, the consumers will clearly know what
jurisdiction will govern. This gives the consumer the option of finding a
Certificate Authority in the jurisdiction in which they want the terms of the
contract to govern. Last, the rules that govern the agreement can be easily
ascertained. The Certificate Authority should be able to provide the users of
its digital signatures with the terms, conditions, and prevalent law pertaining to
their transaction. This provides an ease of acquiring information regarding the
rules of the jurisdiction in which the Certificate Authority is located.
Unfortunately, this approach has its flaws. A problem would arise if the
parties chose to use different Certificate Authorities located in different
jurisdictions; there would be no clear way to determine jurisdiction. Addition-
ally, it is likely that there will be some Certificate Authorities physically located
in more than one jurisdiction. The Certificate Authority could have several
physical locations, several principal places of business, and could be incorpo-
rated in different jurisdictions. Although this would not create a major problem
70. Henrique de Azevedo Fe raneca, LegalAspectsoflnternetSecurities Transactions, 5 B.U.
J. Sci. & TEcH. L. 4, (1999).
71. Id., quodngMatthew R. Burnstein, Note, Conflicts on the Net: Choice ofLaw in Transnational
Cyberspace, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L 75, 78 n.6. (1999).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See generally id.
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for the Certificate Authority, it could cause some confusion for those consumers
that utilized its digital signatures.
Perhaps the only solution to this dilemma is the enactment of a globally
recognized scheme for digital signatures.75 Such a scheme could supplant
conflicting rules and provide legislation for areas where none exist.76 Adequate
clarity and guidance for the use of digital signatures is needed to promote
growth in international e-commerce transactions." Ideal international
legislation for digital signatures would provide uniform rules and encourage the
development of e-commerce. Any legislation related to digital signatures must
consider that barriers such as border patrols, customs, and oceans are almost
eliminated through electronic commerce. 78 The European Union has suggested
that the legislation for digital signatures should have technology-neutral
standards. 79 In order to allow the movement of goods and services through e-
commerce transactions, conflicting laws regarding digital signatures must be
eliminated.'0 The conflicting laws bring about uncertainty, risk, and an inability
to comply with the rules, not to mention significant costs."' The need to reduce
these costs and provide a harmonization of the laws is what drives the crusade
for uniform international laws. 2
Despite the conflicting laws, some critics argue that the establishment of
uniform international rules regarding digital signatures would not be beneficial.
These critics argue that it would only lead to unnecessary governmental
regulations that would restrict the use of digital signatures.83 Further, the critics
believe that the implementation of such regulations would only stifle the
development and expansion of e-commerce, and that e-commerce should
develop naturally.8" Additionally, they contend that legislation on digital
signatures could possibly distort an infant industry, lock in business models that
are harmful to consumers and hamper further e-commerce developments.85
Critics to uniform digital signature legislation also address the issue of
liability to Certificate Authorities and their consumers. They believe that prior
to the implementation of additional legislation regarding liability, there must be
75. See generally Thomas, supra note 9, (discussing the need for a global regulatory scheme).
76. Nimmer, supra note 40, at 21.
77. Id.
78. Lupton, supra note 2.
79. Id.
80. See id.
81. Nimmer, supra note 40, at 20.
82. Id.
83. See Thomas, supra note 9, at 1007 (discussing the objections raised by those opposed to the
enactment of a global legal framework for the use of digital signatures).
84. Id. at 1053.
85. Id.
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an understanding of the risks and implications associated with the use of digital
signatures. 6 The critics go on to argue that currently, legislation shifts the risk
to the users while protecting the Certification Authorities, which they feel
harms not only the users, but will harm the developers eventually. 7
The main concern of the critics to uniform digital signature legislation
appears to be the possibility of over regulation. This concern rests on the fact
that at this point, policy makers lack knowledge about the technology and its
possible uses because it is such a new area. 8 Additionally, critics argue that the
enactment of internationally recognized regulations will be difficult because
there may be conflicts between the local and state laws, and the proposed
international laws.8" While this is a strong argument, it could also be an
argument in support of the enactment of international regulations, since there
are so many different laws which often conflict with one another. This creates
problems for both the Certificate Authority and their consumers. Another
problem with international legislation is that it generally takes years to
negotiate, draft, and pass.' Although these arguments focus on some important
points, it is clear that there is a need for international legislation of digital
signatures.
V. CONCLUSION
Digital signatures can either prove to be the necessary tool required to help
stimulate the growth of e-commerce, or it can be the beginning of the end of e-
commerce. So far, it appears as if digital signatures are contributing to the
growth and progression of e-commerce by providing a way in which parties can
securely form contracts on the Internet. The new legislation, in most areas of
the world, which gives digital signatures the same legal effect and recognition
as traditional hand-written signatures is another contribution.
Unfortunately, with these great advances in technology comes the
problems associated with the uncertainty of an area in which there is no legal
authority. Consequently, different jurisdictions are approaching the issue in
completely different ways. Laws enacted by the different jurisdictions are
totally different from each other, creating much conflict. These conflicts have
led to different views about what approach should be taken to resolve them.
The conflicts surrounding digital signatures range from how to create a set of
uniform laws to regulate and guide the use of digital signatures on the
86. Id at 1055.
87. Id.
88. Thomas, supra note 9, at 1058, relying on Robert G. Ballen & Thomas A. Fox, Electronic
Banking Products and Services: The New Legal Issues, 115 Banking LJ. 334, 343 (1998).
89. Id.
90. Id.
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international level, to the way in which Certificate Authorities should be
allowed to limit their liability.
To resolve these conflicts, the issue becomes whether there should be an
international global scheme regulating digital signatures."1 While there are
those opposed to the enactment of international regulations, without it, more
problems will arise.'2 There is a need for standard rules regarding the
administration and regulation of Certificate Authorities. Without standards
rules for Certificate Authorities, the laws of the different jurisdictions will
continue to clash, and cause the transaction costs of using digital signatures to
rise. The conflicting laws not only create additional costs for the Certificate
Authorities; but inevitably create additional cost for the consumers.
Additionally, there is the problem with the overall conflict regarding
digital signatures. As previously mentioned, there are several laws in effect in
different jurisdictions which lay the groundwork for digital signatures and e-
commerce. However, these laws tend to conflict with one another. In order for
a party to contract through the use of e-commerce, it is necessary to know the
laws of the country and state in which the other party is located. Although the
parties can provide for a choice of law clause in the contract, there are certain
areas in which these clauses have no legal effect. 93 Thus, a party can become
subject to the laws of another country or state. These situations have the
potential to discourage international use of digital signatures and e-commerce.
While opponents of an international regulation of digital signatures propose that
it will stifle the development and growth of e-commerce, it is obvious that
uncertainty about what laws govern tremendously limits the expansion of e-
commerce.
94
Clearly, the task of developing and enacting global legislation for digital
signatures will take time. However, it is a task that should be undertaken in
order to promote e-commerce's continued growth. The ease of contracting
through the use of digital signatures could lead to a huge expansion in
international trade. Thus, steps must be taken to ensure that consumers can be
certain of their rights and the consequences of their actions when contracting
internationally through e-commerce. Digital signature could be the tool used
to promote the use of e-commerce and international trading to the next level.
But in order for digital signatures to be a successful it must be is clear which
laws govern these types of transactions. The obvious solution is the implemen-
tation of a universal set of general standards which establish the roles and
91. See generally id.
92. Id.
93. See generally Nimmer, supra note 40.
94. See generally Thomas, supra note 9 (discussing the arguments supporting and against a global
scheme for digital signatures).
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liabilities of a Certificate Authority, states clearly the terms and conditions of
the use of digital signatures, and the liability to consumers. Without an
international agreement laying the groundwork for digital signatures, the
various laws in different jurisdictions will further confusion and frustration
with this technology. If this continues, the progression of e-commerce and the
use of digital signatures will come to an abrupt halt.
One proposal is the continuation of the development of the UNCITRAL
Uniform Rules on Electronic Signature.95 This will allow the different
jurisdictions to help in the creation of a set of international uniform rules.
However, the rules must be drafted in a way that will influence the acceptance
of nations. Another proposal is to utilize the framework of rules established by
particular countries, such as the European Union Directive or the Electronic
Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act enacted in the United
States." Following this type of legal framework will provide a general set of
rules that will inform parties of their rights and responsibilities. At the same
time, it would still allow individual jurisdictions the ability to create and
maintain their own specific regulations for the progress and growth of e-
commerce. Either of these proposals will aid in clearing up the confusion
surrounding the use of digital signature internationally. More importantly, they
can provide the legal certainty that is desperately needed to further the growth.
of e-commerce and encourage the use of digital signatures.
95. Draft Guide, supra note 8.
96. See generally supra note 5; see also S. Res. 761, 106th Cong. (2000) (enacted). See generally
Electronic Signatures, supra note 5.
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The State of Kuraca and the Republic of Senhava have submitted their
differences concerning the vaccine trials to the International Court of Justice for
resolution through a Special Agreement, in accordance with Article 40(1) of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice. Both States have accepted the
jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to Article 36(2) of the Statute. The
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women also confer jurisdiction on this Court pursuant
to Article 36(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The State of Kuraca is a large, industrialized country with a developed
economy and an extensive higher education system. It is also a world leader in
biotechnology. The Republic of Senhava is a small, developing country
containing diverse ethnic and language groups, several of which live in total
isolation. Kuraca and Senhava have always maintained normal trading relations
with each other. However, their current relations are strained due to their
disagreement over the Multivector Hepatic Viral Disease ('"HVD") vaccine
trials.
MHVD is a deadly and contagious disease that attacks the human liver,
disrupts the digestive system, and ultimately leads to death within three years.
MHVD can be transmitted through air, water, human bodily fluid, and several
Distinguished Brief
kinds of flies and mosquitoes. MHVD was- unknown to public health
authorities until 1988, and in 1996, the World Health Organization ("WHO")
declared MHVD a worldwide pandemic. A WHO Special Panel on MHVD
found that clean water, sanitation, pest control, and avoiding unsafe sexual
practices are the only reliable defenses against the disease, but it urged that a
vaccine be developed to combat the disease.
Because a vaccine to prevent this deadly and pervasive disease is in
demand, Megaceutical Corp. ("Megaceutical"), a multinational pharmaceutical
company incorporated in Kuraca, began developing a potential MHVD vaccine.
Megaceutical conducted research to find a vaccine, and it later conducted small-
scale tests of various vaccine formulas in Senhava through its subsidiary,
Megaceutical-Senhava, Ltd. ("M-S"). Though Megaceutical is not permitted
to own more than forty-nine percent of M-S under Senhavan law, Megaceutical
retains control over M-S through a shareholder agreement.
In the Phase I (toxicity) vaccine trial conducted by M-S, two of the thirty
Senhavan test subjects developed a debilitating form of asthma. However,
Megaceutical decided to continue the vaccine trials in large populations using
a variation of the original vaccine, Vaccine 078c. M-S procured Senhava's
permission to continue the vaccine trials, at the corporation's expense, in return
for payment of an equivalent of Euros 2,000,000 to the Senhavan Health
Ministry. In return, the Senhavan Health Ministry allowed the trials to target
orphanages, prisons, maternal and child health clinics, and people in outer
island villages. Also, the Senhavan National Police were to transport M-S
personnel supervising the trials.
Megaceutical hired Dr. Maria Yukawa-Lopez to oversee the vaccine
project. Dr. Yukawa-Lopez submitted the Biomedical Research Protocol
("Protocol" or "Research Protocol") to the Kuraca Capital University
Biomedical Ethics Review Board ("Board") for its approval. Though the
Protocol included an "informed consent" form ("Consent Form"), the Board
concluded that the Senhavan test subjects were not adequately protected due to
the vulnerability of the proposed study populations, the small likelihood that
any voluntary consent would actually be fully informed, the use of placebos in
areas where the disease is active, and the absence of a credible biomedical
ethics review board in Senhava. The Board also warned that Kuracan Capital
University physicians and faculty working on these proposed vaccine trials
would risk losing their medical licenses if they proceeded to implement the
Protocol.
The Kuracan Medical Product Regulation Agency ("Agency") hired
George Smith, a citizen of Nemin, to provide on-site reporting and advisory
services to M-S. Senhava agreed to permit George Smith to perform these
services. Smith sent copies of the Research Protocol and Consent Form to the
Agency, along with his recommendation that the vaccine trials be canceled.
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After reviewing Smith's recommendation, documents, and the Board's opinion,
the Agency warned Megaceutical to halt the vaccine trials on "humanitarian"
grounds, according to an industry newsletter.
Citing these developments, Dr. Yukawa-Lopez resigned from the vaccine
project. As a result of her resignation and the Agency's warning, Megaceutical
terminated the project. Subsequently, Senhavan National Police arrested
George Smith for giving the Kuracan Medical Product Regulation Agency the
documents relating to the drug trials. Smith continues to be held without bail,
without being formally charged, and without a trial date scheduled. Kuraca has
demanded Smith be freed. On September 16, 1999, Senhava's Ministry of
Health declared a MHVD public health emergency and ordered M-S to continue
the vaccine trials or face substantial fines and imprisonment of its officers. On
September 22, after refusing to comply with Senhava's orders to continue the
vaccine trials, Senhava closed M-S's offices and continues to levy a fine of
$100,000 per day.
Kuraca maintains that it has jurisdiction to regulate its corporations and
comply with its obligations under international law regarding human rights,
while Senhava maintains that this is a Senhavan domestic health issue and thus
outside of Kuraca's prescriptivej urisdiction. Diplomatic intervention has failed
to resolve this impasse. Kuraca now petitions this Court to resolve the dispute.
Though Senhava objects to this Court's jurisdiction, both parties have agreed
to a jointly-prepared Compromise to expedite proceedings.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I. Whether the International Court of Justice Has Jurisdiction over this
Dispute.
II. Whether Kuraca Has Jurisdiction under International Law to Apply
Kuracan National Health Law 1006 to Megaceutical-senhava.
Im. Whether Kuraca's Laws and Regulations Protecting the Human
Rights of People Involved in Medical Experimentation Comply with its
Obligations under International Law.
IV. Whether Senhava Improperly Imprisoned George Smith for
Performing His Duties for the Kuracan Medical Product Regulation Agency.
V. Whether Senhava Should Pay Compensation for Injuries Caused by
its Breaches of International Law.
SUMMARY OF THE PLEADINGS
I. This Court has jurisdiction over this dispute based on three separate
grounds: 1) the Compromise, 2) Kuraca and Senhava's declarations accepting
this Court's jurisdiction, and 3) pre-existing treaties that confer jurisdiction on
this Court. The dispute is international in scope because human rights would
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be violated if the Research Protocol were implemented, and MVHD is a
worldwide pandemic. Thus, Senhava is divested of any claim that this is a
domestic issue. Further, Nemin is not a necessary party to this dispute, as its
rights will not form the subject-matter of this Court's judgment. In addition, the
multilateral treaty reservation is inapplicable because this case involves treaties
that codify existing customary international law.
HI. Kuraca has jurisdiction under international law to apply the Kuracan
National Health Law to M-S for five reasons. First, Kuraca has jurisdiction
under the subjective territoriality principle because Megaceutical planned the
vaccine trials. Second, Kuraca has jurisdiction under the universality principle
to protect the human rights of the Research Protocol test subjects. Third,
Kuraca has jurisdiction under the nationality principle because Megaceutical
is a national of Kuraca. Fourth, the extraterritorial application of the Kuracan
National Health Law is reasonable, in that a Kuracan corporation controls the
vaccine trials, and the human rights that would be violated in these vaccine
trials are of international concern. Fifth, the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties allows Kuraca to suspend the Treaty of Amity and Commerce and thus
apply its health law to Senhava because Senhava breached the treaty first by
closing M-S's offices, threatening its officers, and fining the company.
Mll. International law prohibits the Research Protocol for three reasons.
First, human rights treaties to which both Senhava and Kuraca are parties
prohibit the Research Protocol because it endangers and exploits vulnerable
Senhavans without their free and informed consent, thereby undermining the
treaties' guarantees of human dignity and integrity. Second, the Research
Protocol specifically violates the Convention on Human Rights and
Biomedicine ("CHRB") because it does not ensure the free and informed
consent of the targeted populations and because it does not provide for a
Senhavan ethics review board. Third, the Research Protocol violates customary
international law and customary international human rights law because it
subjects the targeted Senhavans to medical experimentation without their free
and informed consent, and it does not require an ethics review board.
rV. Kuraca has authority to object to the unlawful imprisonment of
George Smith, a citizen of the Republic of Nemin, pursuant to Kuraca's interest
in Smith as its agent. Senhava violates Articles 9 and 10 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights by arbitrarily arresting Smith and holding him
without bail, without presenting formal charges, and without setting a trial date.
V. Customary international law dictates that Senhava should pay
compensation for all damages resulting from its breaches of the Treaty of Amity
and Commerce, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, the Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and the Convention
on the Rights of the Child. Further, Senhava should return the payment of
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Euros 2,000,000 previously advanced by Megaceutical, pay for all damages
resulting from the closing of M-S, and cease all conduct from which the
breaches arise.
PLEADINGS AND AUTHORITIES
I. THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE HAS
JURISDICTION OVER TIs DISPUTE
This Court has jurisdiction based on the declarations of Kuraca and
Senhava accepting this Court's compulsoryj urisdiction,' the Compromise,2 and
treaties which directly confer jurisdiction on this Court Senhava asserts that
this Court lacks jurisdiction because: 1) The dispute exclusively concerns
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of Senhava, as
determined by Senhava; and 2) the Republic of Nemin is not a party to the case.
However, norms of international law do not support Senhava's objections to
this Court's jurisdiction, regardless of which basis for jurisdiction the
objections are applied.
A. Senhava's Domestic Jurisdiction Objection does not Divest this Court
of Jurisdiction
In an apparent attempt to reciprocally assert Kuraca's domestic jurisdiction
reservation, Senhava urges that the issues in this case "are purely internal to
Senhava"4 and attempts to take advantage of the subjective clause of Kuraca's
reservation.5 However, whether Senhava asserts its domestic jurisdiction
objection through the doctrine of reciprocity or through its own "reservations"
to the Compromise, the objection is not supported by international law.
1. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 36, para. 2, 59 Stat. 1055,
T.S. 993 [hereinafter I.CJ. Statute].
2. See I.CJ. Statute, supra note 1, art. 36, para. 1. See also J. G. Merrills, The Optional Clause
Revisited, 64 BRrr. Y.B. INTL L 197, 198 (1993); SHABTMi ROSENNF, THE LAw AND PACICE OF THE
INmTE-ATIONAL CouRT 333,370 (2d ed. 1985); RENATASZAFARZ, THE COMPULSORY JURISDICION OFTHE
IMRNATIONAL COURT OF Jusnca 6-7 (1993).
3. See LCJ. Statute, supra note 1, art. 36, para. 1. See, e.g., Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, art 30,
para. 1, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 121 [hereinafter CAT]; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979, art. 29, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, 34
[hereinafter CEDAW]; see also discussion infra Part 111.B.1.
4. Comp. Issues/Claims p. 13.
5. See Comp. & 34.
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1. The Dispute is International in Scope
The scope of the disagreement between Kuraca and Senhava is essentially
international for two reasons: 1) The facts underlying this dispute are
international in character; and 2) even if the dispute is domestic, Senhava's
participation in multilateral treaties has elevated the dispute to an international
realm. First, the facts have international implications. Because the WHO
declared MHVD a worldwide pandemic,6 concerns about the disease transcend
the borders of Senhava. The ease of MHVD's transmission7 demonstrates that
the pandemic is not localized to Senhava and that it requires an international
response. Moreover, this dispute ultimately turns on the international law of
human rights. As questions of human rights in the medical experimentation
context hold a significant position in international law,8 this case is properly
characterized as essentially international in nature.
Second, to the extent that Megaceutical's vaccine trials may be domestic
in nature, Senhava has elevated that domestic subject matter to an international
level by its assent to treaties implicated by the trials. The "theory of relativity"
accords international status to issues otherwise domestic when a country enters
into an international agreement concerning those same issues.9 Because this
Court must interpret treaties to which Senhava is a party or has signed,"0 the
dispute is plainly international.
2. Senhava should not be Permitted to Subjectively Determine whether this
Dispute is Essentially Domestic in Nature
Senhava should not be permitted to determine this Court's jurisdiction
because: 1) the subjective clause is invalid; and 2) Senhava waived its ability
to rely on the subjective clause.
a. The Subjective Clause is Invalid
Senhava should not be able to assert the subjective clause, reciprocally or
through its own reservation contained in the Compromise, because it is invalid.
According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties ("Vienna
6. See id. & 6.
7. See id. & 5.
8. See generally Frncesco Francioni, An International Bill of Rights: Why it Matters, How it Can
Be Used, 32 TEX. IN'L LJ. 471,481 (1997); see also discussion infra Part IM.A.
9. See Certain Norwegian Loans (Pr. v. Nor.), 1957 LC.J. 9, 23-25; Interhandel (Switz. v. U.S.),
1950 I.CJ. 6, 24 (Mar. 21); Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania, 1950
LCJ. 65, 70-71 (Mar. 30); Advisory Opinion No. 4, Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco
(French Zone) on November 8, 1921, 1923 P.C.LJ. (ser. B) No. 4, at 24.
10. See infra Part 11.B..
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Convention"), the subjective clause is prohibited by the Statute of the
International Court of Justice ("Statute") and therefore is void. The Statute
requires that "in the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction,
the matter shall be settled by a decision of the Court."" The United Nations
Charter and the Statute support the above mandate by declaring that this Court
"shall function in accordance with the . . . Statute."' 2 Accordingly, the
reservation is void under the Vienna Convention, which clearly states that a
state may formulate a reservation "unless the reservation is prohibited by the
treaty."' 3  Furthermore, since the Vienna Convention codified customary
international law regarding reservations, 4 the clause is also invalid under
customary international law.
The invalidity of the subjective clause of Kuraca's reservation does not
invalidate Kuraca's entire declaration. The Vienna Convention permits an
invalid clause to be separated from a treaty where: 1) The separation does not
interfere with the application of the remainder of the treaty; 2) the voided clause
was not an essential basis for the acceptance of the other parties to the treaty;
and 3) the continued performance of the treaty would not be unjust. 5 The
elements are easily satisfied: 1) The declaration will function as if the invalid
clause never existed; 2) as other states chose not to make the same reservation
to their declarations, it may be inferred that no state would have based its
acceptance on Kuraca's subjective clause; and 3) the continued utilization of
the optional clause is not unjust, as the result is equally binding on all parties
that have submitted declarations. However, even if Kuraca's declaration were
deemed invalid, the Compromise 6 and the treaties 7 provide a second and a
third basis for jurisdiction.
b. Senhava Waived the Ability to Assert the Subjective Clause
The Compromise acknowledges this Court's ability to determine its own
jurisdiction in three instances. 8 In agreeing to submit this dispute to this Court,
Kuraca detrimentally relied on the Senhavan assertions that this Court had the
ability to determine its own jurisdiction to the extent that Kuraca by-passed
It. I.C.J. Statute, supra note 1, art. 36, para. 6 (emphasis added).
12. U.N. CHARTER art. 92; I.C.J. Statute, supra note 1, art. 1.
13. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art. 19, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 336-37 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. See also Certain Norwegian Loans 1957 I.C.J. at
43-49 (separate opinion of Judge Lauterpacht); SZARARZ, supra note 2, at 54.
14. See James Crawford, The Legal Effect of Automatic Reservations to the Jurisdiction of the
International Court, 50 BRrr. Y.B. INTLL 63,79 (1981).
15. Vienna Convention, supra note 13, art. 44, para. 3,1155 U.N.T.S. at 343.
16. See supra note 2.
17. See supra note 3.
18. See Comp. preamble & art. 1.
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alternative methods of dispute resolution, such as the arbitration provisions
mandated by treaties implicated in this dispute. 9 Accordingly, Senhava should
be estopped from denying this Court the ability to determine its own jurisdic-
tion.2°
3. If Senhava is Permitted to Determine the Character of this Dispute, then
the Duty of Good Faith Prevents Senhava from Characterizing this Dispute
as Essentially Domestic
The Vienna Convention2 and general principles of international law22
require treaties to be performed in good faith. Indeed, this Court explained that
"[i]n the establishment of this [network of reservations] which constitutes the
Optional-Clause system, the principle of good faith plays an important role. 23
The decidedly international character of this dispute and the theory of
relativity' preclude a good faith characterization of this dispute as essentially
domestic.
B. Nemin's Absence does not Divest this Court of Jurisdiction
Senhava's argument that this Court lacks jurisdiction due to Nemin's
absence implicates two issues of international law: 1) the application of the
necessary party doctrine and 2) the application of the multilateral treaty
reservation, either reciprocally through Kuraca's declaration or through the
Compromise. Neither implication divests this Court of jurisdiction.
1. The Necessary Party Doctrine is not Applicable in this Case
The necessary party doctrine applies in cases where an absent state's rights
would "constitute the very subject matter of' this Court's judgment.' In other
words, the doctrine applies when the absent state's rights form the "basis" for
the judgment, and not simply where the Court's judgment "might well have
implications" for the absent state's rights.26
19. See CAT, supra note 3, art. 3, para. 1, 1465 U.N.T.S. at 121; CEDAW, supra note 3, art. 29,
para. 1, 1249 U.N.T.S. at 34.
20. See Tle Territorial Dispute (Libya/Chad), 1994 I.C.J. 6 (Feb. 3) (separate opinion of Judge
Ajibola).
21. Vienna Convention. supra note 13, art. 26, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 339.
22. See J.F. O'CONNER, GOOD FAITH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 98 (1991).
23. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392,
418 (Nov. 26).
24. See discussion supra Part I.A.1.
25. East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90, 105 (June 30).
26. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 105.
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Nemin has two peripheral connections to this dispute: 1) its national,
George Smith, has been unlawfully imprisoned by Senhava;2 7 and 2) Nemin is
a party to several multilateral treaties to be interpreted by this Court.' These
insubstantial connections cannot form the basis for this Court's judgment.
First, Nemin's rights vis-k-vis George Smith will remain unchanged since his
nationality is not at issue here. While a judgment of this Court will indeed
affect the rights of George Smith, the rights of Nemin are not implicated.
Second, although Nemin is a party to several multilateral treaties that this Court
must construe, Nemin's rights will not be affected because a decision of the
Court "has no binding force except between the parties" to the case.2 Thus,
Nemin's meager connections do not form the basis of the dispute.
2. The Multilateral Treaty Reservation is not Applicable in this Case
The multilateral treaty reservation protects states such as Kuraca from
having the terms of a treaty construed with regard to itself, while other parties
to the same treaty are able to assert the non-binding nature of any judgment of
this Court as a defense for non-compliance with the Court's construction of a
treaty.3 This Court has explained that there is no danger of prejudice to parties
of a case or to absent parties when the Court merely construes customary
international law codified in multilateral treaties.3 Thus, this reservation is
inapplicable as the treaties at issue are codifications of customary international
law. 32
II. KURACA HAS JURISDICTION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW TO APPLY
KURACAN NATIONAL HEALTH LAW 1006 TO MEGACEUTICAL-SENHAVA
Despite the fact that Senhava bears the burden for proving that the
extraterritorial application of the Kuracan National Health Law ("Health Law")
is illegal,33 Kuraca advances three independent bases of jurisdiction for its
extraterritorial application of the law: 1) the subjective territoriality principle,
2) the universality principle, and 3) the nationality principle. Kuraca's
application of its law under these bases is reasonable. Furthermore, the Treaty
27. See Comp. & 25; Clar. & 9.
28. See Clar. & 8.
29. I.C.J. Statute, supra note 1, art. 59.
30. See STANIMI A. ALEXANDROPOV, RSERVATIONSINUNILATERALDECLARATIONS ACCEPTING
THE COMPULsORY JURISDICION O THE INIERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 112-19 (1995).
31. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 LC.J.
14, 94-96 (June 27).
32. See infra Parts M.A., II1B.3.
33. See S.S. Lotus, 1927 P.C.LJ. (set. A) No. 10, at 18.
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on Amity and Commerce ("TAC") does not affect Kuraca's ability to assert
jurisdiction over M-S.
A. Kuraca has Jurisdiction under the Subjective Territoriality Principle
According to the subjective territoriality principle, Kuraca has jurisdiction
over infractions "commenced within the state, but completed or consummated
abroad."' The vaccine trials regulated by the Health Law fit squarely within
this definition. While the trials were conducted in Senhava through M-S,
planning and substantial research was no doubt done at the company's
headquarters in Kuraca, where its principal laboratories and drug processing
facilities are located.35 Indeed, Megaceutical initiated the idea for the MHVD
vaccine project and hired Dr. Maria Yukawa-Lopez to head the project.36 Most
importantly, Megaceutical controls all of its Senhavan satellite's "small scale"37
operations through a shareholder agreement." Megaceutical's orchestration of
the vaccine trials is also analogous to previous applications of the subjective
territoriality principle where states asserted jurisdiction based on the planning
of, or even a single act of, a fraudulent transaction occurring within its
territory."
B. Kuraca has Jurisdiction under the Universality Principle
The universality principle allows jurisdiction over foreign nationals
"where the circumstances.. . justify the repression of some types of crime as
a matter of international public policy."' International human rights law has
gained such stature that some scholars comment that "the principle of
sovereignty is not necessarily a bar to intervention within another nation's
domestic affairs regarding the protection of international human rights." '
Thus, this Court should permit Kuraca to apply its law extraterritorially under
34. IAN BROWNLEE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 303-04 (511H ED. 1998);
INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE FInqY-Fn'rn CONFERENCE 139 (1972); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OFTIIE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF TIE UNITED STATES § 402 (1987) [hereinafta RESTATEMENT].
35. See Comp. & 9.
36. See id. & 12.
37. Id. &9.
38. See id. & 10.
39. See Libman v. T[e Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 178, 212-13 (Can.); see also Lzasco Data
Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2nd Cir. 1972).
40. See BROWNLE, supra note 34, at 307.
41. William C. Plouffe, Sovereignty in the "New World Order": The Once and Future Position
of the United States, A Merlineseque Task of Quasi-legal Definition, 4TJLSAJ. COMP. & INTLL 49,59-60
(footnote omitted) (1996); see also discussion supra Part LA.1 and discussion infra Part l.A.
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the universality principle in order to prevent further human rights abuses in
Senhava.42
C. Kuraca has Jurisdiction under the Nationality Principle
The nationality principle "is also generally recognized as a basis for
jurisdiction over extra-territorial acts."' 3 Thus, Kuraca should be able to apply
its Health Law to M-S because it is a national of Kuraca.
1. General Principles of International Law Hold that a Subsidiary Corpora-
tion should be Treated as a National of the Country from which its Parent
Corporation Controls it
The nationality of a parent corporation determines the nationality of a
subsidiary corporation in many contexts, especially when the parent controls
the affairs of the subsidiary. Numerous international agreements cite the
controlling parent corporation's nationality as the determining factor," and
various courts have held it determinative of the subsidiary's nationality.45
Furthermore, in an analogous situation, countless courts have based liability of
a parent corporation on its control of a subsidiary.' Thus, given Senhava's
concession that Megaceutical effectively controls M-S,47 the subsidiary is a
national of Kuraca.
42. See infra Part 111.B.3.
43. See BROWNLE, supra note 34, at 306.
44. See, e.g., 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982,
art. 153, para. 2, 1833 U.N.T.S. 33, 455; Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular
Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement Claims by the Government of the United States of America
and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Jan. 19, 1981, art. vii, para. 1, 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep.
9, 11 (1983), 20 I.LM. 223, 232-33 (1981); Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between
States and Nationals of other States, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, art. 25, 575 U.N.T.S. 159, 174;
Draft Convention Concerning Recognition of the Legal Personality of Foreign Companies (Societies),
Associations, and Foundations, opened for signature Oct. 31, 1951, art. II, 40 Revue Critique de Droit
International (Fr.) 724, reprinted in I AM. 1. ComP. L. 277, 277-78 (1952). Cf. Convention Relating to the
Mutual Recognition of Companies and Legal Persons, Feb. 29,1968, art. 3-5, 2 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
5211 (1968).
45. See, e.g., Societe Magnet & Garuz v. X, Cour d'appel de Montpellier, May 3, 1926 [1926], S.
Jur.I1. 75 (Fr.); Daimler Co. v. Continential Tyre & Rubber Co. (Great Britain) Ltd., [1916] 2 App. Cass. 307,
340-41 (H.L.) (Eng.); Societe W. Canadian Collieries v. Vanverts, Tribunal civil de Lille, May 21, 1908,
[1910], D. P. 11. 41 (Fr.).
46. See, e.g., Denty v. SmithKline Corp., 907 F. Supp. 879 (E.D. Pa. 1995); Case 202/85,
Commission Decision of 19 December 1984 relating to a Proceeding Under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty
(Wood Pulp), 1985 O.J. (L 85) 1; Mas Marques v. Digital Equip. Corp., 490 F. Supp. 56,58 (D. Mass. 1980);
Joined Cases 6 & 7/73, Instituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA & Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Commission,
1974 E.C.R. 223; Case 48/69, Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. E.E.C. Commission 1972 E.C.R. 619, 662.
47. See Comp. IN 10, 31.
Distinguished Brief
While section 213 of the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law
of the United States ("Restatement") seems to indicate that a corporation's
nationality should be determined by its state of incorporation," this rule is not
absolute. For example, the comments to section 213 explain that "[a] state
cannot, by requiring a foreign enterprise to incorporate locally, compel the
enterprise to surrender... protection by the state of its parent corporation."'49
Accordingly, as M-S is required under Sehavan law to incorporate in Senhava, °
the Restatement is inapplicable.
2. Barcelona Traction is Inapplicable under the Facts of this Case
In Barcelona Traction, this Court held that a corporation's nationality
should be determined by "the laws of which it is incorporated and in whose
territory it has its registered office.""1 However, the corporation in Barcelona
Traction had free choice in selecting its country of incorporation,52 whereas, M-
S was forced to incorporate in Senhava.53 But most importantly, the corpora-
tion in Barcelona Traction had a "close and permanent connection" with its
state of incorporation,5 4 as opposed to the tenuous ties between M-S and
Senhava.
D. Kuraca's Application of Kuracan National Health Law 1006 is Reason-
able
The Restatement requires any assertion of jurisdiction be "reasonable" in
addition to satisfying one of the traditional grounds for jurisdiction.5 The
reasonableness of Kuraca's extraterritorial assertion of its Health Law is
evident in that: 1) The drug testing has a strong link to Kuraca resulting from
Megaceutical's control of the tests;56 2) the nationality of the individual being
regulated is Kuracan;57 and 3) human rights are a serious national concern
within Kuraca, as well as on an international scale. 8 This is true despite the
48. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 34, § 213.
49. Id. cmt. 3.
50. See Comp. 1 10.
51. Barcelona Traction, Ught, and Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 42 (Feb. 5).
52. See Barcelona Traction, 1970 I.C.J. at 42.
53. See Comp. 10.
54. Barcelona Traction, 1970 I.C.J. at 42.
55. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 34, § 403.
56. SeeComp. t llO, 31.
57. See supra Part B.C.
58. See Kuracan National Health Law, 1006 § 6(aXl); see also discussion supra Parts I.A.1., I.B.
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fact that the reasonableness standard is not binding on Kuraca, as it does not
properly reflect international law.59
E The Treaty of Amity and Commerce does not Prevent Kuraca from
Applying the National Health Law Extraterritorially
Though the TAC states that Kuraca and Senhava submit "themselves to all
laws and regulations applicable to them,' " this does not preclude Kuraca's
extraterritorial application of its law due to Senhava's prior material breach of
the treaty. When the Health Law first affected M-S, the law conflicted with no
Senhavan laws. Only in reaction to the Health Law did the Senhavan
government begin treating M-S as if it was acting illegally. Indeed, Senhava
attempted to force M-S to conduct drug trials via a government order,
threatened its officers with substantial fines and imprisonment, and eventually
shut the company down."' This treatment constitutes material breach of the
treaty in that Senhava did not permit M-S, a Kuracan national, to carry on trade
"upon the same terms as Senhava's nationals are permitted to" in Kuraca.62 It
is reasonable to infer that Senhavan companies operating in Kuraca have been
treated well based on the countries' thirty-two year history of normal trading
relations.63 Thus, the Vienna Convention permits Kuraca to suspend the
treaty's operation and apply its Health Law extraterritorially."
I. KURACA MUST APPLY NATIONAL HEALTH LAW 1006 REGARDING
BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH ON HUMANS TO MEGACEUTICAL AND ITS SUBSID-
IARY BECAUSE IT EMBODIES INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. Human Rights are a Matter of International Concern and are Governed
by International Law
International law protects human rights. Since at least the end of the
Second World War, the international system has transformed from one which
values state sovereignty above all else to one which recognizes that there are
inviolable human rights involving the dignity and integrity of people that no
state may violate.6' The United Nations Charter, a clear indicator of the
59. See David B. Massey, How the American Law Institute Influences Customary Law: The
Reasonableness Requirement of the Restatement of Foreign Relations law, 22 YALE J. INT'L L. 419, 444
(1997).
60. Clar. 10.
61. See Comp. 130.
62. See Car. '110.
63. See id. 12.
64. See Vienna Convention, supra note 13, art. 60, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 346.
65. See Louis Henkin, Human Rights and State "Sovereignty, " 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L 31, 33-
34 (1995/1996).
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international protection afforded to human rights, reaffirms in its preamble
"faith in fundamental human rights [and] in the dignity and worth of the human
person."' Both Senhava and Kuraca are members of the United Nations
("U.N.") and are bound by the provisions of the Charter. Further, the U.N.'s
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which guarantees equality in dignity
and rights,6" embodies customary international law." The Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women ("CEDAW"),69 the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment ("CAT"),7" and the Convention on the Rights of the Child
("CRC"),7 key human rights treaties that guarantee human dignity and to which
Senhava and Kuraca are parties, also embody customary international law.72
B. International Law Prohibits Conducting the MHVD Biomedical
Research Protocol in Senhava
Because the Research Protocol violates multilateral human rights treaties,
customary international law, and customary international human rights law, this
Court should uphold Kuraca's rejection of the MVHD vaccine trials in
Senhava.
1. Treaties to which Senhava and Kuraca are Parties
Prohibit the Research Protocol
The CEDAW, the CAT and the CRC all guarantee human dignity and
integrity.73 Advances in biomedics and life sciences may undermine these
guarantees, thereby invoking the application of these human rights treaties
when conducting human experimentation.74 The World Conference on Human
Rights officially links medical ethics with human rights based on the ways in
66. U.N. CHARTER preamble.
67. U.N. G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
68. See, e.g., Montreal Statement of the Assembly for Human Rights (1968), reprinted in 9 J. INT'L
CoMM. JuRISTS REv. 94 (1968); Declaration of Tehran, Final Act of the International Conference on Human
Rights, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.32/41 (1968), reprinted in UNrrED NATIONS, HuMAN RIGHTS, A COMPILAnON
OF INTERNATIONAL INsrRuMENTs 43 (1988).
69. See CEDAW, supra note 3, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13.
70. See CAT, supra note 3, 1465 U.N.T.S. 113.
71. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, openedfor signature Nov. 20,1989,1577 U.N.T.S.
3 [hereinafter CRC].
72. See supra notes 67, 68.
73. See CEDAW, supra note 3, preamble, 1249 U.N.T.S. at 14; CAT, supra note 3, preamble, 1465
U.N.T.S. at 113; CRC, supra note 7 1, preamble, 1577 U.N.T.S. at 44.
74. See Sonia Le Bris et al., International Bioethics, Human Genetics, and Normativity, 33 HOUS.
L REV. 1363, 1364-65 (1997); Vienna Declaration and Program of Action, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., pt. I,
22d mtg.P1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157.24 (1993), 32 L.LM. 1661, 1667 (1993).
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which ethics and health sciences concern fundamental questions throughout the
world with regard to all humans."' The Research Protocol violates the
guarantee of human dignity and integrity because it does not provide for free
and informed consent, as it targets the most vulnerable populations of
Senhava 6
The Research Protocol also violates specific human rights protections
ensured in the CEDAW, the CAT and the CRC. The CEDAW provides for the
elimination of "all forms of discrimination and... promot[ing] equal rights for
men and women."" Because the Protocol targets women in maternal clinics,
it violates the CEDAW by discriminatorily targeting women in health clinics
to the dangerous Vaccine 078c. The CAT prohibits states from, among other
things, treating people in cruel, inhuman or degrading ways.78 Subjecting
disadvantaged populations to the random risk of suffering from debilitating
asthma is degrading and inhuman- sacrificing their bodily integrity and human
worth without first securing their free and informed consent. The introductory
note to the CRC states that the CRC is intended to encompass the "protection
of children ... against medical experimentation., 79 This language was not
specifically included in the treaty- though clearly within the scopeof it- because
of the "last minute rush" in preparing the final version of the CRC. 0 The
Protocol violates the intent of the CRC because it specifically targets children
in health clinics and orphans."
2. The Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine Prohibits the
Research Protocol
The Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine ("CHRB") reiterates
that human rights protect human dignity. 2 Article 5 declares that "intervention
in the health field may only be carried out after the person concerned has given
free and informed consent to it." 3 Article 16 requires the satisfaction of five
conditions before research may be conducted on humans. One of these
75. See Le Bris et al., supra note 74, at 1364-65; Jean-Louis Baudouin, Reflexions sur les Rapports
de la Bioethique et des Droits Fondamentaux, in EmIQUE ET DROrrs FONDAMENTAUX 147, 149 (Guy
LaFrance ed., 1989).
76. See infra Part M.B.3.c.
77. CEDAW, supra note 3, preamble, 1249 U.N.T.S. at 13.
78. CAT, supra note 3, art. 16, 1465 U.N.T.S at 116.
79. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Introductory Note, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1989/48 (1989),
28 I.LM. 1448,1451 n.22.
80. See id.
81. See Comp. I 15.
82. See Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, opened for signature Apr. 4, 1997,
preamble, 36 LLM. 817. 821 [hereinafter CHRB].
83. Id. art. 5, at 821 (emphasis added).
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conditions restates Article 5, thereby emphasizing its importance. Another
condition is approval of the research project by a "competent body after
independent examination. '84 The Research Protocol violates the voluntary,
informed consent provisions of Articles 5 and 16, and it violates Article 16's
requirement of a competent ethics review board. As discussed in Part Il.B.3.c.,
the targeted research populations are also Senhava's most vulnerable, thereby
undermining the possibility of any voluntary, informed consent. Further,
Senhava has no ethics review board, much less a competent one, and Kuraca's
ethics review board has banned the Research Protocol.
85
Senhava and Kuraca have signed the CHRB, and their ratifications are
pending. 6 Therefore, Article 18 of the Vienna Convention, to which Senhava
and Kuraca are parties, obligates them to "refrain from acts which would defeat
the object and purpose of a treaty" because they have "signed the treaty. 81
Conducting research trials which directly violate specific provisions of the
CHRB and which undermine its preamble's stated purpose of respecting human
dignity would defeat the object and purpose of the CHRB.
3. The Research Protocol Violates Customary International Law and
Customary International Human Rights Law because it does not Ensure
Adequate Informed Consent and because it does not Provide for an Ethics
Review Board
a. There is a Lower Threshold for Establishing Customary International
Human Rights Law, as Opposed to Customary International Law
Generally, to prove the existence of a norm as customary international law,
the norm must be 1) an identifiable state practice and 2) recognized as
obligatory and legally binding.88 In North Sea Continental Shelf, this Court
found that multilateral conventions may generate rules which crystallize
customary international law after meeting certain conditions: 1) the rule must
be of a "norm-creating character such as could be regarded as forming the basis
of a general rule of law;" 2) there must be widespread participation in the
Convention, particularly those states whose interests are specifically affected;
and 3) there must be opinio juris reflected in near uniform State practice,
though "the passage of only a short period of time is not necessarily, or of itself,
a bar to the formation of a new rule of customary international law.
819
84. Id. art. 16, at 822.
85. See Comp. 123.
86. See id. 13.
87. Vienna Convention, supra note 13, art. 18, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 336; see also Comp. 13.
88. See North Sea Continental Shelf (FRG/Den.; FRG/Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3,43-44 (Feb. 20).
89. North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 LC.J. at 41-42. See also SIR IAN SINCLAIR, THE ViENNA
CONVEN11ON ON THE LAW OF TREATiES 22 (1984).
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In the realm of human rights, however, the standard for establishing
customary international law is different. In Military and Paramilitary Activities
in and against Nicaragua, this Court emphasized opinio juris as the crux of
establishing law with regard to protecting humans.' Section 701 of the
Restatement states that "the practice of states that is accepted as building
customary international law of human rights includes some forms of conduct
different from those that build customary international law generally";9 "it is
not based on consent ... it does not honor or accept dissent, and it binds
particular states regardless of their objection."'
b. Customary International Law and Customary International Human
Rights Law Require Voluntary, Informed Consent and a Competent Ethics
Review Board when Conducting Biomedical Research
i. The Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine Embodies Customary
International Law and Customary International Human Rights Law Requir-
ing Informed Consent and an Ethics Review Board
Even if Senhava and Kuraca were not bound to further the object and
purpose of the C-RB,9 it has become part of customary international law
because the provisions of informed consent and an ethics review board do not
include any secondary obligations; in other words, they are internationally
practiced without any additional conditions, thereby fulfilling North Sea
Continental Shelf s first requirement.' Second, there is widespread participa-
tion in the CHRB; twenty-four of the members of the Council of Europe have
signed it, as well as Senhava and Kuraca. Finally, as discussed below, the
CHRB reflects opiniojuris, which independently elevates informed consent and
the requirement of an ethics review board to the status of customary interna-
tional human rights law.
The Explanatory Report to the CHRB states that one of the CHRB's
purposes is to "harmonize existing standards;" 5 it builds on human rights law
that already exists. The CHRB further states that it is consistent with
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights' and the CRC,
90. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14, 98-108 (June 27).
91. RESTATEMENT, supra note 34, § 701 n.2.
92. Henkin, supra note 65, at 38.
93. See discussion supra Part m.B.2.
94. See North Sea Continental Shelf, 19691.C.J. at 41.
95. Explanatory Report to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, authorized Dec. 17
1996, 36 LLM. 826, 827 (emphasis added).
96. Open for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 5.
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treaties which are currently in force and to which Senhava is a party. 97 By
signing the CHRB, Senhava and Kuraca indicated their intent to be bound and
their belief that they should be bound by the CHRB's provisions." As such, the
CHRB constitutes opinio juris.
ii. The Declaration of Helsinki and the Nuremberg Code are Customary
International Human Rights Law Requiring Informed Consent and an Ethics
Review Board
The Nuremberg Code" and the World Medical Association Declaration
of Helsinki" ("Declaration of Helsinki") reflect opiniojuris. The Nuremberg
Code consists of ten principles, articulated in the final judgment of the trial of
Nazi doctors who were indicted for and convicted of crimes against humanity
committed during World War II."' The first principle is: "The voluntary
consent of the human subject is absolutely essential."1°2 The Nuremberg Code
has been described as "[tihe most complete and authoritative statement of the
law of informed consent" and "part of international common law... [which]
may be applied in both civil and criminal cases.""0 3
The Declaration of Helsinki builds on the Nuremberg Code." 4 In addition,
it implements the requirement of an ethics review board."' Both are "widely
known international codes of ethics for the protection of human subjects."' 6
International texts and legislation recognize the Declaration of Helsinki as
international law regarding human experimentation, and medical organizations
97. See CHRB, supra note 82, preamble, 36 I.LM. at 821.
98. See NICARAGUA, 1986 I.CJ. at 98-108; RESTATEMENT, supra note 34, § 701 n.2; Hurst
Hannum, The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and International Law, 25
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 287, 318-20 (199511996); Henkin, supra note 65, at 36-38; THEODOR MERON,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANrAIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY LAW 108-13 (1989).
99. Tribunals of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council
Law No. 10, Vols. I and III (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949), Vol. II, 181
[hereinafter Nuremberg Code].
100. WORLD MEDICALAS TION DE TION OP HELSINKI V, 48th World Medical Assembly,
Somerset, South Africa, 1996 [hereinafter Declaration of Helsinki].
101. See Michael A. Grodin, Historical Origins of the Nuremberg Code, in THENAZI DOCTORS AND
THE NUREMBERG CODE: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION 121, (George J. Annas & Michael
A. Grodin eds., 1992) [hereinafter NAZI DOCTORS].
102. Nuremberg Code, supra note 99.
103. GEORGE J. ANNAS ETAL., INFORMED CONSENT TO HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION 1 (1977); SEE
ALSO 4 ENCYa.OPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 1746-82 (Warren Reich ed., 1978).
104. See Declaration of Helsinki, supra note 100, art. 1.9.
105. See id. art. L2.
106. leana Dominquez-Urban, Harmonization in the Regulation of Pharmaceutical Research and
Human Rights: The Need to Think Globally, 30 CORNELL INT'L L J. 245, 273 (1997).
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accept it internationally."° It has also been cited as constituting the basis of
"universality in the field of ethical-moral standards in human experimenta-
tion. ' 8
The Nuremberg Code and the Declaration of Helsinki are modem
clarifications of medical ethics followed worldwide, necessary because of
advances in medicine heralded with new technology and the internationalization
of disease caused by increased international travel."° Indeed, the Nuremberg
Code has its ethical roots in Percival's code of medical ethics, requiring
researchers to be conscientious and responsible, and in Beaumont's code of
medical ethics, requiring the same, as well as a statement of voluntary,
informed consent. It builds on the Hippocratic oath, which obligates doctors
to, do no harm to their patients." °  More modem manifestations of the
Nuremberg Code and the Declaration of Helsinki include the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which requires voluntary consent,"' the
Principles for Those in Research and Experimentation, which requires informed
consent,1 2 the International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research
Involving Human Subjects, issued by the Council for International Organiza-
tions of Medical Sciences in collaboration with the WHO ("WHO/CIOMS
Guidelines") and requiring informed consent as well as approval of an ethics
review board,"3 and many other international instruments.1
4
107. See Sharon Perley et al., The Nuremberg Code: An International Overview, in NAZDOCrORS,
supra note 101, at 159 (citing M. Cheriff Bassiouni et al., An Appraisal of Human Experimentation in
International Law and Practice: The Need for International Regulation of Human Experimentation, 72 J.
CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 1587,1611 (1981)).
108. Id. at 160 (citing William Curran, Subject Consent Requirements in Clinical Research: An
International Perspective for Industrial and Developing Countries, in HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION AND
MEDICAL ETHICS (Zbigniew Bankowski & Norman Howard-Jones eds., 1982)).
109. See David P. Fidler, The Globalization of Public Health: Emerging Infectious Diseases and
International Relations, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LE.GAL STUD. 11, 14-15 (1997).
110. Grodin, supra note 101, at 124-26.
111. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19,1966, art.
7,999 U.N.T.S. 171,175.
112. Principles for Those in Research and Experimentation, World Medical Assembly, 8th Assembly
(Sept.-Oct 1954), reprinted in Organizational News, 2 WORLD MED. J. 12, 14 (1955).
113. See ThE COUNCIL FOR INTL ORG. OF MED. SCIENCES IN COLLABORATION wIT TIRE WORLD
HEALTH ORG., INTERNATIONAL ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN
SUBJECTS, reprinted in HUMAN EUERMENTATION AND MEDICALETHICS, supra note 108, at 387 [hereinafter
WHO/CIOMS GUIDELINES].
114. See Kevin KingA Proposal for the Effective International Regulation of Biomedical Research
Involving Human Subjects, 34 STAN. J. INT'L L 163, 170-90.
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c. The Research Protocol does not Ensure Voluntary, Informed Consent,
and it does not Provide an Ethics Review Board
The WHO/CIOMS Guidelines define vulnerable populations as those
having "a substantial incapacity to protect [their] own interests owing to such
impediments as lack of capability to give informed consent, lack of alternative
means of obtaining medical care or other expensive necessities, or being a
junior or subordinate member of a hierarchical group.""' The Research
Protocol targets the most vulnerable peoples of Senhava- prisoners, people in
outer island villages, orphans, and women and children in health clinics." 6
These are the people who have the least freedom of choice and who are most
vulnerable to manipulation, particularly when M-S uses the Senhavan police to
"provide transportation" to M-S personnel- truly undermining the possibility of
free consent and constituting coercion and duress.1
7
It is unlikely that prisoners would ever be able to give informed consent
because often they have been confined in isolation for so long or to such an
extent that they are not able to weigh options in a meaningful way, as free
citizens are able to do."' Further, because they are forcibly deprived of their
freedom, they often experience a significant lack of self-esteem and diminished
capacities for decision-making." 9 Prisoners may "consent" to medical research
to escape from the violent atmosphere of most prisons to a more regulated and
protected environment provided through medical experimentation. " They may
simply stop caring about their own well-being- defeated and discouraged by
prison life- and helplessly "consent" to medical experimentation.' 2 ' Further, if
a cure is found for MHVD, with or without the use of prisoners, it is unlikely
that they will be one of the groups to benefit from the use of any such vaccine,
thereby increasing their exploitation. 22
People in outer island villages do not share the same basis of knowledge
and education with populations residing in more developed areas; they are
therefore unable to give informed consent. Traditionally, isolated populations-
especially isolated populations in developing countries like Senhava- lack a
scientific conception of disease and a comprehension of the technical details of
115. WHO/CIOMS GDEUNES, supra note 113, at 11.
116. See Comp. 115.
117. See id.
118. See Simon N. Verdun-Jones et al., Prisoners as Subjects of Biomedical Experimentation:
Examining the Arguments For andAgainsta Total Ban, in REsEARcHONHUMAN SuBiECTS 503,506 (David
N. Weisswb ed., 1998).
119. See id.
120. See id. at 521-22.
121. Id. at 522.
122. Id. at 523.
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proposed research.' The peculiar qualities of remote, isolated villages make
the Protocol's "informed" Consent Form completely inadequate; indeed, it is
a tool for exploitation.
Conducting the Research Protocol on orphans and women and children in
health clinics exploits Senhavans who are in desperate situations and who are
least able to freely decline taking part in trials that are sponsored, promoted and
apparently required by the Senhavan government."2 The Consent Form's
provision allowing a legally responsible person to give consent for a minor is
especially problematic with respect to orphans because Senhava may be the
legally responsible authority that provides consent for such testing.
With respect to all of the vulnerable populations discussed above, there is
a further problem involving the use of placebos. Assuming, arguendo, that the
targeted groups could give informed consent, such consent would cease to be
informed when they are given placebos because the Consent Form does not
mention that placebos may be used." The groups have never consented to the
possibility of ingesting placebos. Naturally, another immediate problem
follows: If the targeted populations believe that they are being treated by a
vaccine, then they may continue to engage in conduct which actually spreads
the disease.
Finally, the Research Protocol does not provide for a biomedical ethics
review board to evaluate the Protocol, thereby violating customary international
law and customary international human rights law.
IV. SENHAVA MUST IMMEDIATELY RELEASE GEORGE SMITH BECAUSE HIS
DETENTION VIOLATES INTERNATIONAL LAW
Because the Republic of Nemin, of which George Smith is a citizen, has
declined to intervene in the case at bar or to otherwise participate in the
proceedings," Kuraca has jurisdiction to demand the immediate release of
Smith from detention- in Senhava. If Kuraca did not assert his claims, Smith
would be left without a remedy. Further, Smith's status as an agent of the
Kuracan Medical Product Regulation Agency creates a bond between Kuraca
and Smith, thereby giving Kuraca an interest in asserting Smith's rights. 27
123. Carel B. ljsselmuiden & Ruth R. Paden, Medical Research and the Principle of Respect for
Persons in Non-Western Cultures, in NAZI DOCTORS, supra note 101, at 286-87.
124. See Comp. 115.
125. See Christian Mormont, Ethical Questions Pertaining to the Use of Placebos, in RESEARCH
ON HUMAN SUBJEC, supra note 118, at 541-42.
126. See Comp. I 11.
127. See J. BiuERLY, TE LAW OF NATIONS 276-87 (6th ed., 1963); see also Comp. I 11.
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Further, Senhava has violated Smith's rights under international law.
Article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which constitutes
customary international law," states that "[e]veryone is entitled in full equality
to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the
determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against
him." Senhavan authorities are holding Smith without bail; they have presented
no formal charges against him; they have not scheduled a trial date.'29
Senhavan authorities arrested Smith for performing duties that Senhava
previously agreed he should perform.' ° Therefore, his subsequent arrest for
performing precisely these duties is also arbitrary, thereby violating Article 9
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
V. SENHAVA SHOULD PAY COMPENSATION FOR INJURIES CAUSED BY ITS
BREACHES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Customary international law dictates that Senhava should remedy its
breaches 3' of the TAC the CEDAW, the CAT, the CRC, and customary
international law.'32 Thus, Senhava should pay compensation for injuries
caused and cease all conduct that resulted in the breaches. Furthermore, a state
may recover for injuries to its nationals, such as Megaceutical, M-S, 33 and the
Kuracan shareholders of M-S." Therefore, Senhava should compensate
Kuraca for Megaceutical's advance payment of Euros 2,000,000 and for all
damages arising from M-S's closing.
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF
For the foregoing reasons, Kuraca respectfully requests this Honorable
Court to assert jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case; find that Kuraca
properly applied its National Health Law 1006 to M-S in compliance with
international law; order the immediate release of George Smith; declare that
Kuraca incurred no liability to Senhava in this matter; and order Senhava to
rescind the order closing the offices of M-S and to return the advance payment
of 2,000,000 Euros to the Senhavan Ministry of Health.
128. See discussion supra Part IlA.
129. See Comp. 25.
130. See id. 11.
131. U.S. Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3,41-42 (May 24);
Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 LC.J. 174, 184 (Apr. 11); Corfu
Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 23-24 (Apr. 9); Chorzow Factory (Germ. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.IJ. (ser.
A)No. 17, at 47.
132. Supra Part III.B.
133. Corfu Channel, 1949 l.C.J. at4.
134. Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15, 50 (July 20).
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Governments of the State of Kuraca and the Republic of Senhava have
recognized as compulsory ipsofacto in relation to any other State accepting the
same obligation, the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in
accordance with Article 36, paragraph 2.
Senhava objects to this Court's jurisdiction on several grounds. It observes
that Kuraca's declaration restricts this Court's jurisdiction by placing two
reservations. Senhava, under the principle of reciprocity, relies on those reser-
vations. Alternatively, Senhava contests the validity of Kuraca's declaration.
Accordingly, Senhava requests that the Court decline jurisdiction.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Kuraca is a developed country with one of the world's leading biotechnol-
ogy industries. It is also a foreign assistance donor country [Compromis, 1 1].
The Republic of Senhava is a developing country relying on agriculture,
primary resources, foreign tourism, and foreign assistance for sustenance. She
is an archipelagic state, thousands of miles from Kuraca, with a population of
approximately three million people of diverse ethnic and language groups,
several of whom live in almost total isolation [id., 2]. Of this number, over
20% are confirmed to be infected with the MHVD disease as compared to
Kuraca's reported cases of a few hundred to date [id., 7].
The MHVD is a highly infectious and deadly disease [id., 4 & 5]. It had
been declared a worldwide pandemic in as early as 1996 despite having its first
symptoms reported only as late as 1988. Biomedical, public health and
pharmaceutical organizations worldwide have tried to contain the disease but
to no avail. A WHO panel reported in 1997 that the only guard against the
disease is natural prevention. They urge scientists to develop a vaccine [id.,
61.
Considering the pervasiveness of the disease, numerous biomedical and
pharmaceutical companies in Kuraca have attempted to develop the vaccine, as
it would be extraordinarily profitable. The two leading companies in the race
for a vaccine are Megaceutical Corporation and K-Biomed Corp [id., 8].
Recently, Megaceutical Corporation has reported great progress in a
vaccine project headed by Dr. Yukawa-Lopez of the Biomedical Faculty of
Kuraca Capital University [id., 12]. Dr. Yukawa Lopez is a Kuracan national
[ca., 1] and a world-leading expert on MHVD [comp., 1 12]. Kuraca Capital
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University is a world-renowned private research institution [id., 121 but
receives funds from the Kuracan Government [cla., 3].
Since 1998, several small-scale tests of various formulas have been
conducted on Senhavans through Megaceutical-Senhava [Comp., 12], a
subsidiary of Megaceutical Corporation incorporated and fully-operated in
Senhava [comp., 9]. Phase I (toxicity) Investigational MHVD 078b research
has been conducted with 93.33% success. In view of this, Magaceutical Corp.
and Dr. Yukawa-Lopez had decided to accelerate research with a safer variant
of 078c. Following this, Phase 11 (efficacy and dose-response ratio studies) and
Phase III (clinical trials in large population) have been planned for proceeding
as soon as practicable [id., 13].
Megaceutical announced that Phase 11 and Phase In trials would be
conducted in Senhava by Megaceutical-Senhava, Ltd., for reasons of cost and
availability of test subjects as well as in view of the prevalence of the disease
in Senhava [id., 14].
In June, 1999, Megaceutical-Senhava Ltd. was granted permission by the
Senhavan Government to conduct Phase II and Phase I of the trials of
Investigational MHVD Vaccine 078c in orphanages, prisons, maternal and child
health clinics and outer island villages. The trials are to be carried out at
Megaceutical-Senhava's expense. Arrangements have been made for the
Senhavan national police to provide transportation to Megaceutical-Senhava
personnel supervising the vaccine trials, which were scheduled to commence
in September 1999 [id., 15].
Neither Megaceutical Corporation nor its subsidiary sought Kuracan
Government funding in the vaccine development project [id., 16].
Pursuant to the Kuracan National Health Law 1006, Dr. Yukawa-Lopez
submitted a copy of the Megaceutical-Senhava research protocol to the Kuraca
Capital University Biomedical Ethics Review Board, among whose seven
members was Dr. Francis Zeaklin, the President of K-Biomed Corporation [id.,
19]. Regrettably, The Board rejected the proposal notwithstanding the
seriousness of the MHVD disease. It also warned that any physician who
worked on it would face the risk of revocation of their medical licenses [id.,
21].
Meanwhile, George Smith, the independent consultant who provided on-
site reporting and advisory services to Kuraca with respect to Megaceutical-
Senhava [id., I 11], sent the proposed study protocol and consent form to the
Kuracan Medical Product Regulation Agency recommending that the trials not
be undertaken [id., 22].
Subsequently, the Administrator of the Kuracan Medical Product
Regulation Agency directed the President of Megaceutical Corporation to stop
the project or else drugs and biologics needed for the project will not be readily
granted [id., 23].
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Because of these developments, Dr. Yukawa-Lopez withdrew from the
project and Megaceutical Corporation directed its subsidiary to terminate it.
Thus on August 10, 1999, Megaceutical-Senhava notified the Senhavan
Ministry of Health that it had halted work [id., 124].
Following this, the Senhavan National Police arrested George Smith for
interfering in Senhavan public health measure by providing documents of the
project to the Kuracan government [id., 25]. Immediately two days later
Senhavan Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a diplomatic note attempting to
resolve Kuraca's extraterritorial application of Kuracan health legislation. The
actions of the Kuracan Administrator of the Medical Product Regulation
Agency amounted to 'a wealthy country's self-indulgence' and 'cultural
imperialism'. In the absence of diplomatic improvement, Senhava was
prepared to proceed with the project without Kuraca's consent [id., 26].
In reply, the Kuracan Ministry of Foreign Affairs demanded that George
Smith be freed [id., 127].
Senhava made a reply explaining the domestic character of George Smith's
detention and the violation of Senhava's sovereignty through the extraterritorial
application of Kuracan health legislation. Kuraca's procurement of the
cessation of the project violated Senhava's sovereign rights and international
human rights law [id., 1 28].
The Kuracan Ministry of Foreign Affairs again cited a list of assertions
and an accusation but offered no explanation to the matter [id., 29].
Having tried and failed diplomatic discussions, Senhava announced
publicly its arrangement to proceed with the trials [id., 30]. However,
Megaceutical Corp. continued to hinder the project through its control of
Megaceutical-Senhava thereby forcing Senhava to shut down the office of
Megaceutical-Senhava and levy substantial fine [id., 1 31]. Senhava's Prime
Minister again attempted diplomatic discussion with the Kuracan ambassador
but to no avail [id., 32]. Consequently, each country recalled its ambassador
and announced a break in diplomatic relations [id., 33].
In late October 1999, an ad hoc group of 12 Nobel Peace laureates
proposed to both Kuraca and Senhava that the dispute be referred to the
International Court of Justice [id., 33].
Hence, Kuraca filed the case before the International Court of Justice with
the willing agreement and co-operation of Senhava, although Senhava
maintains the view that the court does not have jurisdiction over the matter [id.,
35].
Both Senhava and Kuraca have accepted the Court's compulsory
jurisdiction [id., 1 34].
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether the Court's jurisdiction is precluded when the consent of the
parties was negated by Kuraca's Declaration?
2. Whether Megaceutical's action in not continuing with its contemplated
vaccine work is justifiable under international law?
3. Whether Kuraca' s extraterritorial application of laws infringe international
law?
4. Whether Kuraca has standing in the dispute concerning George Smith?
5. Whether Senhava is bound to afford reparation to Kuraca under the
principles of state responsibility?
SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS
The existence of Kuraca' s declaration precludes this court from exercising
its jurisdiction. Kuraca's declaration of acceptance under Art. 36 (2) of the ICJ
Statute is invalid as it is contrary to the object of Art. 36 (6). This Honorable
Court therefore does not have before it a valid declaration of acceptance to take
cognizance of the present dispute. Arguendo the declaration is valid, the
reciprocity of Kuraca' s reservation precludes this Court' sjurisdiction. Senhava
relies on Kuraca's domestic reservation clause and the multilateral treaty
reservation.
Megaceutical's action in not continuing with its contemplated vaccine
work has no justification under international law. There are no conventional
international obligations or customary rules of international law binding on
Senhava with regard to the dispute. Therefore, Senhava has the sovereign right
to determine the level of protection given to human subjects in the vaccine
trials. Even were the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine
applicable, the conduct of the trial complies with its terms.
Kuraca's extra-territorial application of laws infringes international law.
Senhava has the right to prescribe jurisdiction over the MHVD vaccine
program. Any extra-territorial effect of the Kuracan Health Law 1006 is a
breach of customary international law, as such an exercise of jurisdiction is not
founded on any valid basis for jurisdiction.
Kuraca has no standing in the dispute concerning George Smith. George
Smith has not exhausted local remedies. The absence of a breach of an
obligation owed by Senhava to Kuraca prevents Kuraca's standing in this
dispute. No international instruments or rules of customary international law
exist which grant Kuraca standing in this dispute. The treatment of George
Smith by Senhava is in any event warranted due to the significant concerns of
national security and public order.
Kuraca is bound to afford reparation to Senhava under the principles of
state responsibility. A breach of international obligation has been committed
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by Kuraca and therefore it has a duty, under international law, to afford
reparation. This Honorable Court must make a declaratory judgment in favour
of Senhava. Kuraca has a duty to undo all the consequences of the wrongful
act. Arguendo Senhava is not entitled to the above remedies, damages is the
appropriate form of reparation.
PLEADINGS AND AUTHORITIES
I. THE EXISTENCE OF KURACA'S DECLARATION PRECLUDES THIS COURT
FROM EXERCISING ITS COMPULSORY JURISDICTION
Senhava objects to the jurisdiction of the Court, firstly, on the ground that
the Honorable Court does not have before it a valid declaration of acceptance
of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, under Art. 36(2) of this Court's
Statute, to take cognizance of the present application. Secondly, Kuraca's
declaration is invocable reciprocally by Senhava by virtue of Art. 36(2). Thus,
Senhava is entitled to exempt herself from the compulsory jurisdiction of the
Court.
A. Kuraca's Declaration of Acceptance' under Art. 36(2) of this Court's
Statute' is Invalid
States are allowed to enter reservations against this Court's jurisdiction in
their declarations under Art. 36(2), but such reservations must conform to the
'object and purpose' of Art. 36.1 A reservation that attempts to emasculate the
power of this Honorable Court to determine its own jurisdiction as conferred
by Art. 36(6) is contrary to the object of the Article and therefore is invalid.4
Invalidity of the reservation invalidates the entire declaration it qualifies.5
1. Compromis., Annex D. [hereinafter Comp.].
2. Statute of the International Court of Justice, 59 Stat. 1055, IS 993 [hereinafter Statute].
3. Vienna Convention on the Laws of Treaties, Openedfor signature May 2,1969, art. 19,1155
UNTS 331 (hereinafter VCLT]; Certain Norwegian Loans (FT. V. Nor.), 1957 ICJ 9, 65-6 (sep. op. Judge
lauterpacht), Interhandel (Switz. V. US), 1959 ICJ 6, 101-9 (dis. op. Judge Lauterpacht); Advisory Opinion
On The Reservation To The Genocide Case 1951 ICJ 15, 24; D. Ende, Comment, Reaccepting the
Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice: a Proposal for a New United States
Declaration, 61 Wash. LR 1145, 1150 (1986); H. Waldock, Plea of Domestic Jurisdiction Before
International Legal Tribunals, 31 BYBIL 96, 132 (1954); H. Lauterpacht, The British Reservation To The
Optional Clause, 10 Economica 137, 169 (1930).
4. Norwegian Loans supra n. 3, at 9, 43-4, 49-50, 67-8 (sep. op. Judge Lauterpacht), 67-8 (sep.
op. Judge Guerero); tnterhandel,supra n. 3, at 101 (dis. op. Judge Lauterpacht), 54 (sep. op. Judge Spender);
L Hussain, Dissenting and Separate Opinions At The World Court 139, 151-2(1984); D. Ende, supra n. 3,
at 1155; J. Guerrero, La Qualification Unilaterale De La Competence Nationale, in Grundproblems des
Internationalen Rechts 207-12 (D. Constantopoulos, et al eds., 1957).
5. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Gre. V. Turk.), 1978 ICJ 1, 33; Norwegian Loans, supra n. 3,
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Kuraca's declaration contains a reservation that purport to confer to
Kuraca the capacity to determine thejurisdiction of the Court." The reservation
breaches the letter of Art. 36(6) and as such, invalidates Kuraca's entire
declaration. Kuraca cannot thus invoke the Court's authority, as it is without
a valid declaration.
B. Arguendo, the Declaration is Valid, the Reciprocity of Kuraca's Reserva-
tion Precludes this Court's Jurisdiction
Kuraca's automatic reservation precludes from this Court's jurisdiction
any dispute that is essentially within Kuraca's 'domestic jurisdiction as
determined by the Kuracan government. Alternatively, the Court has no
jurisdiction, if the dispute arises under a multilateral treaty, unless all parties
to the treaty affected by the decision are also parties to the case before the
Court.
The reservation is invocable by Senhava through the well-established
principle of reciprocity,7 as pointed out by this Court' and its predecessor,9 and
by various publicists.'0 By allowing Senhava to rely on Kuraca's reservation,
this Court would uphold the principle of sovereign equality, whereby Senhava
would not be subjected to a greater scope of judicial scrutiny than that to
Kuraca.
1. The Court's Jurisdiction is Precluded by Kuraca's Domestic Reservation
Clause
The protection of public health and the regulation of internal commerce
is within the dominion of Senhava's domestic jurisdiction." In making the
determination that the present dispute is essentially within the domain of its
at 43-4; R. Jennings, Recent Cases on Automatic Reservations To The Optional Clause, 7 ICLQ 349, 361
(1958); 1. Hussain, supra n. 4; F. Wilcox, The United States Accepts Compulsory Jurisdcition, 40 AJIL 699
(1946); L Preuss, The International Court of Justice, The Senate, And Matters of Domestic Jurisdiction, 40
AJIL 721 (1946); Ende, supra n. 3, at 1115; J. Crawford, The Legal Effect ofAutomatic Reservations to the
Jurisdiction of the International Court, BYBIL 63, 65 (1979).
6. Crawford, id.
7. Statute, supra n. 2, art. 36(2); Norwegian Loans, supra n. 3; Leo Gross, Bulgaria Invokes the
Connally Amendment, 56 AJIL 357 (1962); Ende, supra n. 3, at 1153, n. 45.
8. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (UK v. Iran), 1952 ICJ 93, 103; Interhandel, supra n. 3, at 23.
9. Phosphates in Morocco, 1938 PCIJ (ser. A/B), no. 74,22; Electricity Company of Sofia, 1933
PCIJ (ser. A/B) no. 77, 81.
10. E. Weiss, Reciprocity And the Optional Clause, in The International Court of Justice At A
Crossroads 83-5 (L. Darnrosh. ed. 1987); S. Rosenne, The Law and Practice at the International Court 386
(1985); L. Gross, Compulsory Jurisdiction Under the Optional Clause: History and Practice, in
International Court of Justice At A Crossroads 83-5 (1987, L Damrosh, ed. 1987).
11. SS Lotus (Fr. V. Turk.) 1927, PCIU (set. A), No. 10.
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domestic jurisdiction, Senhava has adhered to the policy of making the
determination in good faith, 2 although Senhava has no legal obligation to do
SO. " Senhava has acted neither arbitrarily 4 nor against the principle of genuine
understanding." Stripping Senhavan the right to control these matters would
preempt its sovereign right to set its own policies and thus violate the principles
of state sovereignty.'" Refusal of Nemin to intervene in the proceedings
indicates a tacit recognition of the domestic nature of the dispute. 7 As the
determination was made in good faith, it should not be made subject to review
by this Court." Senhava is entitled to exempt itself from the compulsory
jurisdiction of the court. The present dispute determined by Senhava is
essentially within the domain of its national jurisdiction. 9 This Court therefore
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the dispute.
2. Further, the Court's Jurisdiction is also Precluded by the Multilateral
Treaty Reservation
The Court's jurisdiction only exists within the limits for which it has been
accepted.' The multilateral treaty reservation was designed to expressly limit
the extent of the Court's jurisdiction and as such should be allowed to serve its
purpose." Nemin, which is a party to all of the multilateral treaties and
therefore potentially affected by this Court's decision, is not before the Court.
The Court's jurisdiction is therefore precluded by the multilateral treaty
reservation clause in Kuraca's declaration.
12. Norwegian Loans, supra n. 3, at 72 (dis. op. of Judge Basdevant); Guggenheim, Written
Observations, Interhandel (Switz. V US), ICJ Pleadings, 579.
13. Norwegian Loans, supra n. 3, at 52-5 (sep. op. of Judge Lauterpacht), 94-5 (dis. Op. of Judge
Read); Interhandel, supra n. 3, at 58-9 (sep. op. Judge Spender), 111-1114 (dis. op. of Judge Lauterpacht).
14. Norwegian Loans, supra n. 3, at 74-6 (dis. op. of Judge Basdevant), 92-5 (dis. Op. of Judge
Read).
15. Id., at 94-5 (dis. Op. of Judge Read); Interhandel, supra a. 3, at 58ff (sep. op. Judge Spender)
102 (dis. op. of Judge Lauterpacht); R. Jennings, supra, n. 5; J. Crawford, supra n. 5, at 1033.
16. UN Charter, art. 2, para. 7; . Brownije, Principles of Public International Law 719 (4th ed.
1990); Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, (Helsinki Accords) Aug. 1, 1975, rep in 14 ILM
1292; V. Leary, When Does the Implementation of Internaional Human Rights Constitute Interference into
the Essentially Domestic Affirs of a State?.the Interactions of Art. 2(7), 55 and 56 of the UN Charter, in
International Human Rights Law and Practice (James C. Tuttle ed. 1978).
17. Comp., I 11.
18. Norwegian Loans, supra n.3, at 94-95 (dis. op. of Judge Read).
19. Norwegian Loans, id.; J. Crawford, supra n.5, at 11.
20. Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spa. V. Can.), 1988 ICJ 668; East Timor (Port. V. Aust.) 1995 ICJ 268.
21. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua, (Nicar. V. US), 1986 ICJ 14,
98 (dis. op. Judge Schwebel); Congressional Record, 79th Congress, 2nd Sess., Vol. 92, 10618.
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II. MEGACEUTICAL'S ACTION IN NOT CONTINUING WITH ITS CONTEMPLATED
VACCINE WORK HAS No JUSTIFICATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. There are no Conventional International Obligations Binding on
Senhava Pertaining to the Vaccine Trials
The pacta tertiis rule protects non-parties to a treaty from having a treaty
imposed on them.22 Senhava is not a party to the ICPR;' therefore, Senhava is
not bound by its terms. Kuraca may contend that Art. 7 is a 'generally accepted
international law', but the provision is not applicable to this dispute since it is
not the intention of the provision to exclude genuine medical experiments.24
Senhava's signature on the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine
(CHRB) only obligates it to 'refrain from acts calculated to frustrate the objects
of the treaty'.25 The Convention explicitly requires ratification for binding
effect.26 Thus, Senhava's signature to it does not establish Senhava's consent
to be bound by it.27 To bind Senhava without her consent would impose an
illegal limitation upon Senhava's rights as a sovereign state.s
B. There are no Customary Rules of International Law Binding on
Senhava with Regard to this Dispute
1. There is no Consistent State Practice and Opinio Juris Pertaining to the
Level of Protection for Human Subject
Since there is no conventional obligation binding on Senhava with regard
to this dispute, this Court must look to customary international law to determine
the existence of any international obligation. States may become bound by
customary international law if there is evidence of both a common practice
among states as well as state's conviction that this practice is rendered
obligatory by the existence of law requiring it.29 According to actual practice
of states regarding the protection given to human subjects, Kuraca cannot bear
22. VCLT, art. 34, supra n. 3; Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex (Switz. v. FT.),
1932 PCIJ (set. A/B), No 46; M. Shaw, International Law 652 (4th Ed. 1997).
23. Comp., .3.
24. Z. Nedjati, Human Rights Under the European Convention 63 (1978).
25. 1. Brownlie, supra n. 16; 606-7 (3rd. Ed. 1979); see also VCLT, supra n. 3, at art. 18.
26. Convention For The Protection Of Human Rights and Dignity of e Human Being With
Regard To The Application of Biology and Medicine, Openedfor signature Apr. 4, 1997, art. 33, ETS No.
164 [hereinafter CHRB].
27. VCLT, supra n. 3, art. 18; 1. Brownlie, supra n. 16, at 606.
28. Island ofPalmas (US v. Neth.), II RIAA 829(1928): SSLotus, supran. 11.
29. Statute, supra n. 2, art. 38 para I (b); North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 ICJ 41 (Feb. 20);
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, supra n. 21.
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its burden of demonstrating the existence of customary rules of international
law in this area.'
Legal provisions are not frequently invoked as a source of protection for
human subjects in medical experiments, it being widely accepted until today to
be largely based on ethical codes of conduct. They are 'recommendations',
acting as a 'guide'," their observance 'voluntary and not legally enforceable'.32
This factor poses a formidable obstacle to the transformation of the codes into
rules of customary international law.33 This is because 'voluntary guidelines
followed by compromises could not lead to the creation of customary
international law as the [Codes] do not purport to be... law by... states'.'
Efforts at national and international levels in this field have remained
restricted to a particular geographical area or incomplete because of their focus
on a particular topic.35 Adoption of even the ethical codes of conduct is rare in
developing countries.36 There is no legal framework in the United Kingdom
that deals with medical research and experimentation. Instead, there are a
number of non-binding guidelines formulated by a variety of bodies covering
different aspects of this topic.37  Similar situation prevails in many other
countries.3 There is also no legal framework for bio-medical research in
Thailand, the first country in the world to launch a large-scale AIDS vaccine
30. Browulie, supra n. 16, 6-10.
31. World Medical Association, Declaration of Helsinki, recommendations guiding physicians in
bio-medical research involving human subjects, as amended at the 48th WMA 1996.
32. British Medical Association, Medicine Betrayed: The Participation of Doctors in Human
Rights Abuses: Report of a Working Party 12 (19xx).
33. H.W. Baade, The Legal Effects of Codes of Conductfor MNEs in Transnational Corporations:
Codes of Conduct 251 (A. Fatouros ed., 1994).
34. Statement of the Representative of the United States at a Meeting of the OECD Council, July,
1977 reproduced in H.W.Baade, id.; see also U.N.Doc.TDIBIC.6/AC.1/3/, at 2 (19750 (Brazil's reply to
proposed code of conduct on transfer of technology); A.A.Fatouros, On the Implementation of International.
Codes of Conduct. An Analysis of Future Experience, in Transnational Corporations (A. Fatouros, ed.
1994).
35. Explanatory Report to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the
Human Being with Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and
Biomedicine, reprinted (1998) 5 IHRR 266 [hereinafter the Explanatory Report].
36. B. Bloom, The Highest Attainable Standard: Ethical Issues in AIDS Vaccines, 279 Science
186.
37. Royal College of Physicians of London, Research Involving Patients; Medical Research
Council, Responsibility in Investigations on Human Participations and Material and on Personal
Information (1992).
38. Canada: Medical Research Council of Canada, Natural Sciences and Engineering Research
Council of Canada and Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, Code of Ethical
Conduct For Research Involving Human Beings; Greece: Code on Deontology and Code on Practice of
Medicine; San Marino: Charter of Patients' Rights and Duties; Swiss Academy of Medical Sciences
Guidelines; Poland: (1992) Bull Inst. Med. Eth. No. 82, 13.
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trial, as well as many other countries where similar trial are currently being
conducted.39
2. There are no Provisions in the CHRB, which have Risen to the Level of
Customary International Law' °
The Biomedicine Convention only recently entered force. Although time
is not a bar to the absorption of a treaty into customary international law, a few
months hardly allows time for extensive and virtually uniform state practice to
develop.4 Thus, the provisions contained within CHRB are not binding
customary international law.
C. Senhava has the Sovereign Right to Determine the Level of Protection
Given to Human Subjects the Vaccine Trials
In the absence of international rules or principles governing the level of
protection to be given to human subjects, it must follow that these standards are
to be determined solely by reference to Senhava's municipal laws and
regulations, under the principle of state sovereignty.4 2
D. Arguendo the CHRB is Applicable, the Conduct of the Vaccine Trials
Complies with its Terms
Art. 26' of CHRB provide that restriction may be placed on the exercise
of the rights and protective provisions contained in the Convention. The
protection of public health is specifically mentioned as a ground on which a
limitation may validly be imposed." The seriousness of the MHVD disease in
Senhava, as evidenced by the declaration of public health emergency by the
Senhavan government,'5 justifies the restrictions on the rights guaranteed under
the Convention.
39. Thailand: From 'Guinea Pig' Fears to Phase III Trial: An Interview With Nath
Bhamarapravati, International AIDS Vaccine Initiative Report: Newsletter on International AIDS Vaccine
Research, March 1999 <httpi/www.iavi.arg/newpageirepoiLhtml> [hereinafter IAVI]; Uganda: Long Rocky
Path To Africa's First HIV Vaccine Trials: An Interview with Roy Mugerwa, IAVI Sept-Oct 1999; Brazil:
The Ebbs and Flows of AIDS Vaccine Trials: An Interview with Dirceau Greco, IAVI March 1999; Suman
Ragunathan, India Launches AIDS Vaccine Program, IAVI Apr.-June 1999; Conducting AIDS Research in
Kenya: An Interview with Omu Anzak, IAVI Jan.-March 1995.
40. Vienna Convention, supra n. 3, at art. 38.
41. North Sea Continental Shelf, supra n. 29.
42. Lotus, supra n. 11.
43. Supra, n. 26.
44. Supra, para 1, n. 26.
45. Comp., 130.
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The restrictions imposed did not go beyond what is necessary to achieve
the purpose of the derogation. The human subject would have incurred minimal
risk far outweighed by the potential benefits of the research to the international
community." Consent as provided under Art. 5 was to be given expressly,
specifically and documented.47 The human subjects would have been informed
of the purpose, nature, consequences and the risks of the trials.48 The research
project has already been approved by the authority responsible for overseeing
medical practice in Senhava i.e. the Ministry of Health.49 Even were the CHRB
applicable, the conduct of the vaccine trials would have complied with its
terms.
III. KURACA'S EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF LAWS INFRINGES
INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. Senhava has the Right to Prescribe Jurisdiction over the MHVD
Vaccine Programme
Senhava's exertion of jurisdiction on Megaceautical-Senhava accords to
the established principles of international law. Megaceutical-Senhava lies
within the territorial jurisdiction of Senhava-° as it is located in Senhava and all
of her operations are in Senhava.5' Furthermore, Megaceutical-Senhava, as a
company incorporated in Senhava, acquires Senhavan nationality 2 and thus lies
within the national jurisdiction of Senhava."3 Although there is an absence of
legislation regulating medical experiments in Senhava, it does not, of itself
allow Kuraca to step in to apply its own laws extraterritorially to that activity.'
It is for Senhava to decide how far it wishes to legislate with regard to persons
within its jurisdiction.55
46. CHRB, art. 16 para. ii, supra n. 26; Comp. 16, 13.
47. CHRB, art. 16 para. v, Id. n. 26; Comp., '120.
48. CHRB, art. 5, id. n. 26; Comp., id.
49. CHRB, art. 16 para. iii, supra n. 26; Comp. 1 15.
50. Brownfie, supra n. 16; M. Shaw, supra n. 22; G. Schwartzenberger & E. Brown, A Manual of
International Law 72-78 (1976); Schooner Exchange v McFaddon, 11 US (7 Cranch) 116,136 (1812); A.
Lowe, Public International Law And The Conflict Of Laws: The European Response To The United States
Export Administration Regulations 33 ICLQ 517 (1984); Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Ltd,
1970 I0 4 [hereinafter Barcelona Traction].
51. Comp., 17.
52. Barcelona Traction , supra n. 50.
53. Sumitomo Inc. v Avagliano, 456 US 176 (1982); Compagnie Europeene Des Petroles S. A. v
Sensor Nederland B. V.; (Dist. Ct., The Hague), reprinted in 22 I.,M 66 (1983).
54. A. Lowe, The Problems of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Economic Sovereignty and the Search
for a Solution 34 ICLQ 738 (1985).
55. Note No. 187, 25 August 1977, to the US Department of State, rep. in Lowe, Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction: An Annotated Collection of Legal Materials 147 (1983).
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B. Extraterritorial Effects of Health Law 1006 is a Breach of Customary
International Law
Kuraca cannot justify her acts of interference in the domestic matter of
Senhava by actions done within her state. Consequences flowing directly from
the enforcement of Kuraca's law on Megaceutical Corporation are still
considered as the extraterritorial application of the law.' Furthermore, the
direction from Megaceutical to Megaceutical-Senhava is invalid since it is not
made in the best interest of the subsidiary.' The order from Kuraca through
Megaceutical is also nullified by the order of the Senhavan government, as
Megaceutical-Senhava is obliged to obey the command of its sovereign.58
1. Kuraca' s Exercise of Jurisdiction over Megaceutical-Senhava through
Megaceutical Corp. is a Breach of Customary International Law
The burden is on Kuraca to prove that international law permits the
exercise ofjurisdiction over foreign companies based on control.5 9 The United
States' attempt to claim jurisdiction over foreign companies controlled by its
nationals under the Export Administration Act and the Trading with the Enemy
Act was met with severe criticism from states,' municipal courts6' and
publicists.62 Such exercise of jurisdiction is invalid under international law.
56. A. Lowe, supra n. 54; § 418, Comment a, Tentative Draft No. 2 of the Foreign Relations Law
of the United States, 585-587, VoL 1 (1922); A. Lowe, The Problems of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction:
Economic Sovereignty and a Search for a Solution, 34 ICLQ 724, 725; Foreign Relations of the United
States, at586-587, (1922) Vol 1; NoteNo. 187,25 August 1977 to the US Departmentof the State; A. Lowe,
supra n. 55.
57. Fruehauf v. Massardy, ILM, 476.
58. Mann, Further Studies in International Law 46 (1990).
59. Fisheries (UK v. Nor.), 1951ICJ116; Nottebohm (iech. V. Guat.), 1955ICJ4; F. Mann, The
Doctrine of International Jurisdiction, 189 Hag R 35 (1984, 3); 1. Brownlie, supra n. 16, at 307 (1990).
60. European Communities, Comments on the US Regulation Concerning Trade with USSR, rep.
in 21 ILM 851 (1982); European Communities Comments on the Amendments of 22 1982 to the Export
Administration Act, (1982) XX ILM 891; Letter by the Congressional Committee, 13 March 1984, rep. in
A. Lowe &C. Warbrick, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and Extradition, 36 ICLQ 339 (1987); A. Lowe, supra
n. 50, at 515-529; EC aide memoire on 14 March 1983, rep. in A. Lowe, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction 215
(1983); UK Note to the US dated 18 Oct 1982 53 BYBIL 453 (1982); Note No.187, 25 August 1977, to the
US Department of State, supra n. 55; A. Lowe, supra n. 54.
61. Compagnie Europeene Des Petroles S. A. v Sensor Nederland B. V, supra n. 53.
62. Mann, supra n. 50, at 41-2; ExtraterritorialApplication of the Export Administration Act 1979
Under American and International Law, 81 Michigan Law Review, 1318-1336, (1982-83).
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2. Kuraca's Exercise of Jurisdiction is not Founded on any Valid Basis for
Jurisdiction
In order for Kuraca's exercise of jurisdiction to be valid, it must be
founded on at least one of the grounds of prescribing jurisdiction. However,
Kuraca cannot exercise territorial jurisdiction over Megaceutical-Senhava as
it is located and operates in Senhava.'3 Secondly, the nationality principle is
inapplicable as Megaceutical-Senhava is of Senhavan nationality." Thirdly, the
MIHVD vaccine programme will not affect any Kuracan nationals since the
subjects of the experiments are all of Senhavan nationality. Hence, Kuraca
cannot claim jurisdiction based on the passive personality.65 Furthermore,
Kuraca cannot exercise jurisdiction based on the effects doctrine as the trials
will not have any substantial effect on Kuraca." The protective principle is
inapplicable as the conduct of the trials are not prejudicial to the security of
Kuraca.67 Lastly, the MHVD vaccine trials are not a matter within the universal
jurisdiction of all states because they do not constitute any breach of obligations
owed erga omnes." Hence, Kuraca's exercise of extra-territorial jurisdiction
is not founded on any of the universally accepted or even the more controversial
basis of prescribing jurisdiction.69 It is, therefore, a clear breach of interna-
tional law.
63. Proposed text of the Draft Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, art. 56, UNCTC,
United Nations Document E/1990/1994, Annex, at 3-18; L Oppenheim, International Law 286
(H.Lauterpachted., 8th ed., 1955); Schooner Exchange v Mcfaddon, supra n. 50; Sec 402(a), American Law
Institute, Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, § 402(a), (1986) [hereinafter
Third Restatement]; 0. Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice 254 (19xx); L. Henkin,
International Law: Politics and Values, supra n. 16, 424, (1995); M. Whiteman, Digest of International
Law, 183-186 (1965).
64. Barcelona Traction, supra n. 50; 1. Brownlie, supra n. 16, at 380; Compagnie Europeene Des
Petroles S. A. v Sensor Nederland B. V., supra n. 53; Sumitomo Inc. v Avagliano, supra n. 53.
65. M. Shaw, supra n. 22, at 467; L Henkin, supra n. 63, at 239; W. Levi, Contemporary
International Law 145, (1991); Brownlie, supran. 16, at 303; Starke, International Law 210 (I. Shearer ed.,
1994)); 0. Schachter, supra n. 63, at 254.
66. Third Restatement, supra n. 63, § 402(c); M. Shaw, supra n. 22, at 484; L Henkin, supra n.
63, at 241; US v Aluminium Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (1945); Timberlane Lumber Co. v Bank of
America, 549 F.2d 597 (1976); Mannington Mills v Congoleum Corporation, 595 F.2d 1287 (1979).
67. W. Levi, supra n. 65, at 146; M. Shaw, supra n. 22, at 468;1 Brownlie, supra n. 16, at 300; L.
Henkin, supra n. 63, at 238; 0. Schachter, supra n. 63, at 254; Third Restatement, supra n. 63, § 402(3);
Joyce v. DPP, [1946] AC 347.
68. 0. Schachter, id.; W. Levi, supra n. 65, at 147; L Henkin, supra n. 63, at 240; Brownfie, supra
n. 16, at 304; Yunis V. Yunis (1991) 30 ILM 403; Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann (1961) 36 ILR 5
(Dist. Ct. of Jerusalem); L Oppenheim, International Law 420-421 (Jennings ed., 9th ed. 1992).
69. European Communities Comments on the Amendments of 22 1982 to the Export
Administration Act, supra n. 60; A.V. Lowe, Blocking Extraterritorial Jurisdiction-The British Protection
of Trading Interests Act 1980 75 AJIL 257 (1982).
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3. Exercising Jurisdiction through Ownership or Control is against the
Principle of Separate Legal Entity between Parent and Subsidiary
Companies
As laid down in the Barcelona Traction case7° and various municipal
decisions,7 Megaceutical-Senhava is an entity entirely separated from its parent
company, Megaceutical Corporation. Assertingjurisdiction through ownership
or control is a violation of this principle. The treatment of subsidiaries and
parent company as one entity has been rejected by state practice,72 writings of
publicists73 as well as decided cases.74 Furthermore, there is no evidence from
the facts that Megaceutical has exercised any more than policy control to
warrant the piercing of the corporate veil. 5
4. Kuraca's Exercise of Jurisdiction would be Unreasonable
Arguendo Kuraca has a right to prescribe jurisdiction according to the
principle of reasonableness or balance of interest, it should still not exercise as
it is unreasonable for it to do so.76 The unreasonableness occur from the fact
that:
70. Barcelona Traction, supra n. 50.
71. Solomon v. Salomon Co. Ltd [1897] AC 22; Macaura v. Northern Assurance Co. Ltd [19251
AC 619; Foss v. Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461; 67 ER 189; Lee v. Lee's Air Farming Ltd [1961] AC 12.
72. European Communities: Comments on the US Regulations Concerning Trade with the USSR,
supra n. 60; A. Neale, The Antitrust Trust Laws of the United States ofAmerica 365-72 (2nd ed., 1970); Note
174, from the UK Government to the US Department of the State, 4 Sept. 1981; Australian Note to the US
Department of the State 23 May 1983; A. Lowe, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction 214 (1983).
73. P. Blumbergh, Multinational Challenge to Corporation Law: The Searchfora New Corporate
Personality 94 (1993); A. Lowe, supra n. 50, at 528.
74. Sumitomo Inc. v Avagliano, supra n. 53; Sumitomo Shoji America Inc. v Avagliano XXII ILM
629(1982); Fruhauf case ILM 476 (1966); Compagnie Europeene Des Petroles S. A. v Sensor Nederland
B. supra n. 53; Bank of Tokyo Ltd. v Karoon [1981] AC 45; Adams v Cape Industries PLC Ch 433,532-9
[1990].
75. P. Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law, at 327; P. Blumberg, supra n.73, at 94,
n. 73; United States v Watchmakers of Switz Information Centre Inc., 133 F. Supp. 40 (S.D. N.Y.), Cannon
Manufacturing Co v Cudaby Packing Co., 267 US 333, 337 (1925).
76. Third Restatement, §. 403 (1), supra n. 63; Foreign Non-disclosure Laws and Domestic
Discovery Orders in Antitrust Litigation (1979) 88 Yale I.J. 612; In Re Westinghouse Uranium Contracts
Litigation, 563 F. 2d 992 (1977); 1. Brownlie, supra n. 16; Barcelona Traction, supra n. 4, at 150 op. Judge
Fitzmaurice); H. Maier, Jurisdictional Rules in Customary International Law, in Extraterritorial Jurisdcition
in Theory and Practice 72 (1996); Annex 2, OECD Declaration on International Investments and
Multinational Enterprises: 1991 Review,101-120 1992); 0. Schachter, supra n. 63, 258-261; Mann, supra
n. 58, at 12-13; L Henkin, supra n. 63, at 242-246; 1. Brownlie, supra n. 16, at 310; A. Lowe, supra n. 54,
at 740.
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a. The Experiments are within Senhava's Essential Domestic Jurisdiction
International law prohibits Kuraca from exercising jurisdiction over a
matter within another state's essential domestic jurisdiction." Since the
vaccine trials are within Senhava's essential domestic jurisdiction, Kuraca
could not exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over it.
b. Kuraca's Exercise of Jurisdiction would Force Megaceutical-Senhava to
Act against the Laws and Policies of Senhava
Kuraca's exercise of jurisdiction is unreasonable, as it would force
Megaceutical-Senhava to violate the order of the Senhavan Government under
the public health emergency legislation. 8 Moreover, it forces Megaceutical-
Senhava to act against the policy of the Senhavan government to find a cure for
MIvD. 79
c. Kuraca has no Substantial Connection with the Experiments
Customary international law requires that Kuraca has substantial
connection over the trials before it could exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction
over the trials.' Kuraca has to prove more than mere ordinary interest in the
trials to establish substantial connection that justifies its interference in
Senhava's domestic matter.8" Kuraca has no such connection to justify its
assertion of jurisdiction. The experiments are carried out by a Senhavan
company on Senhavan subjects wholly within Senhava's territory. Thus,
Kuraca cannot exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over it.
77. L Brownfie, supra n. 16. at 310; R. Muse, A Public International Law Critique of the
ExtraterritorialJurisdiction ofthe Helms-Burton Act, George Washington JILE 224, (1990); Buck vAttorney
General, [ 19651 Cb 745, 770-2 (per Lord Diplock); British Aide-Memoire to the Commission of European
Communities, 20 Oct 1969, reprinted in British Practice, 58 (1968).
78. Brownfie, supra n. 16, at3 10; Mann, supra n. 58; ThirdRestatement, § 414, Commentd, supra
u. 63, at 272.
79. A. Lowe, supra a. 54, at 738. Societe Internationale v Rogers, 357 US 197 (1958); In Re
Westinghouse Uranium Contracts Litigation 563, supra n. 76.
80. Brownfie, supra n. 16; Mann, id.; Third Restatement, supra n. 63 § 403(2)(a), supra n. 10; F.
Mann, supra a. 58; Jennings, 121 Hag R 515 (1967,11).
81. McDougal H, Codification of Choice of Law 5 Tul. L Rev 114, 131-32 (1980); H. Maier,
Interest Balancing and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction 3 Am. JCL 579, 585 (1983); F. Mann, supra n. 58.
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d. Kuraca's Claim to Jurisdiction Constitutes an Unreasonable Demand of
Special Treatment on Kuracan Nationals
Under the Treaty of Amity and Commerce, 2 Senhava is obliged to treat
a Kuracan national upon the same terms and conditions as its own national.
However, Kuraca's claim to jurisdiction cannot be reconciled with claims of
national treatment of Kuracan investment abroad.83 If Megaceutical-Senhava
is to be subjected to the Kuraca health laws, then the foreign investors in the
Megaceutical-Senhava are not being treated as favorably as nationals, whose
companies, not being subjected to the Kuracan health laws, are not denied the
permission to conduct the trials. Investors of other nationalities in
Megaceutical-Senhava will object to the denial of business opportunities, as
will Senhava, which is concerned about the effects of such constraints on
Megaceutical-Senhava's capacity to act as employer, tax payer and foreign
currency earner.8' Kuraca's claim to jurisdiction would have an adverse effect
on investments by Kuracan company in Senhava. 5
Thus, considering all these factors, Kuraca exercise ofjurisdiction over the
trials would be unreasonable and therefore unlawful under customary
international law.
IV. KURACA HAS No STANDING IN THE DISPUTE CONCERNING GEORGE
SMITH
A. George Smith has not Exhausted Local Remedies
It is an 'important principle of customary international law,' 8 that before
international proceedings are instituted, the various remedies, 'administrative,
arbitral or judicial,' 7 provided by the local state should have been exhausted.8
82. Comp., 13.
83. EC Aide Memoire on 14 March 1983, supra n. 60; A. Lowe, supra n. 50, at 528; Australian
Note to the US Department of States, dated 23 May 1983:
84. A. Lowe, supra, n. 50.
85. EC Aide Memoire on 14 March 1983, supra n. 60; Australian Note to the U.S Department of
States, dated 23 May 1983, supra n. 72.
86. Elettronica Sicula S.p.A., (Italy v. US), 1959 1CJ 15, 42.
87. 1961 Harvard Draft Convention on the International Responsibility of States for Injuries to
Aliens, Draft art. 19,55 AJIL 577 (1961).
88. lLC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, art. 22, ILC's 996ReportGAOR,5lstSess., Supp.
10, 125; Roberto Ago, Sixth Report on State Responsibility, 2 YBlLC 1, 40-1 [1977); Mavrommatis
Palestine Concessions (Gr. V. UK), 1924 PCIJ (ser. A), No. 2, 12; Interhandel, supra n. 3; Ambatielos (Gre.
V. UK) 12 RIAA 83 (1956); Heathrow Airport User Charges Arbitration 102 ILR 215, 277 et seq.; Rules
Regarding International Claims (British Foreign and Commonwealth Office), rule VII, 37 ICLQ 1006 (1988);
D. Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law 617 et seq. (5th ed. 1998); T. Men, Human Rights
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Such a provision also appears in all the international and regional human rights
instruments. 9 This is to enable the particular state to have an opportunity to
redress the wrong that has occurred within its own legal order thereby reducing
the number of international claims that can be brought. By not pre-empting the
operation of their legal system, respect is thus accorded to the sovereignty and
jurisdiction of the foreign state.' Logically, reference to this Court must not
proceed until the highest Senhavan court has ruled on the matter.9 Kuraca has
not sought a remedy in Senhavan courts.
Neither of the two situations where the insistence on the exhaustion of
local remedies is generally excepted; where such exhaustion would be
unreasonably prolonged or where local remedies would be ineffective or
unavailable,92 apply. There is no indication that the Senhavan courts would not
give full regard to customary international principles in reviewing the needs of
George Smith or that the courts would unreasonably prolong such review. If
claims could be brought on behalf of individuals after they assert violation and
before the state responsible had a chance to rectify it, it would tax the
international system as well as proving vexatious. Consequently, the Honorable
Court should hold the dispute concerning George Smith to be inadmissible for
failure of Kuraca to prove that there are no effective remedies to which recourse
can be had.93
B. The Absence of a Breach of an Obligation Owed by Senhava to Kuraca
Prevents Kuraca 's Standing in this Dispute
A state must posses jus standii in order to present a dispute before this
Honorable Court, in accordance with art. 37 of the Court's Statute. Generally,
and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law 171 etseq. (1991); Briggs, Interhandel, The Court's Judgment
of March 21, 1959, On The Preliminary Objections of the United States, 53 AJIL 547, 560-3 (1959).
89. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature, Dec. 16, 1966,
UNGA Res. 2220 (XXI), 21 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49, UN Doc. A/6316 (1967), arts. 41(c), 2
[hereinafter ICCPR]; European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom Opened for
signature, Dec. 16,1966,999 UNTS 3, art. 26 [hereinafter EHR]; African Charter on Human Rights Opened
for signature June 26 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev. 5, art. 50 [hereinafter AFR]; ECOSOC
resolution 1503, UNESCO decision 104 EX/3.3, 1978, para. 14 (IX); AE v. Switzerland,
CAT/C/14/D/24/1995; de Zayas, Moller, Opsahl, Application Of The International Covenant of Civil and
Political Rights Under The Optional Protocol By The Human Rights Committee 28 Ger. YBIL 9, 24 (1985).
90. M. Shaw, supra n. 22; Karl Doehring, Exhaustion of Local Remedies, in I EPIL 137 (R.
Bernhardt ed. 1987).
91. Salem (Egypt v. US) 2 RIAA 1161(1932); Lawless 4 YBECHR 302, 322 (1961); Retimag 4
YBECHR 385,400(1961); Nielsen 4 YBECHR 414, 438 (1959); Electricity Company of Sofia [1939] PCIJ
(ser. A/B) no. 77, 81.
92. Finnish Ships Arbitration (Fin. V. GB) 3 RIAA 1479 (1934); Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway
PCIJ (ser. A/B), no. 78, 18 (1939); Third Restatement, supra n. 63; Whiteman, 5 Digest 82.
93. Norwegian Loans, supra n. 3, 39 (sep. op. by Judge Lauterpacht).
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this requires a state to have a legal interest in the dispute.9 A right to vindicate
an act by another state must derive from either a treaty obligation, an interest
capable of diplomatic protection, or an obligation erga omnes, none of which
are applicable to the present case.
1. No International Instruments Exist which Grant Kuraca Standing
This Court has jurisdiction under art. 36 (1) of it's Statute in all cases
referred to it by parties, regarding all matters specially provided for in the UN
Charter or in treaties or conventions in force. However, no such treaty between
Senhava and Kuraca exists. Although both are members of the UN, Senhava
has not breached any obligations found in the Charter. Without a mutual
instrument setting out Kuraca's legal interest in this dispute, Kuraca has no
standing to art. 36(1).
2. No Rules of Customary International Law Exist which Grant Kuraca
Standing in this Dispute
As Kuraca failed to obtain redress through international instruments, it
must seekjus standii in more general customary international rules. Only an
individual's state of nationality may offer diplomatic protection of that indivi-
dual's interest.95 George Smith has not been conferred Kuracan nationality.
The only exception allowing a state to sue another state on behalf of
persons who are nationals of neither requires the breach of obligatio erga
omnes.' This Court has never based the standing of an otherwise disinterested
state on the enforcement of obligation erga omnes.' Kuraca lacks the
necessary standing, as it has no rights or interests of its own in this dispute that
has been materially affected.9"
94. 0. Schachter, supra n. 63; L Henkin et al., International Law: Cases and Materials 526-30
(2nd ed. 1987).
95. Shaw, supra n. 22, at 563; Harris, supra n. 88; Penevezys-Saldutiskis Railway (Est. V. lth.)
1939 PCIJ, Ser. A/B, No. 76; Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, supra n. 88 at 12; L Oppenheim,
International Law 512 (1992); O' Connell, supra n. 68, at 1032,1033 (1970); Warbrick, UKRulesApplying
to International Claims 37 ICLQ 1006; Sinclair, Nationality of Claims: British Practice 27 BYBIL 125-44
(1950); Van Panhuys, The Role of Nationality and Diplomatic Protection 86 (1959); C. Joseph, Nationality
and Diplomatic Protection 31 (1969); Hurst, Nationality of Claims 7 BYBIL 182 (1969).
96. Barcelona Traction, Ught and Power, supra n. 50; TIbirlway, Law and Procedure of the ICJ
1960-1989 60 BYBIL 4, 92 ff. (1989); Graefarth, Responsibility and Damages Caused 85 Hag R 19, 52
(1984, 2).
97. South West Africa (Eth. V. S. Afr.; Lib. V. S. Afr.)1966 1CJ 4,22; Nuclear Tests (Austl. V. Fr.;
NZ v. Fr.) 1974 ICJ 253, 424; Barcelona Traction, id., at 327; Schachter, supra n. 63, at 208.
98. South West Africa (Eth. V. S. Afr.; Ib. V. S. Afr.) 1962 10 6,104 (dis. op. of Pres. Winiarski),
166 (joint dis. op. Judges Spender and Fitzmaurice) (Dec. 21); Gray, Judicial Remedies in International Law
211-5 (1990).
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Furthermore, erga omnes obligation implies conduct far different from the
facts of this dispute. None of the claims made by Kuraca suggests acts that rise
to the level recognized by this Court in Barcelona Traction' for example
slavery, genocide, etc. Any expanded definition would discourage many states
from accepting this Court's compulsory jurisdiction and would be vulnerable
to abuse by states capriciously seeking political advantage.
In the absence of an erga omnes obligation, there must be a close link
connecting the state attempting to redress for the injury and the allegedly
injured individual."° Kuraca had no connection with George Smith, other than
that he was employed in the Kuracan government regulatory process, much less
one so great that he could be said to have a connection with Kuraca greater than
that with Nemin. °'
The breadth of diplomatic protection must be limited to lessen the chance
of its abuse and to strengthen the boundaries of consent, sovereignty, and
standing defined by principles of customary international law. " An obligation
of some sort owed by Senhava must be found to encroach these principles.
C. Senhava's Treatment of George Smith is Warranted due to Significant
Concerns of National Security and Public Order
No obligation has been breached by Senhava in this dispute. Human rights
documents contain justification for derogation in cases of national security and
maintenance of public order." The threatened state has a sovereign right to
take whatever measures in its territory necessary to ensure the safety of the
community, whenever the safety, security or integrity of a state is threatened."°'
The MHVD epidemic qualifies as an emergency, which if uncontrolled would
threaten Senhava's national security and public order.
The detention of George Smith has not been prolonged considering the
circumstances. When learning that George Smith had been providing vaccine
development documents to the Kuracan Government, Senhavan police detained
him, informing him immediately of the reason for his arrest."° Senhava's
continuous detention is justified, in light of the real danger that George Smith
99. Id. 32; Graefarth, supra n. 96, at 56-7; Meron, supra n. 88, at 5-13; Simma & Alston, The
Sources of Human Rights: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles 12 Aust. YBIL 82, 103.
100. Nottebohm supra n. 59; R. Wallace, International Law; A Student Introduction 170 (1986).
101. Nottebohm, Id., at 24-6; Barcelona Traction, supra n. 50, 42; Leigh, Nationality and
Diplomatic Protection 20 ICLQ 453 (1971); Cordova, 2 YBI.C 42 (1954-1); Third Restatement, supra n.
63.
102. 0. Schachter, supra a. 63, at 208.
103. UDHR, art. 29; EHR, arts. 15, 16, 17. 18; ACR, art. 27; ICPR, art. 4; ECR, art. 4.
104. Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States 298- 300 (1963).
105. Comp., -[25.
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might abscond, that he might repeat the offense for which he is detained and
that he might attempt to suppress evidence prejudicial to him. No restriction
was imposed on his right to have the legality of his detention tested before the
Senhavan courts, a right that he has not availed himself to during his detention.
V. KURACA IS BOUND TO AFFORD REPARATION TO SENHAVA UNDER THE
PRINCIPLES OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY
A. Under International Law, State Responsibility Stems from the Breach of
an International Obligation
In order to establish that a State has committed an internationally wrongful
act, the complaining state must show that the former has breached an interna-
tional obligation and the breach is attributable to it. 1 6 As established earlier,
Kuraca violated international law by promulgating laws and regulations to
operate extraterritorially, and by putting obstacles to the conduct of MHVD
vaccine trials in Senhava. Under international law, the act of an organ of a
State shall be considered as an act of that state, whether the organ belongs to
the constituent, legislative, executive or judicial or other power. Therefore, the
illegal act of ordering that the vaccine work be halted is attributable to Kuraca
although the wrongful act was committed by Its Government official."10
B. Kuraca has a Duty under International Law to Afford Reparation to
Senhava
1. This Honorable Court Must Make a Declaratory Judgment in Favor of
Senhava
It is trite law that declarations are a form of judicial remedy in interna-
tional law.'" In this case, this Honorable Court should declare to the effect that
Kuraca violated international law by promulgating laws and regulations to
operate extraterritorially, violating Senhava's sovereign rights.
2. Kuraca has a Duty to Undo all the Consequences of the Wrongful Act
Since Kuraca has breached her international obligation, the appropriate
form of reparation is the immediate cessation of such activities, restoration of
106. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, Report of the ILC in the work of its Thirty-Second
Session, art. 3, UN Doec. A/35/10 (1981); Amerasinghe, State Responsibilityfor Injuries to Aliens 39(1967);
E. Arechaga, International Responsibility, in Manual of Public International Law 534 (Sorensen ed., 1968).
107. Id.,art 5.
108. SS Lotus, supra n. 11; J. Arechaga, General Course in Public International Law, Hag R 217,
267 (1978, 1); C. Gray, supra n. 98.
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the status quo ante, and undoing of all the consequences of the wrongful act.'O°
Accordingly, Senhava requests that this Honorable Court order that Kuraca
promptly remove all direct and indirect legal and governmental obstacle to the
conduct of the MHVD vaccine trials as proposed in the research protocol that
led to this controversy.
In the alternative, This Honorable Court should order that Kuraca remove
obstacles to the development and trials of MHVD vaccine by Megaceutical-
Senhava, Ltd., a Senhavan corporation.
3. Arguendo, Senhava is not Entitled to the Orders, that Damages is the
Appropriate Form of Reparation
The appropriate form of reparation is damages to compensate Senhava for
public health expenses reasonably incurred because of failure to conduct
vaccine trials in Senhava, including a percentage of the cost of treating future
victims of the epidemic.
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Senhava respectfully prays that this Honorable Court:
DECLARE that this Court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of
the dispute;
DECLARE that Kuraca violated international law by promulgating law
and regulations to operate extraterritorially;
ORDER that Kuraca promptly remove all direct and indirect Kuracan
legal and governmental obstacles to the conduct of MHVD vaccine trials in
Senhava.
In the alternative, A WARD monetary damages to compensate Senhava for
public health expenses reasonably incurred because of failure to conduct
vaccine trials in Senhava, including a percentage of the cost of treating future
victims of the MHVD epidemic.
Respectfully submitted,
Agents for Senhava
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